N.H. v. Superior Court
Filed 5/21/13 N.H. v. Superior Court CA1/1
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
N.H.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF SOLANO
COUNTY,
Respondent;
SOLANO COUNTY
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,
Real Party in Interest.
A138010
(Solano
County
Super. Ct.
No. J40267)
R.,
a child fathered by appellant N.H. (Father), is one of two siblings who were
the subject of a July 2010 dependency
petition, alleging neglect due to their mother’s drug abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) R.
was found to be a dependent of the court, and her mother’s parental rights were
terminated by order of April 22, 2011. Father’s whereabouts were initially unknown,
but in August 2011, he was located overseas by the
Department (Agency) and granted six months of
court. After a status hearing at which
Father was present and testified, the juvenile court issued a detailed written
order finding the services provided to Father were reasonable, denying him
additional services, concluding R.’s return to Father would be detrimental to
her, and scheduling a permanency planning hearing pursuant to
section 366.26.
On
April 8, 2013, Father filed
a petition for an extraordinary writ
in this court seeking an order directing the juvenile court to vacate its order
and restore reunification services.
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding he
was provided reasonable reunification services and in terminating those
services after six months. The factual
circumstances underlying Father’s claims of error are known to the parties and
are summarized in Father’s “Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for
Writ and Stay of Proceedings.â€
The
law governing the provision of reunification services was summarized in
Cal.App.4th 1415: “Family reunification
services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. [Citations.]
Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the
family. . . . [¶] The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and the
reasonableness of the [Agency’s] efforts are judged according to the
circumstances of each case.’
[Citation.] To support a finding
reasonable services were offered or provided, ‘the record should show that the
supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered
services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable
contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable
efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult
. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘The standard is not whether the services
provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether
the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ †(Id. at
pp. 1425–1426.) We review the juvenile
court’s finding of reasonableness under the
H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1346.)
We
find substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that, under
the unusual and difficult circumstances presented here, the services provided
by the Agency were reasonable. As the
Agency determined, the primary barrier to reunification was the lack of any
personal relationship between R. and Father, a foreign national who resides in
the Republic of Palau,
had never met R. prior to being contacted by the Agency, and lacked a visa
permitting his travel to the United States. Before Father had even requested
reunification services, the Agency arranged for regular visitation by telephone
and, later, Skype. (In re T.G. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 687, 696–697 [“ ‘Visitation is a critical component, probably
the most critical component, of a reunification plan.’ â€].) After the grant of services, the Agency
labored to determine the availability of services in Palau,
finding none. The Agency then sent
Father a “parenting packet†as a form of self-education, directed him to
prepare a scrapbook for R. and send her cards and letters to acquaint her with
life in Palau, located a Palauan government social worker to provide Father
parenting instruction, and directed him to obtain a visa to travel here. This level of services is consistent with
those suggested for a deported parent under section 361.5, subdivisions (e)(1)(A)–(E),
an analogous circumstance in light of Father’s inability to travel to the United
States during the services period.
In
arguing services were inadequate, Father does not suggest any services that
could have been, but were not provided.
Instead, he argues the Agency should have maintained more frequent
contact with him and the social worker to increase the effectiveness of the
services. Father’s own responsiveness to
the Agency, however, was variable, and his cooperation was spotty. He performed almost none of the tasks asked
of him and was less than forthcoming in his communications. While the Agency might have been more
attentive, its conduct was a reasonable response to Father’s limited commitment
to its efforts. (See
323, 330 [reasonableness of services depends in part on a parent’s willingness
to cooperate].)
Father
also contends his services should not have been terminated after six months
because he substantially complied with his case plan. With respect to a ward who is under three
years old at the time of detention, as R. was, the ordinary period for parental
reunification services is six months.
(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In
re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.) A longer period of services can be granted
only if there is a “substantial probability†the child will be returned to the
parent’s custody. (§ 361.5, subd.
(a)(3); see In re Jesse W. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 49, 64 [services can be terminated after six months if parent
unlikely to reunify].) We find
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding of a low
probability of a grant of custody to Father, given his difficulty in forming a
personal relationship with R. and his lack of sensitivity to her individual
circumstances and needs.
We
do not understand Father’s petition to challenge the juvenile court’s finding
that return of the minor to Father would be detrimental to R., but we would, in
any event, find no abuse of discretion in that conclusion, given the importance
of the bond between R. and her sister, Father’s demonstrated lack of
sensitivity for that bond, and the absence of any meaningful personal
relationship between R. and Father.
Father’s
petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Kowis
v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) The decision is final
in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i),
8.490(b)(3).)
_________________________
Margulies,
Acting P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Dondero, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] We
resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of
Judicial Administration, section 8.1(3) (a “memorandum or other abbreviated
form of opinion†is appropriate when an appeal “rais[es] factual issues that
are determined by the substantial evidence ruleâ€).
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
