CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Mario Alberto Gaytan appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his probation and ordering the previously suspended 23-year prison sentence to be executed. Defendant argues: 1) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he violated the term of his probation that he violate no law by committing auto burglary because there is no admissible evidence that the door of the car was locked; 2) the court prejudicially erred when it admitted his post-arrest statement because he is a Spanish speaker and did not knowingly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 426 (Miranda); and 3) the court prejudicially erred when it admitted unreliable hearsay regarding the ownership of the vehicle in question and whether the vehicle in which he was riding had itself been stolen. As discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jacqueline Gabriella Angelo appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion under Penal Code section 1203.4[1] to set aside her 1998 guilty plea and dismiss the complaint, after she pled guilty to illegally taking or driving a vehicle in exchange for three years of probation, which was revoked twice. The People conceded based on the plain wording of the statute. However, after briefing was completed on this case, this Court filed a published opinion on the very same issue, People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252 (Johnson). In that case we concluded that, based on the legislative intent behind section 1203.4, a defendant who seeks to set aside a guilty plea based on his or her early “discharge” from probation must establish not the mere early termination of probation, but that the probation was terminated because of defendant’s good conduct. Because defendant has not established that her probation was terminated because of her good conduct, we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying her section 1203.4 motion.

Breanna K. appeals following the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her daughter, Arianna M. Breanna contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding and the dispositional order removing Arianna from her custody. We affirm.

Victoria W. appeals an order terminating her reunification services at the six-month status review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.21, subdivision (e).[1] We dismiss the appeal as moot.

This appeal arises from a dispositional order after Carlos L. (the Minor) admitted having committed an attempted murder for the benefit of a street gang. In his admission of attempted murder, the Minor accepted as a factual basis that he aided and abetted the commission of the offense. The probation officer's report for the dispositional hearing noted witness statements that claimed the Minor was the person with the gun and the one who fired a shot at a rival gang member. The juvenile court considered that information together with other data in the probation officer's report and ordered the Minor be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The Minor appeals contending the court erred in considering the witness statements in the probation officer's report, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to such statements. The Minor has also filed a companion petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re Carlos L., D064067) repeating his allegations that trial counsel was ineffective.
We will find no error by the court or the prosecution in referring to the witness statements which identified the Minor as the person who used the firearm. We will also find the Minor has failed to establish ineffective assistance by trial counsel. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment. We will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus by separate order.
Before we begin the discussion of the issues raised in this appeal, we pause to note what is not at issue. The Minor does not challenge his admission of the offense and the gang enhancement. Nor does the Minor challenge the juvenile court's exercise of discretion in rejecting his request for placement in a residential treatment facility and instead choosing to commit him to DJJ. With those limitations in mind, we will omit a statement of facts of the underlying offense since it is not necessary for the discussion of the issues on appeal.

Kenneth Dale Kirby III pleaded no contest to one count of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) and admitted allegations that he personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court denied probation, awarded two days of actual custody credit, and sentenced Kirby to a six-year prison term consisting of a three-year midterm for the assault, and a consecutive three-year term for the firearm use enhancement. It ordered Kirby to pay various fees and fines. Kirby filed the present appeal. We affirm the judgment and remand with directions to amend the abstract of judgment as described below.

Michael Harris pled guilty to one count of assault by a state prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)[1] and admitted one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. The trial court sentenced Harris to the middle term of four years, doubled to eight years for the prior conviction. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Kyle Robertson MacDougall of attempting to rape an unconscious person, attempting to rape an intoxicated person and assault with intent to rape. The court sentenced MacDougall to three years formal probation, including a term of 365 days in county jail. He appeals, contending the trial court erred when it (1) admitted his out of court statements and (2) excluded certain photographs of the victim. He asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of due process. He also claims the trial court erred when imposing the restitution fines. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

Yvonne T. Quin, trustee of the Joseph Quin Family Trust (Landlord), appeals an order denying, in part, her request for attorney fees as prevailing party under a lease containing an attorney fees provision. Quin, in her capacity as trustee, served as the landlord under the lease. Image 2000 Multimedia, Inc. and El Cajon Grand Cocktail Lounge (together Lessees) were the lessees under the lease.[1] Landlord contends the superior court abused its discretion by failing to engage in a proper lodestar analysis in determining the amount of reasonable fees to award Landlord's previous trial counsel, Slater & Truxaw LLP (Slater).
Landlord, however, minimizes the unique procedural history of this litigation in making her arguments. When this matter first proceeded to trial, Lessees prevailed and were entitled to their attorney fees. The matter involved two issues: whether an option under the lease was exercised and possession of the leased premises. In their motion for attorney fees, Lessees asked for $126,854.87. In opposing Lessees' motion, Landlord characterized Lessees' motion as an example of "the legal profession at its worst" because Lessees' attorneys requested such an "astounding amount." She expressed outrage at the "profiteering, abuse, and sheer audacity set forth in the billings of" Lessees' attorneys and described the subject billings as "shocking and disgusting." In the end, Landlord argued that, at most, the superior court should award attorney fees in the amount of $27,045.15 because "[n]othing more is warranted or supportable" for a case comprising a one-day bench trial.

Yvonne T. Quin, trustee of the Joseph Quin Family Trust (Landlord), appeals an order denying, in part, her request for attorney fees as prevailing party under a lease containing an attorney fees provision. Quin, in her capacity as trustee, served as the landlord under the lease. Image 2000 Multimedia, Inc. and El Cajon Grand Cocktail Lounge (together Lessees) were the lessees under the lease.[1] Landlord contends the superior court abused its discretion by failing to engage in a proper lodestar analysis in determining the amount of reasonable fees to award Landlord's previous trial counsel, Slater & Truxaw LLP (Slater).
Landlord, however, minimizes the unique procedural history of this litigation in making her arguments. When this matter first proceeded to trial, Lessees prevailed and were entitled to their attorney fees. The matter involved two issues: whether an option under the lease was exercised and possession of the leased premises. In their motion for attorney fees, Lessees asked for $126,854.87. In opposing Lessees' motion, Landlord characterized Lessees' motion as an example of "the legal profession at its worst" because Lessees' attorneys requested such an "astounding amount." She expressed outrage at the "profiteering, abuse, and sheer audacity set forth in the billings of" Lessees' attorneys and described the subject billings as "shocking and disgusting." In the end, Landlord argued that, at most, the superior court should award attorney fees in the amount of $27,045.15 because "[n]othing more is warranted or supportable" for a case comprising a one-day bench trial.

Plaintiffs and appellants Jason E. Berkes, Wendy L. Berkes, Jason E. Berkes, Trustee of the Jason E. Berkes and Wendy Lee Berkes 2002 Family Trust and SeaSilver USA, Inc. appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant San Diego Foreclosure Services, Inc. (SDFS) after the court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to plaintiffs' third amended complaint seeking, inter alia, quiet title to certain residential property. Because the matter has become moot, we will reverse the judgment as to SDFS and direct the trial court to dismiss the underlying action against it. (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134.)

Appointed counsel for defendant William Frear has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm the judgment

Defendant Robert Morales has been in prison for 22 years for fatally stabbing one man and critically wounding another following a failed car burglary. The Board of Parole Hearings (Board) denied defendant’s request for parole, explaining its reasoning as follows: “The first consideration which does weigh against suitability today is the commitment offense, and the Panel feels there is an adequate nexus between the commitment offense and your current risk of danger based on the fact that this is a crime that has never been considered by a previous Panel.” The Board then purported to describe additional unsuitability factors revealed by the record, but failed to relate how those factors were in any way probative of defendant’s current dangerousness. The Board then stated that after “weighing all of the evidence presented today, you’re unsuitable [for] parole because you pose a current and unreasonable risk of danger if released and require at least an additional five years of incarceration.”
Defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the Board’s decision. In a 23-page decision, the trial court granted defendant’s petition. The trial court explained that the factors enumerated by the Board were either unsupported by the record or lacked a nexus to current dangerousness.
The People now appeal to this court. We affirm.

Defendant Lucas Eugene Simpson pleaded no contest to attempted first degree robbery and assault with a firearm. He also admitted allegations that he acted in concert with two or more persons and that he was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense. The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to seven years four months in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) he must be resentenced because the attempted robbery in concert did not occur within an inhabited dwelling as required by Penal Code section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A)[1]; and (2) if we conclude his first contention is forfeited, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue on appeal.
We conclude (1) defendant’s first contention is not cognizable on appeal, and (2) as for his second contention, he has not established that his trial counsel was deficient.
We will affirm the judgment.