Ward v. Super. >Ct.>















Filed 2/21/13 Ward v. Super. Ct. CA3











NOT TO BE PUBLISHED







California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.









IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Nevada)








>

CALVIN WARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent.

C070633 (Super. Ct. No. 201000072617)

Calvin
Ward was arrested on a warrant intended for another person after the Sacramento
County Superior Court (Court) mistakenly merged Ward’s personal information
with an individual who has the same first name.
Ward sued the Court (among others), alleging he was wrongfully arrested
because the Court negligently failed to maintain accurate records.

Ward now appeals from the judgment
entered after the trial court sustained the Court’s demurrer to his href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">second
amended complaint without leave to amend. He asserts, among other things, that the
trial court erred in transferring the matter to the Nevada County Superior
Court, and erred in concluding Ward alleged that an error in ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s BILAIN000009 county, rather than court,
records was responsible for his wrongful arrest. Moreover, Ward contends, because “the complaint
could easily be amended to fix this deficiency[,] . . . it was error
for the court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend
. . . .”

We shall affirm the judgment, as
Ward’s contentions lack merit, and he has not shown he can amend to state a
viable cause of action.

BACKGROUND

“Because this matter comes to us on
demurrer, we take the facts from plaintiff’s complaint, the allegations of
which are deemed true for the limited purpose of determining whether plaintiff
has stated a viable cause of action.
[Citation.]” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 54 s
BILAIN000001 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Stevenson v. Superior Court(1997) 16 Cal.4th 880" Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885.)

In or before July 2009, Ward was
arrested on suspicion of bicycling under the influence of alcohol. When Ward went to the Court on July 27 to
fulfill his promise to appear on that charge, he learned no charges arising
from the bicycling arrest had been filed.
An unrelated arrest warrant had
previously issued for a person named Calvin Phillips and, because the Court had
erroneously linked Ward’s “personal identifying information in the Jail
Information Management System (‘JIMS’) with a person named Calvin Phillips who
had a warrant out for his arrest,” Ward was wrongfully arrested and held in
custody for three days. Ward, a
self-employed upholsterer, lost business and business opportunities as a result
of his arrest.

After Ward’s government tort claim
was rejected, he brought this action in the Court. The original complaint alleged Ward’s civil
rights were violated, and stated a negligence cause of action against three
individual officers, the City of Sacramento (City), the County of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Sacramento
(County), and the Court.

Defendants demurred to the original
complaint. Ward responded by filing a
first amended complaint; it contained essentially the same substantive
allegations as the original complaint and named as defendants the City, the
Court, and the officer who arrested defendant on the bicycling charge.

Defendants demurred to the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">first
amended complaint.
Ward dismissed the City and the arresting officer, and opposed the
Court’s demurrer.

While the Court’s demurrer was
pending, the Court’s judicial bench recused itself and the case was ordered
transferred to the Nevada County Superior Court. Judge Dowling of the Nevada County Superior
Court was assigned to the case.

Following a hearing, Judge Dowling
sustained the Court’s demurrer with leave to amend, on the grounds (among
others) Ward had abandoned his civil rights claims; and the negligence claim is
uncertain as to its allegations against the Court.

Ward then filed the second amended
(operative) complaint, in which the Court is the only named defendant. He alleges the Court “conflated his personal
identifying information in the Jail Information Management System (‘JIMS’) with
a person named Calvin Phillips” and “erroneously linked the name ‘Calvin
Philips’ to [Ward’s] personal identification information in JIMS, causing
Ward’s wrongful arrest.” The complaint
purports to state two causes of action.
The first alleges the Court breached its duties under ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 40 s BILAIN000002 l "Government Code sections 69844 and 815.6" Government Code
sections 69844 and 815.6href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] “to keep the records of the Court” by
“mixing up [Ward’s] personal identifiers with those of another person.” The second cause of action alleges the Court
breached its common law “duty to keep accurate records, including not
conflating personal identifiers including names and x-reference numbers of
people whose records are kept in [JIMS].”

The Court demurred to the second
amended complaint. It argued Ward’s
statutory claim must fail because (1) ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844 does
not create a mandatory duty giving rise to a private claim for damages; and (2)
ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s
BILAIN000031 section 69844 creates no duty on the Court’s
part to maintain the County’s JIMS system.
The Court also argued Ward’s general negligence claim fails because the
Court cannot be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of unnamed employees,
and the Court has no duty to detect, investigate, assess, or correct errors of
identity. Finally, the Court argued,
Ward has not alleged why the action is not precluded by general principles of
judicial immunity for damages for wrongful arrests.

Following a hearing, at which the
parties appeared through counsel and argued, the trial court (by Judge Dowling)
sustained the Court’s demurrer without leave to amend. It ruled that ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844
“does not create a mandatory duty” and, even if it did, that duty would not
extend to “to maintain the County system,” i.e., the County’s JIMS system, and
the Court also has no common law duty to maintain the County’s JIMS system.

DISCUSSION

>I.
The Case Was Properly Transferred to >Nevada> >County> Superior Court

Notwithstanding that Ward did not
object to the transfer of the matter to the Nevada County Superior Court, to
the assignment of Judge Dowling, or to the hearing of the demurrers in Nevada
County Superior Court, he contends on appeal the case was “improperly
transferred to Nevada County.”
Ward is mistaken.

The entire Sacramento County
Superior Court bench recused itself from hearing these proceedings while the
Court’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was pending. The California Judicial Council assigned the
case to Nevada County Superior Court Judge Dowling for all purposes. This is consistent with the terms of ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 37 s BILAIN000003 l "Code of Civil Procedure section 170.8" Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.8, which states that “[w]hen there is no judge of a
court qualified to hear an action or proceeding, . . . .
[t]he judge assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council shall hear the
action or proceeding . . . .”

Thereafter, the master calendar
manager of the Sacramento County Superior Court sent the parties a “Notice of
Transfer and Judicial Assignment Pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 29 s BILAIN000004 l "Government Code section 69740" Government Code
section 69740,” which informed them of Judge Dowling’s assignment to the
case and alerted them to the fact that documents should be filed in the Nevada
County Superior Court, and hearings would be held there. This was not error. ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 30 s BILAIN000036 l "Section 69740, subdivision (b)" Section 69740,
subdivision (b), states that, “[i]n appropriate circumstances, upon
agreement of the presiding judges of the courts, and in the discretion of the
court, the location of a session may be outside the
county . . . .”

Thus, Ward has shown no error in the
assignment of the case to Judge Dowling, or of “the transfer” of proceedings in
the matter to Nevada County.

>II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer

On appeal from an order of dismissal
after an order sustaining a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo, i.e.,
we exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause
of action as a matter of law. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 82 s
BILAIN000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629" >Los Altos> El Granada Investors v. City of >Capitola
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 650.)
In reviewing the complaint, we must assume the truth of all facts properly
pleaded by the plaintiff and matters properly judicially noticed. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 76 s
BILAIN000006 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra(2001) 25 Cal.4th 809" Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001)
25 Cal.4th 809, 814.) However,
we “do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact
or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact
which may be judicially noticed.” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 49 s
BILAIN000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Dutra v. Eagleson(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216" Dutra v. Eagleson (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 221.) And when the demurrer has been sustained
without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the
defect can be cured by amendment. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s
BILAIN000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Blank v. Kirwan(1985)
39 Cal.3d 311" Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 59 s BILAIN000009 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Zelig v. County of Los
Angeles(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112"
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)

The trial court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer, because the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against the Court. Ward alleges he was wrongfully arrested as
the result of the Court’s having mixed-up Ward’s personal identifying
information in the County’s JIMS system with that of a person named Calvin
Phillips. The court sustained the
demurrer on the grounds Ward could allege neither a mandatory duty on the
court’s part “to maintain the County system” of identity records, nor a common
law duty to do so. We concur with the
trial court: the Court can have no legal liability for failing to ensure the
accuracy of records maintained by another public entity.

Ward argues on appeal (as he did in
the trial court) that the operative complaint adequately alleged he was injured
by inaccurate court records, as well as county jail records, inasmuch as the
complaint alleged that the Court and its unnamed employees (Does 1-10) failed
“to keep accurate records” and “ensure that Ward’s court records” were not
merged with those of another person. At
best, these few allegations highlight that the complaint is uncertain, as it is
unclear whether Ward attributes his wrongful arrest to erroneous records
maintained by the County or the Court.
That uncertainty justifies sustaining the demurrer. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 42 s BILAIN000010 xpl 1 l "Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subdivision (f)" Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 430.10, subdivision (f).)

>III.
Ward Cannot Amend the Complaint to State a Cause of Action

Ward argues the demurrer should not
have been sustained without leave to amend, because the complaint “could easily
be amended to fix” any mistaken reference to county records that arose from his “understanding that court clerks
directly enter data and create records in JIMS.” To demonstrate that his identifying
information has been erroneously merged with Phillips’s in records maintained
by the Court, Ward attaches as exhibits to his appellate brief two exhibits
that purport to represent the results of records searches made on the online
website of the Court records. The records
search for “Calvin Ward” erroneously lists “Calvin Phillips” as an alias of
Ward’s; the search for “Calvin Phillips” likewise erroneously lists “Calvin
Ward” as an alias of Phillips’s.

When a complaint is defective,
“ ‘ “great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff
to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]” ’ ” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 62 s
BILAIN000011 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962" Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970-971.) Such an abuse of discretion is reviewable on
appeal even absent a request for leave to amend, and even if the plaintiff does
not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 13 s ID
xhfl Rep xpl 1 Id.
at p. 971.)

Because Ward’s complaint involves a
claim against a public entity and/or its employees, it is subject to the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">Government
Claims Act. ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s
BILAIN000038 xpl 1 l "§ 810 et seq."
§ 810 et seq.) A general rule of immunity for public
entities in California is contained in ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 11 s BILAIN000039 l "section 815" section 815, which states that “>[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [¶]
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury
arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or
any other person.” ( ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 5 s
BILAIN000039 xpl 1 § 815, italics added.) Conversely, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by statute . . . , a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission >to the same extent as a private person.” ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 16 s
BILAIN000040 xpl 1 l "§ 820, subd. (a)"
§ 820, subd. (a),
italics added.) Thus, the Government
Claims Act “establishes the basic rules that public entities are immune from
liability except as provided by statute ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 16 s
BILAIN000042 xpl 1 l "§ 815, subd. (a)"
§ 815, subd. (a))
[and] that public employees are liable for their torts except as otherwise
provided by statute . . . .”
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s BILAIN000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Caldwell v.
Montoya(1995) 10 Cal.4th 972"
Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 63 s BILAIN000013 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Lawson v. Superior
Court(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372"
Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372,
1382-1383.)

As relevant here, the Government
Claims Act sets forth two main statutory exceptions to the immunity from
liability that it confers on public entities.
First, ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s
BILAIN000043 l "section 815.2" section 815.2
provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an
act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his
employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given
rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative”
(
ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 18 s BILAIN000044 xpl 1 l "§ 815.2, subd. (a)" § 815.2, subd.
(a), [except “where the employee is immune from liability” ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 18 s
BILAIN000045 xpl 1 l "§ 815.2, subd. (b)"
§ 815.2, subd.
(b))]). This “‘[v]icarious liability
is a primary basis for liability on the part of a public entity, and flows from
the responsibility of such an entity for the acts of its employees under the
principle of respondeat superior.’
[Citation.]” ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 59 s
BILAIN000013 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Lawson
v. Superior Court, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1382.)

Second, ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s BILAIN000046 l "section 815.6" section 815.6 provides that “[w]here a
public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed
to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity
is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to
discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised
reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 7 s BILAIN000046 xpl 1 § 815.6.) This provision “imposes liability on a public
entity if it breaches a mandatory statutory duty that is intended to protect
against the kind of injury the party seeking relief has suffered, and the
breach proximately caused that injury.”
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 67 s BILAIN000014 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Creason v. Department of
Health Services(1998) 18 Cal.4th 623"
Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th
623, 629; ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 65 s
BILAIN000013 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Lawson v. Superior Court,
supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1382-1383.

A. Ward Cannot State a Cause of Action for
Negligence on a Vicarious Liability Theory.

Ward seeks to amend his complaint to
allege, more unambiguously, that the failure of Court employees to maintain
accurate court records of his identity caused his false arrest. We conclude that Ward cannot establish that
the Court may be vicariously liable in negligence.

ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s BILAIN000047 l "Section 821.6" Section 821.6 provides: “A public employee is not liable for injury
caused by his instituting or prosecuting any href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">judicial
or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if
he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” This section immunizes activities relating to
criminal investigations and the accusation of possible suspects so that law
enforcement personnel may perform their duties efficiently and effectively
without harassment and fear of personal liability. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 58 s BILAIN000015 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Cappuccio, Inc. v.
Harmon(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1496"
Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1501
[holding that incorrect post-prosecution statements by investigator are not
actionable].) Courts construe ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s BILAIN000047 section 821.6
immunity broadly, giving it an “ ‘expansive interpretation’ ” in the
service of its purpose. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 52 s
BILAIN000016 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Miller v. Filter(2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 652" Miller
v. Filter (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 652, 668; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 49 s BILAIN000017 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Ingram v.
Flippo(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280"
Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1292.) Accordingly, it extends beyond the actual
target of the proceedings to the claims of others, like plaintiff, who are
injured as a result of the institution or prosecution of a judicial
proceeding. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 70 s BILAIN000018 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Amylou R. v. County of
Riverside(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1205"
Amylou R. v. County of Riverside (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1205,
1211-1214 (
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 9 s BILAIN000018 xpl 2 Amylou
R.).)

Prosecutorial immunity encompasses
the filing of a criminal complaint and extends to activity taken in preparation
of any “ ‘essential step’ ” toward the institution of formal
proceedings. (Amylou R., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1210; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 68 s BILAIN000019 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Blackburn v. County of Los
Angeles(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 175"
Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 175,
177-178
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 49 s BILAIN000018 xhfl Rep xpl 1 .)
The identification of a suspect, during the booking stage and in later
proceedings against him, is an integral part of bringing charges against
him. Identification of a suspect
encompasses the documentation of personal information and the investigation
necessary to confirm or refute the suspect’s identity. Court employees are thus immune from
liability for all alleged acts and omissions in connection with and incidental
to this activity. ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 43 s
BILAIN000018 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Amylou R., supra,
28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, 1214 [officers’ investigations and incidental
acts are protected by ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s BILAIN000047 xpl 2 section 821.6 immunity; crime victim cannot
recover for emotional distress]; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s BILAIN000020 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Javor v.
Taggart(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795"
Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795, 799-800 [ ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s
BILAIN000047 xpl 2 section 821.6 immunity applies to state
enforcement action against the wrong person due to identity theft]; see also ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s BILAIN000021 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Lopez v. City of Oxnard(1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 1" Lopez
v. City of Oxnard (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [the County had no “duty to correct” its records
to reflect that “[Lopez] was not the criminal sought by the warrant” to “assist
the court and the police in identifying the correct suspect”].) Although we sympathize with Ward’s plight, we
conclude that the alleged conduct falls within an area of activity to which the
Legislature, for significant policy reasons, has afforded protection from
liability. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 59 s BILAIN000015 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, supra,
208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1501.)

We conclude, accordingly, that Court
employees are immune from negligence liability for mistakenly identifying Ward
as an alias of Calvin Phillips and Ward’s second cause of action must
fail. In so holding, we also conclude
that amending the complaint as Ward proposes -- to specify that errors in the
Court’s records, not the County’s records led to his wrongful arrest -- would
not allow him to state a cause of action against the Court for vicarious
liability.

B. Ward Cannot State a Cause of Action Based
on Breach of a Mandatory State Duty.

Ward contends the Court breached a
mandatory state duty created by ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844,
which states “[t]he clerk of the superior court shall keep the minutes and
other records of the court, entering at length within the time specified by
law, or forthwith if no time is specified, any order, judgment, and decree of
the court which is required to be entered and showing the date when each entry
is made.” In Ward’s view, ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844 creates a mandatory duty to
keep accurate court records, which duty the Court breached by merging his
identity records with Phillips’s.

To state a cause of action for
failure to discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed
to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury” ( ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 7 s
BILAIN000046 xpl 1 § 815.6), a
plaintiff must allege an enactment that (1) imposes a mandatory rather than a
discretionary duty, and (2) was enacted to protect against the kind of injury
he suffered. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 62 s BILAIN000022 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Thompson v. City of Lake
Elsinore(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 49"
Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 49, 54.)

For the sake of argument, we assume
the first prong of the test may be met because ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844 creates a mandatory, not
discretionary duty, as it obliges the court clerk to prepare a record of the
events of the court’s sessions. (E.g., ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 71 s BILAIN000023 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Copley Press, Inc. v.
Superior Court(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 106"
Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 106,
112, 115; see also ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 75 s BILAIN000024 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Peoples Ditch Co. v.
Foothill Irrigation Dist.(1932) 123
Cal.App. 257" Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Irrigation Dist. (1932)
123 Cal.App. 257, 261 [“The clerk of the court is an assistant whose
principal duty it is to make a correct memorial of the court’s orders and
directions”].)

But Ward has made no attempt to meet
the second prong of the “mandatory duty” test by showing ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844 was designed to protect
against the particular kind of injury Ward suffered. The second prong of the test asks “‘whether
the enactment . . . was intended to impose an obligatory duty to take
specified official action to prevent particular foreseeable injuries’ ” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 79 s
BILAIN000025 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224" Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1239) and a plaintiff must show his injury was
“ ‘one of the consequences . . . the [enacting body] sought to prevent
through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.’ ” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 70 s
BILAIN000026 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist.(1998) 19 Cal.4th 925" Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925,
939, fn. omitted.) Ward contends
“[t]he purpose of requiring the clerk to maintain correct records is to protect
against the kind of injury that [he] suffered”, but he cites no authority for
that proposition. Consequently, the
argument is forfeited. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 44 s
BILAIN000027 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Stanley(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764" People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 59 s BILAIN000028 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Badie v. Bank of
America(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779"
Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785;
see ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 52 s
BILAIN000029 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Jones v. Superior Court(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92" Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99
[“Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported
by argument or citation to authority, [they are] waived”].)

Moreover, our own review of the law
does not support a conclusion ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s BILAIN000031 section 69844 was designed to protect against
wrongful arrests, but only to capture the judge’s rulings for future
reference. (See, e.g., ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 53 s BILAIN000030 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Lauren H. v.
Kannappan(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 834"
Lauren H. v. Kannappan (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 834, 839, fn.
4 [whether “ ‘the minutes of the court’ ” support motion for new
trial involves review of “records of the proceedings entered by the judge or
courtroom clerk, showing what action was taken and the date it was taken”
pursuant to ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 18 s
BILAIN000031 xpl 2 l "Gov. Code, § 69844"
Gov. Code,
§ 69844]; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 50 s BILAIN000032 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Fortenberry v.
Weber(1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 213"
Fortenberry v. Weber (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 213, 219 [“ ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 29 s
BILAIN000031 xpl 2 Government Code section 69844 requires the
clerk of the superior court to keep minutes of the court”; rough longhand
minutes are not the official records or permanent minutes of the court]; ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s BILAIN000033 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "Desherow v.
Rhodes(1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 733"
Desherow v. Rhodes (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 733, 738-739 [ ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s
BILAIN000031 xpl 2 section 69844 “gives us some guidance” as to
what may be included in the “permanent minutes” of the court].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is
affirmed. The parties shall bear their
own costs on appeal. ( ADDIN BA xc <@ru> xl 38 s
BILAIN000034 xpl 1 l "Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278 (a)(5)" Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278 (a)(5).)







BLEASE , Acting
P. J.





We
concur:





HULL , J.





MAURO , J.

---

id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Undesignated statutory references are
to the ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 15 s
BILAIN000035 l "Government
Code" Government Code.