In re Jason M.
Filed 3/8/13 In re Jason M. CA1/5
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
Juvenile Court Law.
and Respondent,
and Appellant.
A133453
(
Super.
Appellant
Jason M. (Minor) admitted to having raped a young woman in concert with another
by means of force or fear of immediate and
subd. (a).) Based on that
admission, the juvenile court committed Minor to the custody of the Division of
Juvenile Justice of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(DJJ). Minor now challenges the juvenile
court’s dispositional order, arguing the court abused its discretion in
committing him to DJJ. He also claims
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the dispositional
hearing. Minor further contends he
should not be subject to sex offender registration requirements and residency
restrictions when he is discharged or paroled from DJJ. Finally, he argues the record does not
reflect that the juvenile court considered the individual circumstances of his
case in determining his term of confinement.
We
find none of Minor’s contentions persuasive.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Factual and
Procedural Background
Late
in the evening of June 24, 2011, officers from the Cloverdale Police
Department responded to a report that a minor female had been raped by two
males. The victim told the police she
had attended an event with friends earlier that evening and then walked over to
a high school accompanied by Minor and another male. The victim said the three had been sitting on
a bench when Minor and his accomplice pulled off her shorts, held her down, and
took turns performing sexual acts on her.
Minor pushed the victim (who was approximately five feet tall and
weighed less than 100 pounds) down so her back was on a table and held her
down. Minor forcibly pulled the victim’s
legs apart and penetrated her. The
incident lasted approximately 30 minutes, after which Minor told the victim not
to tell anyone about it.
The
incident left the victim with redness and abrasions on her forearm, which she
attributed to having been held down on the table. A subsequent exam showed the victim had
injuries consistent with trauma likely sustained from the assault.
When
the police spoke to Minor, he initially denied any involvement in the
incident. After he was placed under
arrest and waived his Miranda rights,
he continued to deny having been at the high school or knowing the victim. Under further questioning, however, his
account changed dramatically several times, and he eventually admitted to
having had sex with the victim without her permission.
On
June 29, 2011, the
County District Attorney filed an original Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 petition.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] An amended petition was filed on
August 10, 2011, charging Minor with five separate offenses—forcible rape
in concert with another, forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object,
forcible oral copulation, false imprisonment, and aggravated rape in concert by
means of force and fear of immediate and
Penal Code section 264.1, subdivision (a) and a serious felony within the
meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c). Minor admitted the last offense in exchange for
the dismissal of the other counts.
The
juvenile court appointed Dr. Laura Doty to conduct a psychological evaluation
of Minor prior to disposition. Dr. Doty
found Minor to be “an emotionally volatile, angry and controlling boy who seems
inclined to bully others[.]†In his
discussions with her, he minimized his responsibility for the offense and
denied the rape included violence. Dr.
Doty observed that Minor “exhibited no empathy for the victim and no
remorse.†She noted that his
longstanding history of violence raised strong reasons for concern about
community safety. She explained that
Minor’s “pattern of minimizing and denying his behavior and his failure
successfully to alter his pattern of aggressivity despite therapy, medication,
school support and residential treatment are other data that suggest [Minor]
likely cannot yet be managed safely outside of a highly structured
setting.†Dr. Doty therefore opined that
Minor was not a good candidate for ordinary residential treatment and that he
“require[d] a level of containment for the protection of the community that is
provided only [by DJJ].†Like Dr. Doty,
in her dispositional report, the probation officer recommended that Minor be
declared a ward of the juvenile court and be committed to DJJ.
On
September 12, 2011, the juvenile court held the
read the probation officer’s report, Dr. Doty’s psychological evaluation, a
letter submitted on Minor’s behalf by a social worker, and Minor’s own
letter. The court then heard argument
from counsel. It also heard from Minor’s
father and grandmother.
At
the close of the hearing, the juvenile court committed Minor to DJJ for a
maximum term of confinement of nine years.
It also ordered him to pay a $500 restitution fine.
Minor
filed a notice of appeal on September 28, 2011.
Discussion
Minor
raises a number of challenges to the dispositional order. First, he contends the juvenile court abused
its discretion in committing him to DJJ by failing to consider various
factors. Second, he argues his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present
evidence that DJJ commitment would not meet his mental health needs. Third, Minor argues that the registration
requirements and residency restrictions applicable to sex offenders do not
apply to him and that he was entitled to a jury trial on the underlying
charges. Finally, Minor contends the
commitment order must be corrected to show that the court considered the
individual facts and circumstances of his case in determining the term of
confinement. We will address these
arguments in the order raised in Minor’s opening brief.
I. The
Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Committing Minor to DJJ.
Minor contends the juvenile court
abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ, because, he claims, it failed
to consider various required factors before making its commitment
decision. As we explain, Minor’s arguments
are unpersuasive.
A.
Minor’s Educational Needs.
Minor
contends his commitment was an abuse of discretion because the juvenile court
failed to consider his special educational needs at disposition. Relying principally on In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392 (Angela M.) and Education Code section 56000 et seq., Minor
argues the juvenile court’s alleged failure to consider whether he had special
educational needs requires that we reverse the juvenile court and remand with
directions that it conduct a dispositional hearing with that consideration in
mind. We disagree.
Initially,
we note that Minor has failed to demonstrate that this claim was raised in the
juvenile court. We have independently
reviewed the record, and it does not appear that Minor’s counsel objected to
the juvenile court’s ruling on this basis.
We therefore question whether the issue is properly before us. (See In
re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 42.)
Even
if Minor has not forfeited the issue, it is meritless. Education Code section 56000, subdivision (a)
“declares that all individuals with
exceptional needs have a right to participate in free appropriate public
education.†Subdivision (d) of that
section states, [i]t is the . . . intent of the Legislature to ensure
that all individuals with exceptional
needs are provided their rights to appropriate programs and services which
are designed to meet their unique needs under the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C.
Sec. 1400 et seq.).†(Italics
added.) “Individuals with exceptional
needs†means those persons who meet each of the several requirements enumerated
in section 56026, including that such persons be “[i]dentified by an
individualized education program [IEP] team as a child with a disability, as
that phrase is defined in [the specified portion] of the United States Codeâ€
(Ed. Code, § 56026, subd. (a)), and that “[t]heir impairment, as described
by subdivision (a), requires instruction and services which cannot be provided
with modification of the regular school program in order to ensure that the
individual is provided a free appropriate public education pursuant to section
1401(9) of Title 20 of the United States Code.â€
(Ed. Code, § 56026, subd. (b).)
Although
Minor was identified as a special education student, there is nothing in the
record indicating that he has ever been identified by an IEP team as a child
with a disability. (Ed. Code,
§ 56026, subd. (a).) Since he
did not meet that criterion, the juvenile court could properly find Minor was
not an individual with exceptional needs, and indeed, Minor does not challenge
that finding on appeal. In making this
finding, the juvenile court noted it had considered the probation officer’s
dispositional report,
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]
the psychological evaluation, a letter from the Sonoma County Human Services
Department, and Minor’s own letter.
Those materials discuss Minor’s school record and the fact that he was a
special education student. It is
therefore apparent that the juvenile court did
consider Minor’s special education needs before committing him to DJJ.
Angela M., supra, 111
Cal.App.4th 1392, is of no assistance to Minor.
In that case, a court appointed psychologist had reported that the minor
“‘must undergo an IEP’ assessment.†(
M. court did not believe the juvenile court had given this any
consideration because it “did not mention this issue when committing her to the
CYA.†(Id. at p. 1399.) Here,
the juvenile court’s order includes an express finding that Minor did not have
any exceptional needs. Therefore, unlike
the juvenile court in Angela M., in
the case before us, the juvenile court both considered and determined the issue
B. Substantial
Evidence in the Record Supports a Finding of Probable Benefit to Minor from DJJ
Commitment.
Minor
contends his commitment to DJJ is not supported by substantial evidence that it
will be of probable benefit to him. (See
§ 734.) He argues that there was no
substantial evidence that commitment would meet his mental health and special
education needs.
title="">[4] We disagree.
In
determining the appropriate disposition in delinquency proceedings, “the
[juvenile] court shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material
evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the
offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor’s previous delinquent
history.†(§ 725.5.) “[T]here must be evidence in the record
demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a [DJJ] commitment and
the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive
alternatives.†(Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) When the juvenile court commits a minor to
DJJ, “the specific reasons for such commitment need not be stated in the
record.†(In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 59.) We may reverse the commitment order only upon
a showing of abuse of discretion. (
474, 485 (Jonathan T.).)
Minor
contends DJJ commitment is inappropriate because he is a “mentally disturbed
youth†in need of mental health treatment rather than incarceration at DJJ.
demonstrating that DJJ cannot meet his claimed need for
re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 417 [noting that DJJ “has many
rehabilitative programs that can benefit delinquent wardsâ€].) In fact, the record suggests otherwise. Minor’s case plan, for example, specifically
calls for Minor to receive therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder and sex
offender treatment. The juvenile court
noted that DJJ has “an excellent structured sexual rehabilitation program†and
found “it probable that [Minor] will benefit from the reformatory discipline
and other specific treatment provided by [DJJ].†This finding was sufficient, because the
court was not required to find “exactly how [Minor] will benefit from being
committed to DJJ.†(Jonathan T., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) Moreover, “[t]his court cannot assume that
the superior court judge, who presided over the dispositional hearing and heard
appellant’s counsel’s arguments, gave them no consideration or completely
failed to evaluate appellant’s suitability for the [DJJ].†(In re
Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183-184 (Ricky
H.).)
In
addition, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court considered every one
of the factors set out in section 725.5.
It was aware of Minor’s age and took that into account when making its
ruling. It acknowledged Minor was “still
a child†and “still a kid,†and it noted he “was under the age of 18 years oldâ€
when he committed the offense. The
juvenile court thus properly considered Minor’s age. (See Jonathan T.,
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 [record supported conclusion that
juvenile court considered the minor’s age because court referred to him as a
“‘young man’â€].)
The
court also considered the circumstances and gravity of Minor’s offense. Minor admitted to having forcibly raped a
much smaller 15-year-old girl. Even
Minor’s counsel admitted that this was a “terrible case†and that her client
had committed “a very serious crime[.]â€
The juvenile court properly took into account the facts surrounding
Minor’s aggravated rape when it considered the gravity of the offense. (See In
re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.) It was certainly within the juvenile court’s
discretion to conclude that the offense was so serious it required commitment
to DJJ. (Id. at p. 1330.)
Finally,
although Minor had no prior delinquent record in Sonoma County, the court did
consider Minor’s “violent history,†his placement at the Aldea Redwood Group
Home, and his record of suspensions from school for an altercation with a
fellow student, smoking marijuana, and stealing a teacher’s mobile phone. Although Minor emphasizes that prior to the
instant offense, he was not involved in the delinquency system, that did not
preclude the juvenile court from committing him to DJJ. “[T]here is no absolute rule that a [DJJ]
commitment should never be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been
attempted.†(Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 183.) Thus, “it is clear that a commitment to [DJJ]
may be made in the first instance[.]†(
467, 473.) Furthermore, even if this
offense “represented [Minor’s] first step off the path of virtue, it was a
giant one.†(Id. at p. 474, fn. omitted.)
C.
Less Restrictive Placements.
Minor
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by (1) failing to conduct an
individualized assessment of his needs, (2) focusing only on the seriousness of
the offense, and (3) failing to consider less restrictive placement
alternatives. Minor’s first two
contentions fail for the reasons set out in the previous section. That is, the record contains substantial
evidence demonstrating the juvenile court did conduct such an individualized
assessment, and it did not focus solely on the seriousness of the offense but
considered all statutorily required factors.
The
record also does not support Minor’s contention that the juvenile court failed
to consider less restrictive alternative treatments. The dispositional report noted Minor had
received outpatient psychological treatment since late 2008 and that he had
spent a year in the Aldea Redwood Group Home.
Although “his aggressive behavior reduced in frequency†while in
residential treatment, the instant offense followed the conclusion of that
treatment. The juvenile court was thus
well aware of Minor’s experience with less structured treatment
environments. (See Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.)
Furthermore,
at the dispositional hearing, Minor’s counsel expressly proposed less
restrictive alternatives to the juvenile court.
She noted Minor had gotten through a program at the Aldea group home,
and she suggested he be placed “in a therapeutic setting in a
sex-offender-style group home.†Minor’s
counsel also raised the possibility that the court “could impose DJJ by
suspending it, because the case is so serious, where if . . . [Minor]
doesn’t comply . . . then the DJJ would be imposed without
question[.]†Counsel also asked the court
to consider a commitment to DJJ for less than the maximum term of nine
years. In light of this record, we could
not hold that the juvenile court failed to consider less restrictive
alternatives unless we were to assume the court gave the record and counsel’s
arguments no consideration at all. The
California Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that we may not so
assume. (Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 183-184.)
D.
Required by Section 726.
There
is no merit to Minor’s contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by failing to make one of the findings required by section 726,
subdivision (a). As Minor
acknowledges, on the juvenile court’s September 12, 2011 dispositional
findings and order, the court circled the statement, “The welfare of the minor
requires that custody be taken from minor’s parent(s).†This language is virtually identical to that
of section 726, subdivision (a)(3).
Thus, the court did just what appellant states it was required to do:
“make an express finding pursuant to section 726 in the language of the
statute at a minimum in support of its removal order.†The California Supreme Court has held that
the requirement for findings under section 726, subdivision (a) is
satisfied if the juvenile court checks a box reciting the language of the
statute. (In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 620-621.) We therefore reject Minor’s claim.
E. The
Juvenile Court Did Not Fail to Consider the Consequences of Committing Minor to
DJJ.
There
is likewise no merit to Minor’s argument that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in allegedly failing to consider the lifetime consequences of
committing him to DJJ. To begin with,
Minor fails to demonstrate that he raised this issue in the juvenile court, and
thus we conclude it has been forfeited.
(In re Brian K., supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 42.) Even if it
were not forfeited, it is unavailing.
The August 10, 2011 amended petition contains the following
language in boldface type: “NOTICE: is
hereby given that adjudic[ation] as a ward of the court for this offense and a
disposition to the [DJJ] will require you to register pursuant to
Section 290 of the Penal Code.
Registration is mandatory for life.â€
In its oral ruling at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court
referred specifically to the amended petition, to which it also referred in its
written order. Minor’s argument is thus
flatly contradicted by the record.
In
his brief, Minor argues that the consequences of having to register as a sex
offender are extremely serious. As he
concedes, however, he admitted to having violated Penal Code section 264.1,
subdivision (a). In entering this
plea, he acknowledged to the court that he understood the consequences thereof. The amended petition gave notice that
adjudication as a ward for the offense would require Minor to register as a sex
offender. Minor was aware of those
consequences and chose to admit to the offense rather than go to trial. Having accepted the consequences of his
admission, Minor cannot now be heard to complain.
II.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Minor
argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
investigate and to present to the juvenile court evidence that a DJJ commitment
would not benefit his mental health needs.
He claims that his trial counsel should have investigated the
appropriateness of a DJJ commitment given his mental health history and needs
and should have sought mitigating evidence about that history. Minor contends his counsel should have presented
this evidence to the juvenile court and advocated for a placement that provided
appropriate mental health care. We
reject Minor’s claim.
A.
The
Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel extends to minors in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. (Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 857.) To demonstrate he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, Minor “bears the two-pronged burden of showing that his
counsel’s representation fell below prevailing professional norms and that he
was prejudiced by that deficiency.†(
905, 909, citing Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) To satisfy
this burden, “the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient
in that it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] . . . under
prevailing professional norms.’
[Citations.] If counsel’s
performance has been shown to be deficient, the defendant is entitled to relief
only if it can additionally be established that he or she was prejudiced by
counsel’s deficient performance.
[Citations.]†(
387, 406-407.)
Defendant’s
burden is difficult to carry on direct appeal (People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 876), because the trial
record often does not indicate why trial counsel acted or failed to act in the
manner she did. (See
Cal.4th 264, 266-268.) We may reverse a
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if the
record affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose
for her act or omission. (
p. 876.) We presume counsel’s
actions were simply sound trial strategy unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide it, or if there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation for the claimed error.
(In re Angel R., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) If “there
is a reasonable tactical explanation for trial counsel’s action, we
assistance of counsel claim.†(
whether defendant can establish deficient performance by his trial counsel†if
he cannot establish prejudice, “that is, a reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance.†(People
v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 495.)
B. Minor
Has Failed to Show He Was Prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s Alleged Errors.
Minor’s
claim of ineffective assistance fails because he has not demonstrated he was
prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged errors.
The sole basis for his claim of prejudice is the contention that his
trial counsel was aware of his alleged mental illness and special education
needs and thus counsel should have investigated this information so that she
could “present mitigation based thereon at disposition.†He claims his counsel was aware that referral
to a “multidisciplinary team†would have resulted in a recommendation for his
placement “in the least restrictive setting consistent with the protection of
the public and [his] treatment needs.â€
To
begin with, Minor’s trial counsel did indeed argue for a less restrictive
placement based on his abusive childhood, and she raised Minor’s prior
treatment at the Aldea group home, “which deals with kids with mental health
issues.†Counsel also submitted a letter
from a social worker who attested to Minor’s “significant progress in addressing
his mental health issues and developing healthy coping skills.†Furthermore, the dispositional report
informed the juvenile court of the fact that Minor had suffered severe abuse as
a child, had been placed in special education, and had been prescribed
medications for psychological
problems. It specifically identified
“Emotional Mental Health Disabilities†as one of Minor’s problems. Finally, the juvenile court had before it Dr.
Doty’s psychological evaluation report.
juvenile court did receive evidence about his mental health and special
education issues.
Moreover,
Minor “must establish prejudice as a demonstrable reality, not simply
speculation[.]†(In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1016, quotation marks
omitted.) To support his contention that
his counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence, Minor would
have to put forth either declarations or testimony that would establish the
substance of the allegedly omitted evidence and the likelihood it would have
led the juvenile court to a different disposition. (See, e.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334 [ineffective assistance
claim “‘must be supported by declarations or other proffered testimony
establishing both the substance of the omitted evidence and its likelihood for
exonerating the accused’â€].) Here,
however, Minor points to no mitigating evidence beyond that which was already
before the juvenile court. We therefore
conclude he has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating he was
prejudiced. (Ibid.)
III. Minor’s
Claims Regarding Sex Offender Registration and Residency Restrictions Are
Either Forfeited, Unripe, or Foreclosed by Binding Precedent.
Minor
asks this court to enjoin enforcement against him of the sex offender
registration requirement of Penal Code section 290.008 and the residency
restrictions of Penal Code section 3003.5, subdivision (b). He argues the residency restriction does not
apply to juveniles, and he contends both the registration requirement and
residency restrictions must be enjoined because he was entitled to a jury trial
on the underlying charges.
Minor
does not claim he raised these issues in the juvenile court, and he makes no
argument that they are not subject to the ordinary rules of forfeiture. Minor also does not argue that he will
definitely be subject to these conditions.
Rather, he “[a]ssum[es] that the residency restriction . . .
will be applied to him upon his discharge or parole from DJJ[.]†Perhaps as a consequence, the Attorney
General argues in her brief that Minor’s claims are not ripe for consideration,
because the challenged restrictions will not go into effect until Minor is discharged
or paroled from DJJ. (See
539.) Minor does not respond to this
argument in his reply brief, and we may therefore assume he has conceded the
point. (See People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112, fn. 3
[appellant’s failure to reassert claim in reply brief led court to “assume that
he, as are we, was persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument in response . .
.â€].) Since Minor does not demonstrate
that the issues were properly preserved for appeal, and because he does not
appear to disagree with the Attorney General that the issues are not ripe for
consideration, we will not address the arguments further.
Minor
also makes no reply to the Attorney General’s argument that controlling
California Supreme Court precedent precludes us from holding he is entitled to
a jury trial on the underlying charges.
We therefore agree that we are bound by our Supreme Court’s
determination that sex offender registration is not “punishment†(
1185, 1196-1197; In re Alva (2004) 33
Cal.4th 254, 287-292; People v.
Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 792), and similarly, its determination
that the residency restrictions do not impose “punishment†for the offense that
gives rise to the registration requirement, but rather for conduct that occurs
after the commission of, or the conviction for, the registerable offense. (People
v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 343-344; In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1280.) Moreover, if either is “punishment,†the
inquiry becomes whether Minor has a constitutional right to a jury trial. The law at this juncture is that he does not.
III. The
Record Shows the Juvenile Court Exercised its Discretion in Setting the Term of
Confinement.
Finally,
Minor contends the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in setting
his term of confinement based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The basis of this argument appears to be the
fact that the court failed to mark the box on the commitment form next to the
statement, “The court has considered the individual facts and circumstances of
the case in determining the maximum period of confinement.†Minor’s claim is meritless.
After
hearing the arguments of counsel, the juvenile court stated it was imposing the
nine-year term because “the information in the reports indicates that this is
justified and may be required to effectuate a
[Minor].†The juvenile court’s exercise
of its discretion is therefore apparent from the reporter’s transcript of the
disposition hearing. This suffices to
fulfill the court’s duty under section 731, subdivision (c). (See In
re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499 [proper exercise of juvenile
court’s sentencing discretion must be presumed even where record is silent].)
Disposition
The
judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftnref8" title="">[8]
_________________________
Jones,
P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Simons, J.
_________________________
Bruiniers,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
Minor concedes in his reply brief that his challenge to the restitution fine
imposed at disposition is foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision
in People v. Villalobos (2012) 54
Cal.4th 177. He has also abandoned his
claim regarding victim restitution and his argument that the DJJ commitment
order must be amended to reflect his credit for time served. We therefore need not address those issues.
