CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Appellant Anthony Brown was convicted, following a jury trial, of four counts of attempted second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 211 and 664,[1] six counts of second degree robbery in violation of section 211, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The jury found true the allegations that appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robberies within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the count 8 robbery within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The jury also found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the assault within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
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Appellant Robert Ouriel appeals the trial court’s restitution order awarding the victim more than $200,000 for the losses suffered as a result of a residential burglary that appellant committed. Appellant asserts that the restitution award ordered by the court was not supported by sufficient evidence in three respects: (1) the evidence presented at the hearing failed to establish the value of the jewelry taken in the charged burglary; (2) the court awarded restitution for a piece of jewelry—an emerald necklace—that was recovered and returned to the victim; and (3) the award of incidental expenses claimed by the victim was not supported by the evidence, and was not limited to expenses incurred as a result of appellant’s criminal conduct. Appellant also argues his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to (1) examine certain evidence relating to the jewelry; (2) object to the incidental expenses and other awards; and (3) properly prepare appellant’s expert witness. As explained below, appellant’s claims lack merit. There is sufficient evidence to support the restitution awarded, and the trial court acted within its discretion awarding restitution for the losses, including expenses that the victim incurred as a result of appellant’s crime. Furthermore, appellant has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s representation during the restitution proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.
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In this case involving indecent exposure defendant asserts error in the trial court’s mid-deliberation instructions to the jury on grounds of claimed inaccuracy and coercive effect, as well as its general handling of jury notes indicating an impasse in deliberations. Defendant also claims the court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted indecent exposure. We find no error and affirm.
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Minor W.V. admitted committing a sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)) against his sister. The juvenile court’s dispositional order required him to submit to polygraph testing as part of his sex offender therapy. W.V. contends that the polygraph condition is overbroad and violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He also contends that the he was not notified of his eligibility for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). We agree on the latter point, and remand the case to the juvenile court so that W.V. may be at least considered for DEJ. |
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J.K. Merz Construction, Inc. (Merz Construction) was the general contractor on a public works project for the City of Antioch (City). Appellant IDEX Global Services, Inc. (IDEX) was the electrical subcontractor on the project. IDEX sued Merz Construction for amounts still due on the job. IDEX also sued the owners of Merz Construction on an alter ego theory, sought recovery against the contractor’s license bond, and asked the court to award statutory prompt payment penalties and attorney fees and costs against all of the defendants. The trial court entered judgment for most of the claimed debt against the contractor and judgment for a lesser amount against the bond surety. IDEX appeals the trial court’s denial of alter ego liability, prompt payment penalties, and attorney fees and costs.[1] We affirm.
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On April 18, 2011, 58-year-old Vance Gattis was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, in violation of Penal Code section 187.[1] As a result of his three prior convictions, his prior state prison term, and serious felony findings, he was sentenced to state prison for a total term of 46 years to life. Defendant claims that his constitutional rights were violated by jury instructions that were contradictory, inaccurate, and prejudicially misleading. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to some jury instructions and that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and remote evidence of his prior domestic violence. We disagree and affirm. |
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Appellant Rico Lavert Fernando was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of seven years eight months, consisting of the six-year upper term on the burglary count and consecutive terms of one year and eight months, respectively, for convictions of transporting marijuana and possession of a controlled substance, which arose in previous cases. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11360, subd. (a), 11350, subd. (a); Solano County Superior Court Nos. VCR184428 & VCR183543.) Appellant contends that (1) the judgment must be reversed because the court did not allow him to present expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification; and (2) fines of $200 each on the subordinate counts should be deemed satisfied based on presentence credits in excess of the term appellant was ordered to serve. We agree with the second contention, which the People concede, but otherwise affirm the judgment. |
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Codefendants Lamar Landry, Deshawn Landry[1] and Eric Greer were convicted by a jury of one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)[2] The jury also found true an allegation that Lamar, Deshawn and Greer personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Anthony Mata, in the course of the assault. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1203, subd. (e)(3).) The three codefendants were among a group of people who assaulted Mata outside a San Jose nightclub early in the morning of June 16, 2010. Mata was knocked to the ground during the fight and kicked at least twice in the head, suffering severe injuries. The melee was witnessed by several people including two bouncers from nearby nightclubs and the manager of one of those same clubs.
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The County of Orange (County) Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) successfully moved to modify William D. Goble’s guideline child support obligations for his now 16-year-old son, obtaining an increase of $18 per month (increasing Goble’s support obligation from $290 to $308 per month). Although he filed nothing in opposition to the modification request, and did not argue the nominal increase in child support was unwarranted, Goble subsequently moved to vacate the modification order and all other orders issued in the action on the grounds the entire Orange County Superior Court bench was disqualified from considering child support proceedings to which the DCSS is a party as intervenor because the judges receive “illegal†supplemental employment benefits paid by the County. Goble also asserted the modification order, which was issued by a court commissioner, was void because he was not advised of his right to object to the commissioner sitting as a temporary judge. Goble appeals from the order denying his motion to vacate. We reject his contentions and affirm the order.
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Marcos B. was adjudged a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on findings he violated Health and Safety Code section 11351 (possession of narcotics for sale), Health and Safety Code section 11350, subd. (a) (possession of narcotics and controlled substances), Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 (possession of cocaine base for sale), and Health and Safety Code section 11378 (possession of controlled substances for sale). The case against Marcos relied heavily on the observations of Santa Ana Police Officer Corey Slayton, who declined to reveal the exact location from which he observed Marcos and two others engaging in what Slayton described as drug sales. After an in camera hearing, the court upheld the prosecutor’s claim that the location was privileged information under Evidence Code section 1040 (all further statutory references are to the Evidence Code) and ruled the location was not material information for purposes of section 1042.
Marcos asks us to review the transcript of the in camera hearing, to ascertain whether the court abused its discretion in determining the location qualified as privileged information under section 1040, and argues that even if the claim of privilege was properly sustained, the court erred by concluding the officer’s location was not material information. We reverse. |
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Mariah Y. (mother) in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from a juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her children, who range in age from one to six years of age.[1] Mother admits there were valid reasons for the juvenile court’s decision and simply asks for a second chance. She does not claim the juvenile court committed any prejudicial error in reaching its decision. On review, we conclude mother’s petition is facially inadequate and will dismiss her petition.
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I.F. (mother) has challenged juvenile court dispositional orders (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361 & 361.5 subd. (b)(6)), among others, pertaining to her nine-year-old daughter, J.[1] After reviewing the appellate record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Mother makes numerous allegations about respondent Fresno County Department of Social Services (the department), the superior court, and those appointed to represent her. She assumes this court may reconsider and thoroughly investigate the facts relating to this case. However, as discussed below, mother misunderstands the role of an appellate court and her responsibility as an appellant. None of mother’s allegations constitute a good cause showing that there is any arguable issue of reversible error. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we will dismiss her appeal. |
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