P. v.
Filed 1/23/13 P. v. Anderson CA2/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NICKOLAS CLYDE
ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
B241055
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. KA095980)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County. Steven D.
Blades, Judge. Affirmed.
Eileen
M. Rice, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William
Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and J. Michael
Lehmann, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Defendant
Nickolas Clyde Anderson appeals from the judgment entered following a jury
trial in which he was convicted of receiving
stolen property. Defendant contends
the prosecutor had no power to charge him with receiving stolen property
because a more specific statute, Penal Code section 484e, subdivision (c),
applied to his conduct. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
About 4:00 a.m. on September 5, 2011, police officers found defendant lying,
partially concealed by shrubbery, against a wall in John Tarankow’s yard in Claremont. The police saw a light on inside David
Douglass’s car, which was parked in the driveway next door, and they found
Douglass’s gasoline credit card and two gloves near the front steps of Tarankow’s
house, about 12 to 15 feet from where defendant was hiding. The credit card had been inside the center
console of Douglass’s car when he last purchased gasoline, three or four days
earlier. Douglass was not sure whether
he locked his car when he left it in the driveway on the evening of September 4, 2011.
Defendant
testified that after he and his fiancée Erika Sanchez had consumed a bottle of
Jagermeister, they left their home in San Bernardino
about 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on September
5, 2011, to shop at Walmart.
After they finished shopping, defendant continued driving and ended up
in Claremont. He got off the freeway because he and Erika
were arguing and he was upset. He parked
the car on a residential street and went for a walk to let his anger cool. He became tired but was still angry, so he
went into some bushes, where he fell asleep.
He was awakened by police shouting at him. He denied entering anyone else’s vehicle and
knew nothing about the gloves and credit card.
The court
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss a vehicular
burglary charge, and the jury convicted defendant of receiving stolen
property. Defendant admitted he had
served three prior prison terms within the scope of Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (b). (Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) The
trial court sentenced defendant to five years in the county jail, consisting of
the two-year mid term for the offense plus one year for each prior prison term
enhancement.
Defendant
filed a timely appeal. We appointed
counsel to represent defendant on appeal.
After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising
no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On September
17, 2012, we advised defendant he had 30 days within which to
personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. To date, we have received no response.
On November 20, 2012, we asked the
parties to file letter briefs addressing the issue of the effect, if any, of
section 484e, subdivision (c), upon the validity of defendant’s conviction
under section 496, subdivision (a), for receiving stolen property.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends
the prosecutor had no power to charge him with receiving stolen property
because a more specific statute, section 484e, subdivision (c), applied to his
conduct. The Attorney General correctly
contends that section 484e, subdivision (c), has no effect upon defendant’s receiving
stolen property conviction because an uncodified section of the 1967 act
repealing and reenacting the credit card crime statutes expressly provides,
“This act shall not be construed to preclude the applicability of any other
provision of the criminal law of this state which presently applies or may in
the future apply to any transaction which violates this act.†(Stats. 1967, ch. 1395, § 8,
p. 3260.) This uncodified section
constitutes a clear declaration of legislative intent precluding application of
the general rule of statutory construction applicable where general and
specific statutes proscribe the same conduct.
(People v. Braz (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.)
Before
requesting additional briefing, we examined the entire record and are satisfied
that defendant’s attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that
no arguable issues exist. (
109–110; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436, 441.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MALLANO,
P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
JOHNSON,
J.
