CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Bello Lee Luna challenges the trial court’s order extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and obtain his personal waiver of that right. We affirm.

Lance Duane Purcell appeals from an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (Department) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)[1] Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of prior SVP commitments to be the focus of the trial, which shifted the burden of proof to him to prove he was no longer an SVP; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Department failed to evaluate appellant pursuant to a valid protocol; and (3) an indeterminate SVP commitment violates due process, equal protection, ex post facto and double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal Constitutions.

Defendants Aircraft Connection Corp., Gustav Cardenas and Cesar Cardenas appeal from a judgment for breach of contract and conversion entered in favor of Airparts Express Corp. (Airparts.) Their primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. However, several of defendants’ claimed facts are unsupported by any citation to the record and we consequently disregard them. Further, as Airparts points out, defendants have not provided us with a fair summary of all the evidence bearing upon the findings they claim are unsupported and thus have failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating the evidence is insufficient.

Defendant Cannibis Garren Nye appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree residential burglary and receipt of stolen property. He contends the admission of a portion of an investigator’s testimony, which recounted a witness’s statements made during the investigation of the charged offenses, denied Nye his right to confront and cross‑examine witnesses in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argues his trial counsel’s failure to object to the investigator’s testimony on that ground constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Nye also contends insufficient evidence supported the burglary conviction because the prosecution failed to present any proof he entered the victim’s apartment.
We affirm. Nye’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Even assuming Nye’s trial counsel’s representation was deficient in his failure to object to the investigator’s testimony regarding a witness’s statements, the challenged testimony was duplicative of other evidence admitted at trial that was adduced from another witness. Thus, its admission did not prejudice Nye. As explained in detail post, we also conclude substantial evidence supported Nye’s burglary conviction.

On May 15, 2012, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] alleging 16-year-old appellant, Ricky G., committed a felony, attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 215). The petition also alleged that appellant’s offense was a serious felony. The prosecutor filed a JV-750 form setting forth a determination that appellant was ineligible for Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ). All of the boxes indicating appellant was eligible for DEJ were otherwise checked. The prosecutor did not attach the JV-751 form giving appellant written notification and a full description of the procedures for DEJ as required by section 791, subdivision (a).
Appellant contends, and respondent concedes, that attempted carjacking is not an enumerated offense in section 707, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 707(b)) and that he was eligible for DEJ. Because appellant was not properly notified of his eligibility for DEJ, the parties also agree that this case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We agree with the parties.

Defendant and appellant Steven Anthony Arias appeals after he pleaded guilty to one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or parent of his child. He was sentenced to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for nine years, as a second-striker, with enhancements. He filed a notice of appeal. We affirm.

On January 31, 2012, an information alleged that defendant and appellant Camila Diaz committed the crime of unlawfully driving, taking, buying and receiving a vehicle that had been obtained by theft under Penal Code section 666.5, while defendant had sustained a previous conviction for unlawfully taking a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and grand theft involving a vehicle under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (3) (count 2).[1] The information also alleged a prior strike offense under Penal Code section 211, within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1) and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). The information further alleged that defendant had served a prior prison commitment within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On May 9, 2012, defendant filed a motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, to dismiss her prior strike under Penal Code section 1385. The court denied the motion.
On June 1, 2012, defendant entered into a plea agreement. She pled guilty to the charge of violating Penal Code section 666.5, subdivision (a) (count 2) and admitted the prior strike allegation. Defendant waived her right to appeal.
On the same day, the court sentenced defendant to prison for four years (the low term of two years, doubled by the prior strike). The court also imposed a restitution fine of $240, a $30 conviction fee, a $40 court security fee, and a $1,200 victim restitution fee. The court awarded presentence custody credit of 144 days. The prosecution’s motion to strike the prior prison commitment allegation was granted.
On June 18, 2012, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. Defendant did not file a request for certificate of probable cause.

Defendant and appellant Santos Gomez Zarco appeals from the revocation of probation stemming from his felony conviction for indecent exposure. (Pen. Code, § 314.)[1] Following an evidentiary hearing, he was found in violation of probation condition No. 20 and sentenced to three years in state prison. He contends that condition No. 20 is constitutionally overbroad and, in any case, there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he willfully violated it.
We conclude that his first contention has been forfeited, and reject the second contention. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

On December 19, 2011, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that defendant and appellant, V.E. (minor), willfully and unlawfully resisted a public officer in the course of duty, in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
On January 10, 2012, the juvenile court found the allegation true. Following a disposition hearing on January 25, 2012, the court adjudged minor a ward of the court, released him to the Department of Public Social Services, and placed him on probation.
Minor filed his notice of appeal on January 25, 2012.

A modification decision.

Tony M. appeals an order summarily denying his Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition in which he requested the court invalidate all previous dependency orders regarding his son, Brandon F., and return the case to the dispositional phase. He contends the court was required to consider section 361.2 and to grant custody to him absent a showing of detriment, the court erred by concluding he is not Brandon's father under Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.), and it erred by denying his petition without a hearing. Because a subsequent order terminating Tony's parental rights is now final, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

This is a dispute between adjacent property owners, Lone Jack Ranch LP (the LP) and Virginia Perkins. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court misinterpreted a 1981 settlement agreement between the parties' predecessors in interest, which pertains to Perkins's access to her property over a private road on the LP's property. We find error and reverse the judgment with directions.

The mother, E.R., appeals from the juvenile court’s June 13, 2012 jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning S.P., the child, who is five years old. The mother argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] The mother denies failing to protect the child and argues the minor was not at risk of serious physical harm as a result of the father’s drug use. The mother also challenges the dispositional order. She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her to attend a parenting class. We affirm the orders under review.

Appellant Rudolph R. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and its dispositional order requiring him to participate in individual counseling, parenting classes and fatherhood education.[1] Finding the court’s orders supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.