CA Unpub Decisions

Melisa Jean Hermans filed a petition for modification of limited conservatorship and a petition for termination of general probate conservatorship. The conservators, her parents, Randel D. Hermans and Trudy J. Hermans, and her sister, Jacquita Thomassen, opposed the petitions.[1] After considering the moving papers and hearing testimony, the trial court terminated the probate conservatorship and replaced it with a limited conservatorship. Melisa argues there was insufficient evidence to support a portion of the trial court’s order establishing a limited conservatorship. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

The basic facts of this case are simple: Client is represented by law firm in a civil case. Client, unhappy with the representation received, fires the law firm and hires a new firm. The old law firm sues client for unpaid legal fees. Client and the old law firm execute a settlement agreement. Client then serves on the old law firm the malpractice lawsuit it had filed before the settlement agreement was executed.
The question before us on appeal is whether client’s failure to file the malpractice claim as a compulsory cross-complaint, rather than as a separate lawsuit, requires its dismissal. We conclude, based on the record before it, the trial court correctly sustained the old law firm’s demurrer because the malpractice claim was a compulsory cross‑complaint.
However, on appeal, client asks for leave to amend the complaint to allege the compulsory cross-complaint rule is inapplicable because of the terms of the settlement agreement. Given the liberal rules of granting leave to amend, client should be given an additional opportunity to try to state a cause of action and explain in a pleading why the compulsory cross-complaint rule does not apply as a result of the settlement agreement.
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand with directions to the trial court to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend.

Jerome Eugene Kelly appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of kidnapping to commit a sex offense, sodomy by force, forcible oral copulation, kidnapping, and sodomy by force, and found true movement of the victim and multiple victim enhancements. Kelly argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence, instructing the jury, and sentencing him. We agree Kelly’s sentencing claim has merit. None of his other contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment as modified.

Marina F. (mother) appeals from a 2013 order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] to her 14-year-old daughter, Clara. After reviewing the entire record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
After the time to file a letter brief expired, this court received a photocopy of a letter apparently from mother in which she asks to regain custody of Clara. According to the letter, mother is “doing what [the] judge ordered.” The letter also claims Clara is suffering and needs mother. On review, we conclude the letter does not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.

Samantha N. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional findings on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300[1] petition. Specifically, she alleges the juvenile court’s findings that she made minimal progress in addressing causes that led to her daughter A.N.’s out-of-home placement are inaccurate. Mother also contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that A. faced a substantial risk of harm if she were returned to mother’s care. Lastly, mother argues the juvenile court’s determination has led to infringement of her fundamental right to parent and has compromised her ability to bond with her daughter. We affirm.

Appellant Martin Armando Perez was convicted after jury trial of first degree burglary and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a).)[1] Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the guilty verdict and argues that he is entitled to additional custody credits. Neither contention is persuasive. The judgment will be affirmed.

Defendant Joshua Cody Boykin was charged with the following crimes in a second amended information: count I – possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)[1]); count II – possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code,[2] § 12316, subd. (b)(1) ); and count III – misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a).) Four identical prior convictions were alleged as to each of counts I and II: a July 25, 2007, conviction for violating section 245, subdivision (a)(1); and three June 15, 2010, convictions for violating sections 12021, subdivision (a)(1), 243, subdivision (d), and 245, subdivision (a)(1). The same four convictions were alleged as section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements. The June 15, 2010, conviction for violating section 243, subdivision (d) was also alleged as a prior strike.
Defendant pled guilty to count III. Defendant ostensibly admitted all four prior convictions. A jury convicted defendant on counts I and II. The court sentenced defendant to a total of five years in prison.[3]

Appellant Kevin Alan Bowman was convicted after jury trial of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possessing drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, a misdemeanor). He pled guilty to using a false license plate (Veh. Code, § 4462.5, a misdemeanor) and operating a vehicle with no license plate (Veh. Code, § 5200, an infraction). Other counts and enhancement allegations not relevant to this appeal were dismissed or found not true. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years in prison on the felony count, with concurrent terms on the misdemeanors. The court imposed various fees and fines, including four assessments totaling $125 pursuant to Government Code section 70373.
Appellant contends that testimony establishing the nature of the controlled substance was admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. He also asserts, and respondent concedes, that the assessments imposed pursuant to Government Code section 70373 are impermissible because his crimes were committed prior to the statute’s effective date.
In March 2010, this court issued a partially published opinion rejecting appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim and accepting respondent’s concession pertaining to the challenged assessments. At that time, the most recent decisions by the Supreme Courts of the United States and the State of California addressing the Sixth Amendment issue were Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz) and People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555 (Geier). We modified the judgment to omit the challenged fines and affirmed the judgment as modified.
The California Supreme Court granted review. (See People v. Bowman (2010) formerly published at 182 Cal.App.4th 1616, depub. Jun. 9, 2010, upon grant of review.) On May 22, 2013, it transferred the case back to this court with instructions to reconsider our original opinion in light of People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569 (Lopez), People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608 (Dungo), People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650 (Rutterschmidt) and Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221] (Williams). Having conducted the required reconsideration, we again reject appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim but conclude that the challenged assessments were properly imposed. The judgment will be affirmed.

T.P. (father) seeks writ review of the decision of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] as well as the denial of his petition for modification under section 388 regarding his child K.P. (the minor).
Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his request to set aside the initial jurisdictional and dispositional findings. Next, he contends that the Department of Public Social Services (department) failed to provide reasonable reunification services.
We conclude that neither challenge is well taken, and accordingly we deny the petition.

On April 25, 2001, an information charged defendant and appellant Cecilia Agnes Fraher with three counts of murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a)[1] (counts 1-3), and three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated under section 191.5, subdivision (a) (counts 4-6). The information also alleged a prior Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), conviction within the meaning of section 191.5, subdivision (d) (counts 4-6); however, according to the September 27, 2002, probation officer’s report, on motion of the People, the trial court struck the prior allegation on August 14, 2002.
On August 30, 2002, a jury convicted defendant of all charges. On March 28, 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total indeterminate term of 45 years to life in state prison.
On December 24, 2012, defendant filed a petition to modify her sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. (§ 1170.126.) On January 14, 2013, the trial court denied the motion without appearances; it found that section 1170.126 did not apply to defendant.
On March 1, 2013, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Arroyo is a former employee of Riverside Auto Holdings, Inc. doing business as Singh Chevrolet. On January 5, 2012, Arroyo filed a class action complaint against Riverside under Code of Civil Procedure section 382.[1] The class was defined as “[a]ll current and former hourly, non-exempt automobile mechanic employees employed by Riverside Auto Holdings Inc. in California within the four years prior to the filing of [the] complaint to the present.” The complaint generally alleged that Riverside engaged in a number of wage and hour practices that violated the California Labor Code.
Specifically, seven causes of action were alleged: (1) failure to pay regular and overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to indemnify employees for hand tools and equipment; (4) failure to make payments within the required time; (5) failure to provide itemized wage statements; (6) failure to maintain records; and (7) unfair and unlawful competition.

S.P., a minor, appeals after he was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court for possession of metal knuckles. He contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. He further contends that, even if the adjudication was proper, two of the conditions of his probation are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree that one of the probation conditions should be modified to include a knowledge requirement. Otherwise, however, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Keith Silva, of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and torture (§ 209), both of which were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). In connection with the murder, the jury further found that a principal had used a firearm, discharged a firearm and discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted having suffered a strike prior. He was sentenced to prison for 75 years to life. He appeals, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the jury venire, in denying his motion for a mistrial and in instructing the jury. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment as it applies to them. The parties agree that our holding in People v. Beltran (Aug. 21, 2012, E053541 [nonpub. opn.] (Beltran)) constitutes the law of the case and, based on it, we reverse the gang true findings as to both offenses and the firearm true findings as to the murder. We also direct the trial court to correct errors in the abstract of judgment.
Facts[2]
“On April 4, 2003, defendant and his codefendant, both members and officers of a local chapter of the Vagos motorcycle club, participated, along with seven other members, in the beating of the victim, a club “hang-around,” because the latter owed money to one of the other members and had not returned a truck belonging to yet another. Then, defendant drove the bound victim, along with the codefendant, in his truck out to the desert where the victim was fatally shot.” (Beltran, supra, E053541, pp. 2-3.) Facts relating to the gang findings are described in Beltran. (Id. at pp. 3-6.)

This case arises out of defendant Stuart Alden Greenwood, a chiropractor, committing sexual crimes against his female patients while leading them to believe he was providing them with chiropractic treatment. Defendant appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for two counts of foreign object penetration by means of a fraudulent professional purpose (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d)(4);[1] counts 1 and 5), three counts of sexual battery by means of a fraudulent professional purpose (§ 243.4, subd. (c); counts 2, 3, 4), and three counts of misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); counts 6, 7, 8). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of eight years.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for foreign object penetration by means of a fraudulent professional purpose as to R.S. (count 1) and his conviction for sexual battery by means of a fraudulent professional purpose as to De.L. (count 8). Defendant also contends the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 370 on motive.