P. v. Pedraza
Filed 2/4/13 P. v. Pedraza CA2/4
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN
PEDRAZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
B239967
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA091828)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior
Court for Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge.
Affirmed.
Landra E. Rosenthal, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Jonathan Pedraza appeals
from a judgment sentencing him to prison for a determinate term of three years,
followed by an indeterminate term of 27 years to life, after a jury convicted
him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), and two misdemeanor
counts of hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). He contends the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury on second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter based
upon heat of passion or provocation, and that there was
jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On August 31,
2010, Miguel
Pedraza (defendant’s father) and his live-in partner, Lorna Lualhati, drove in
Lualhati’s car, a beige Toyota, to pick up defendant from a gas
station and take him to the house in which he rented a room. During the drive, defendant told Miguel he
wanted to go to a storage unit that Miguel had rented, in order to pick something
up. Miguel and defendant’s mother had
rented the storage unit to store defendant’s possessions. Miguel told defendant they could not go there
at that time, because the facility had closed for the day, but they made plans
to go on another day.
The storage unit that Miguel rented
was at A-1 Storage in Irwindale. There
are 999 units at the facility; Miguel rented unit 824. To enter or exit the facility, a renter must
enter on a keypad a seven-digit code specific to his or her unit, which opens a
gate. The renter may then drive into the
facility and to his or her unit, which is secured by a padlock. Anytime someone enters or exits the facility,
the time and the unit associated with the code entered on the keypad is
automatically recorded on an activity log in the facility’s computer
system. The facility also has video
cameras that record activity at the front entrance/exit and down each aisle of
units.
The activity log shows that at 3:57 p.m. on September 3,
2010,
someone entered the facility by entering the code for unit 824. The video recording associated with that time
shows Lualhati’s car, driven by Miguel, entering the facility and driving down
the aisle to unit 824; it took about three minutes from the time the gate
opened until the car got to the unit.
Ten minutes after the car entered, the same car pulled up to the gate
and honked.
Haide Sanchez, the manager of the
facility, was working in the office at that time, along with another employee,
Jose Chavez. Sanchez heard the honking
but ignored it, thinking it was a new customer who forgot he had to enter the
code on the keypad to open the gate. She
then saw the car pulling up next to the office door, and saw a man she
subsequently identified as defendant exit the car from the driver’s side; there
was no one else in the car. Defendant
walked up to the door and asked Sanchez to let him out. She asked him how he got in, and told him he
needed to use his code to get out. He
said that he did not know the code, and again asked Sanchez to let him out,
saying he needed to go. He continued to
ask to be let out for a few minutes, then left the office. He got into the car, backed the car up, then
rammed the car into the gate and drove off.
Ryan Moat, who was driving south on
Irwindale Avenue near the facility, saw a car race out of the facility, and had
to swerve to avoid being hit. He
followed the car and called A-1 Storage, thinking that the person driving the
car may have stolen something from the facility. He provided the person who answered the phone
with the car’s license plate number.
In the meantime, Maria Escarcega was
in her truck, stopped at a stop sign when she heard a screeching sound. She looked in her rearview mirror and saw
that a white Chrysler had been hit by a beige Toyota, and the Toyota was
driving in her direction, but in the opposite lane of traffic. The Toyota made a right turn in front of her,
hitting her car, and continued driving down Ramona Boulevard. Escarcega followed the Toyota, which was
being driven by a man she subsequently identified as defendant. As defendant turned left onto Main Street, he
lost control of the car, which came to a stop in front of a senior home. He got out of the car, jumped over the gate
to the senior home, and went up the steps toward the roof.
Escarcega called 911 while she was
following the car, and the police arrived within minutes after defendant got
out of the car. Officer Ruben Guerrero
of the Baldwin Park Police Department was the first officer to respond. He spoke with Escarcega, as well as Lewas
Dellgad. Dellgad was driving the first
car that defendant hit. He had been
exiting a parking lot at 14519 Ramona Boulevard when defendant crashed into the
driver’s side of his white rental car.
He saw that a woman in a truck started to chase the car that hit him,
and he followed it. He did not go fast,
and by the time he arrived at the senior home (which was across from the police
station), Officer Guerrero was already there.
After Officer Guerrero spoke to him, the officer jumped over the fence
to the senior home and searched the area.
He found defendant on the rooftop and arrested him for hit-and-run
driving and vandalism.
In the meantime, Officer Diego Cornejo
of the Irwindale Police Department responded to a call of possible vandalism at
A-1 Storage. When he arrived, Haide
Sanchez gave him the license plate number of the car that had rammed through
the gate about 20 minutes earlier. He
ran the number, and determined the car was registered to Lorna Magsanoc
Lualhati. When the dispatcher told him
that the car was involved in a hit-and-run collision in Baldwin Park, Officer
Cornejo took Sanchez to Baldwin Park for a field identification of the suspect. Sanchez identified defendant as the person
who drove the car through the gate at A-1 Storage.
Within approximately a half an hour
after the police arrived at A-1 Storage, one of the officers asked Jose Chavez
to check to see if there was any damage to any of the storage units at the
facility. Chavez went up and down the
aisles, and saw that the door to unit 824 was open a little bit from the
bottom. He opened it a bit more, and a
body “popped out.†He immediately
returned to the office and told the police officer there.
Jill Licht, a senior criminalist with
the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, was called to the scene at A-1 Storage to
document and collect evidence. When she
got to unit 824, she saw that the door was lifted and the body of the deceased
victim, Miguel Pedraza, was inside the unit.
There were blood stains on the ground, the walls, and some of the items
inside, including a barbell or dumbbell.
Raffi Djabourian, a senior deputy
medical examiner for the Los Angeles County Department of Coroner, conducted an
autopsy on the body of Miguel Pedraza.
He found there were 10 lacerations on Miguel’s head and face, internal
head trauma, and numerous skull fractures that were consistent with being hit
in the head with a dumbbell or other heavy object, as well as wounds on his
right hand and the inside of his left forearm that were consistent with
defensive wounds. He concluded that the
injuries had to have been caused by at least five, and probably six, blows to
the head, and that the cause of death was blunt head trauma.
Defendant was charged by information with
one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with a special allegation that he
personally used a deadly weapon (a dumbbell) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), one count
of vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a)), and two counts of hit-run driving
(Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). The
information also alleged a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision
(b).
The jury found him guilty on all
counts. As to the murder count, the jury
found the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated in the first degree
and that he personally used a deadly weapon in its commission. Defendant waived jury trial on the prior
prison term allegation, and admitted the allegation.
On count 1, the trial court sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life for
190, subd. (a)), plus one year for use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1)) and one year for the prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In addition, the court imposed a determinate
term of three years (the high term) on count 2, the vandalism count,
consecutive to count 1, and six months each for counts 3 and 4, concurrent with
each other and concurrent with count 2.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant raises two issues on
appeal. First, he contends there was
sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion, and therefore
the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
included offense of murder and on the effect of provocation in reducing the
homicide from first degree to second degree murder. Second, he contends there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the jury’s finding that
the murder was in the first degree. We
are not persuaded by either contention.
A.
Instructions
Defendant contends the trial court
erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter based upon heat of passion and on the effect of provocation on the
degree of murder. We disagree.
“Where an intentional and unlawful
killing occurs ‘upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ (§ 192, subd. (a)),
the malice aforethought required for murder is negated, and the offense is
reduced to voluntary manslaughter -- a lesser included offense of murder. [Citation.]
Such heat of passion exists only where ‘the killer’s reason was actually
obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a “provocationâ€
sufficient to cause an “‘ordinary [person] of average disposition . . . to act
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather
than from judgment.Չۉ۪ [Citation.] . . .
[¶] In a related vein, the
‘“existence of provocation which is not ‘adequate’ to reduce the class of the
offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt
that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after,
deliberation and premeditationâ€â€™ -- an inquiry relevant to determining whether
the offense is premeditated murder in the first degree, or unpremeditated murder
in the second degree. [Citations.]†(People
v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306.)
The trial court is required to
instruct the jury on “‘“general principles of law relevant to the issues raised
by the evidence.â€â€™â€ (
704.) This includes a duty to instruct
on lesser included offenses if the evidence warrants it (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366), but only where there
is substantial evidence to support the instruction (People v. Avila, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 705). Here, there was
no evidence of any provocation by Miguel.
Indeed, defendant’s trial counsel admitted as much during discussions
the trial court had with the parties regarding the jury instructions.
During those discussions, the court
asked counsel what evidence there was to show that there was some provocation
such that defendant’s conduct was a reasonable reaction to it. Counsel responded that, given the short
amount of time during which the murder took place, it was obvious that
something happened, and there must have been some reason for it. But she admitted, “We don’t know what the
reason is. That is absent from the
record.†She was correct. Because there was no evidence about what
caused defendant to hit Miguel in the head with a dumbbell, a juror could find
that Miguel provoked defendant’s reaction only through speculation. But “‘speculation is not an appropriate basis
for instructions since it is not evidence.’â€
(People v. Chambers (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 444, 456.) Therefore, the trial
court did not err by omitting instructions on voluntary manslaughter or the
effect of provocation on the degree of murder.
B. There
Was Sufficient Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation
Defendant contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the murder was
premeditated and deliberate. We
disagree.
“In assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a jury’s finding of premeditated and deliberate murder, a
reviewing court considers the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it contains substantial evidence -- that
is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]
When the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, a
reviewing court’s opinion that the circumstances might also be reasonably
reconciled with contrary findings does not warrant reversal of the
judgment.†(People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1068-1069.)
“A verdict of deliberate and
premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to
kill. [Citation.] ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought
over in advance. [Citations.] ‘The process of premeditation and
deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of reflection.
Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly. . . .†[Citations.]’
[Citation.]†(
1080.)
In People
v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, the Supreme Court “identified three types
of evidence -- evidence of planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of
killing -- that assist in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
findings of premeditation and deliberation.â€
(People v. Mendoza,
exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence
that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.†[Citations.]’
[Citation.]†(
In the present case, there was
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant had planned
the murder. Lualhati testified that
Miguel and defendant made plans to go to the storage unit on August 31, 2010,
three days before the murder. She also
testified that the items in the storage unit belonged to defendant. The jury reasonably could infer that
defendant knew that his dumbbell probably was in the storage unit, and asked
Miguel to take him there so he could commit the murder in the unit and out of
the view of witnesses. (See, e.g.,
668, 768 [fact that defendant took victim to location where no witnesses were
likely to observe him suggests planning].)
The manner of killing also supports
the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. The deputy medical examiner testified that
Miguel’s injuries were caused by at least five, and probably six, blows to the
head with a heavy object. A reasonable
jury could conclude that, by hitting Miguel repeatedly
in the most vulnerable part of his body, defendant made a cold, calculated
decision to kill his father. Therefore,
we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
the murder was premeditated and deliberate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
