CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
|
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court should have redacted the transcripts of a recorded jailhouse conversation between defendant and his brother-in-law; and (2) the trial court should have stayed the Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement. The Attorney General agrees with defendant’s second contention.
We conclude (1) the trial court did not err in admitting unredacted transcripts of the jailhouse conversation, and (2) defendant is correct that one of the enhancements should be stayed. We will stay the Penal Code section 12022.7 enhancement and affirm the judgment as modified. |
|
In exchange for a stipulated sentence of 16 years four months, defendant Jason McKim pleaded no contest to two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 -- counts 1 & 2),[1] one count of vandalism (§ 594 -- count 3) and one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1) -- count 4). He also admitted a deadly weapon enhancement as to the second robbery charge (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), two prior serious felony enhancements (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c), (e)(1), 1192.7) and a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant contends the imposition of a one-year term for the deadly weapon enhancement was unauthorized because it violates the requirements of section 1170.1. We find the court improperly designated count 1 as the principal term. This error requires the abstract of judgment be amended.
|
|
Defendant Devin Michael Merritt and a codefendant were charged with felony assault on a fellow inmate. Defendant was also alleged to have eight prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law.
A jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court found the allegations of all eight prior convictions to be true and denied defendant’s Romero[1] motion to strike seven of those priors. Defendant makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues the trial court’s sentence violates the United States Constitution.[2] Second, he avers the trial court’s “refusal to strike [his] prior qualifying ‘strike’ convictions constituted an abuse of discretion.†Because both arguments lack merit, we affirm. |
|
Plaintiffs Linda Paluda and Terry Peterson are sisters and beneficiaries of a family trust. Their father, Bob Hamblen, was the trustee until it was alleged that he had wasted or transferred substantial trust assets. A stipulated judgment provided for Hamblen to encumber his house in favor of the trust and for the appointment of defendant Carolyn M. Young as successor trustee.
Despite the terms of the stipulated judgment, Hamblin did not assign an interest in the house to the trust. Instead, he took out a mortgage against the house. Young subsequently perfected the trust’s interest in the house, but that interest was subordinate to the mortgage lender’s interest. When the house was sold, the lender was fully repaid and the trust was not. The sisters sued Young for breach of trust in late 2010, alleging that she should have prevented the mortgage lender from taking an interest in the house. Young moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action is time-barred and that she is protected from liability by an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument. The trial court granted summary judgment, agreeing with Young that she is protected from liability by the exculpatory clause. |
|
Defendant and appellant, Jonathan Perez, appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to having a concealed weapon on his person (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(2)).[1] The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Perez on formal probation for three years on the condition, among others, that he serve one year in county jail. We affirm.
|
|
Celina R. is the mother of five children: three boys and two girls. The youngest child is five years old, and the eldest is nine years old. Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to all of the children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] Her sole contention is that the evidence is insufficient to show that the children are adoptable. We affirm.
|
|
This is a juvenile dependency case involving C.F. (mother) and her daughter K.F. After the juvenile court entered orders terminating mother’s reunification services and scheduling a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing regarding K., mother filed a petition pursuant to section 388 requesting that K. be returned to mother’s custody or, in the alternative, that mother be provided six additional months of family reunification services. On October 31, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying mother’s section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights to K. Mother appeals that order. We affirm.
|
|
DeWitt John Clinton, Jr., and David Jason Prekker appeal judgments entered after they pleaded nolo contendere to assault with a semiautomatic firearm. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b).)[1] Chad Ryan Major appeals a judgment entered after he pleaded nolo contendere to attempted murder, possession of heroin for sale, and possession of an assault weapon, and admitted that he personally used a firearm during commission of attempted murder, personally inflicted great bodily injury upon his victim, suffered a prior narcotics conviction, and served a prior prison term. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; §§ 12280, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a); § 667.5, subd. (b).) We conclude that the trial court properly ordered victim restitution, and affirm. (People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1272-1273.)
|
|
Neil Morgon Henderson appeals a judgment following his conviction of escape by force or violence (count 1) and resisting an executive officer (count 2), with findings that he suffered a felony strike conviction and served three prison terms. (Pen. Code, §§ 4532, subd. (b)(2), 69, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).)[1]
At a jury trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that on August 16, 2010, Henderson escaped from a Los Angeles courtroom as he awaited a hearing. A deputy sheriff chased him into the hallway and attempted to restrain him. A scuffle ensued and Henderson pushed the deputy, who fell and injured his head and shoulder. Two police officers then assisted the deputy in restraining and handcuffing Henderson. In a separate proceeding, the prosecutor presented evidence that Henderson suffered a serious felony strike conviction and served four prison terms. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).) |
|
A jury found defendant and appellant Reginald Lamar Rayford guilty of second degree robbery and of attempted second degree robbery. On appeal, he contends that the trial court failed, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted grand theft to attempted second degree robbery. He also contends that the trial court failed to hold a hearing on his “implied†Marsden[1] motion. We disagree with both contentions and affirm the judgment.
|
|
Defendants and appellants John Gidding[1] and John Gidding Designs, Inc. (defendants) appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 (section 473.5) to set aside a default judgment. The trial court denied the section 473.5 motion as, inter alia, untimely because it was filed more than six months after plaintiff and respondent Flutie Entertainment, Inc. (plaintiff) served the notice of entry of the default judgment.
We hold that the trial court’s findings that the notice of entry of default judgment was properly served on defendants and that they had actual knowledge of the entry of the judgment by September 2011 were supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the section 473.5 motion as untimely. We therefore affirm the order denying defendants’ section 473.5 motion to set aside the default judgment. |
|
Gilbert Manuel Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered following his guilty plea to aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14, and more than 10 years younger than him. (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1) & (2)).[1] Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court dismissed five other charges (including two counts of lewd acts upon a child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), and sentenced appellant to state prison for a stipulated sentence of 15 years to life. When he pled, appellant also entered a "Harvey waiver" and agreed that the facts of the dismissed charges could be considered at sentencing. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.) The court also ordered appellant to pay direct victim restitution for noneconomic damages, as well as other forms of restitution, and various fees and fines. Appellant contends that the court lacked authority to order restitution for noneconomic damages, because he was not convicted of section 288.[2] As we shall explain, a sentencing court may order restitution for noneconomic damages when a dismissed count both qualifies for such an award and is accompanied by a Harvey waiver. We affirm.
|
|
Nelson Oliverio Cabrera appeals his conviction by jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).)[1] The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to 12 years state prison. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome and not granting probation. We affirm.
|
|
Mark Fitzpatrick appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of sexual penetration under threat by public official (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (g));[1] sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a)); sexual penetration by foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)); and 3 counts of felony false imprisonment (§ 236). The trial court sentenced him to serve 9 years 4 months in state prison. Appellant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged offenses, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to conduct vital cross-examination of several prosecution witnesses and misunderstood the law concerning two offenses. We affirm.
|
Actions
Category Stats
Listings: 77266
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
