In re
Jorge R.
Filed
8/16/12 In re Jorge R. CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re JORGE R., a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JORGE R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D060391
(Super. Ct. No. J220-274)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
County, Andrew Kurz, Temporary Judge (pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, §
21), and Polly H. Shamoon, Judge.
Affirmed.
The juvenile court adjudged 17-year-old Jorge R. a ward
of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on a true
finding that he had received a stolen vehicle.
The court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor and placed Jorge on
probation. Jorge appeals, contending
court's true finding. We find his
argument unavailing and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Andres
Reyna owned a silver, four-door, Honda Civic that he usually parked on the
street in front of the apartment complex where he lived with his companion,
Girelli Ahumada-Conde. Between midnight
and 12:30 a.m. on February 13, 2011, Reyna learned that the car was missing and
contacted the police. Reyna had not
given anyone permission to use or be in his car.
National
City Police Officer Christopher Cameon took a report concerning the stolen
vehicle. While on patrol at around 1:19
a.m., Officer Cameon saw the stolen silver Honda, but could not see the driver. Before he could initiate a traffic stop, the
silver Honda turned and pulled over to the curb. All four doors swung open and five people ran
from the car.
Officer
Cameon pursued Jorge, who was one of the people running from the driver's side
of the silver Honda. Officer Cameon,
however, did not see from which driver's side door Jorge exited. Officer Cameon chased Jorge, shouting at him
to stop. Eventually, other officers
arrested Jorge, but were unable to apprehend the other four occupants of the
silver Honda.
Officer
Cameon picked up Ahumada-Conde at her home to identify the silver Honda, which
she did. At that time, Officer Cameon
noticed a red Honda Accord parked directly in front of Ahumada-Conde's
residence. A records check revealed that
the red Honda was stolen.
Jorge spoke to Officer Cameon after the arrest. Jorge stated that he met his friend, Felipe,
at a party. Felipe left the party with
some girls and arranged for Jorge to get a ride in a red Honda with three of Felipe's
friends, one of whom was named Pitufo.
Via cell phone, Jorge and Felipe agreed to meet at a 7-Eleven. Felipe's friends dropped Jorge off at the
7-Eleven, where he met Felipe and the girls.
About 20 to 30 minutes later, Felipe's friends returned driving a silver
Honda instead of the red Honda. Jorge
talked to them about the silver Honda and learned it was stolen. The group, including Jorge, decided to drive
around town with the girls. Felipe and
the girls were in one car, while Jorge and Felipe's friends followed them in
the silver Honda.
At one point, the car in which Felipe and the girls were
in broke down. Jorge and the others in
the silver Honda worked on the car for a while and got it running again. Jorge got back into the silver Honda, which
continued to drive around town, following the girls and Felipe. A short time later, Pitufo, who was driving
the silver Honda, saw a police car coming up behind them. Pitufo stopped the car and yelled at everyone
to get out and run. They all did so,
including Jorge.
DISCUSSION
To
establish the crime of receiving stolen property, the People must prove (1) the
property was stolen, (2) the defendant knew it was stolen, and (3) the
defendant had possession of it. (
718, 728 (Anthony J.).) Jorge concedes that the car was stolen and
that he was aware of this fact. Jorge
contends the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
receiving a stolen vehicle because there was no evidence that he possessed the
car.
Sufficiency
of the evidence claims are reviewed under the same standard in juvenile and
adult criminal cases. (
1359, 1371.) The critical inquiry is
"
'whether, after reviewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Ibid.,
quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979)
443 U.S. 307, 318-319.) The standard of
appellate review is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on
trier of fact, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Bean (1988) 46
Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
We view the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains reasonable, credible, and solid evidence to support the trier of
fact's finding. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.) If the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact and not retry
the case ourselves. (
1206.)
"Possession" of stolen property may be actual
or constructive and need not be exclusive.
(People v. Land (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 220, 223 (Land).) Physical possession is not required; it is
sufficient "if the defendant acquires a measure of control or dominion
over the stolen property." (
mere presence or access; rather, " '[s]omething
more must be shown to support inferring of these elements. Of course, the necessary additional
circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight. [Citations.]
It is clear, however, that some additional fact is essential.' [Citation.]" (Id.
at p. 225.) Whether a passenger can be
in possession of a stolen vehicle "turns on the unique factual
circumstances of each case." (
sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the passenger "was
in a position to exert control over the vehicle" and thus constructively
possessed the stolen vehicle. (
For
example, in Land, the reviewing court
found substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer
that the defendant constructively possessed the stolen vehicle, even though he
was merely a passenger, noting that the defendant and the driver drank and did
drugs together, were friends, the car was stolen near the defendant's residence
and they drove it within an hour of the theft, the defendant knew the car was
stolen, they used the vehicle for their own benefit and enjoyment, they used
the car in a joint criminal enterprise that evening, and the defendant made no
effort to disassociate himself from his friend or the stolen vehicle although
he had ample opportunity. (
In
contrast, in Anthony J., the
reviewing court concluded there was insufficient evidence that the minor
possessed a stolen vehicle. (
The minor was a passenger in the backseat of a stolen vehicle for about
20 to 30 minutes and was one of four people that ran from the vehicle when a
patrol car drove nearby. (
before, but did not know him well or know that the vehicle was stolen. (Ibid.)
Here, the
juvenile court found that Jorge knew the car was stolen, had a plan with the
others in the car to follow girls in another car, and when the other car broke
down, they stopped and then continued with the enterprise. Accordingly, it impliedly concluded that the
facts of this case were more akin to Land,
than to Anthony J. The evidence, while not overwhelming,
supported this finding.
Although
Jorge was not a close friend of Pitufo, the driver of the silver Honda, or the
other three people in the car, these individuals were friends of Felipe. Moreover, Jorge had plenty of time to get
acquainted with these individuals and presumably felt comfortable with them as
he had two opportunities to leave. He
could have left during the wait at the 7-Eleven or when the other car broke
down, but he chose to stay. Also, after Jorge
called Felipe while riding in the red Honda and agreed to meet him at a 7-Eleven,
Jorge presumably communicated this plan to the three other individuals in the
red Honda because the meeting later occurred.
This suggests Jorge had some measure of control over the three
individuals even though they were not close friends.
These other
individuals then left the 7-Eleven to abandon the red Honda, stole the silver
Honda and then returned to the 7-Eleven in the silver Honda. Knowing that the silver Honda was stolen,
Jorge expressly joined a "plan" to "drive around with the
girls." He participated in this
plan until the other car broke down.
Jorge and the others in the silver Honda worked on the car for a while
and got it running again. Jorge got back
into the silver Honda, which continued to drive around town following the girls
as he and the others had previously planned.
This evidence suggests Jorge was not merely present or had access to the
stolen car, but that he joined in a plan with the driver of the stolen car to
use it for his own benefit and enjoyment.
Unlike
and the other individuals in the silver Honda intended to commit crimes using
the car. (Land, supra, 30
Cal.App.4th at pp. 222-223.)
Nonetheless, the evidence clearly shows that Jorge and the other
individuals in the silver Honda shared a joint purpose of benefiting and
enjoying the stolen car until they saw the police and abandoned it. The evidence here, as in Land, supports an inference of constructive possession and cannot
be deemed insufficient as a matter of law.
(Land, supra, at p. 228.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
McINTYRE,
J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
