In re J.L.

 

 

Filed 1/31/14  In
re J.L. CA4/3

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

In re J.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,         Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   J.L.,         Defendant and Appellant.	G048124            (Super. Ct. No. DL043475)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Appeal
from an order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Gregory W. Jones, Judge. 
Affirmed.

                        Robert
Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

                        Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R.
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*                *                *

                        The
juvenile court found J.L. was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] after he admitted allegations charging him
with one count of residential burglary, with a nonaccomplice present during the
burglary.  (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460,
subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)  Though
J.L. was eligible for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) pursuant to section 790
et seq., the juvenile court found J.L.
“unsuitable” for DEJ.  J.L. appeals from the
dispositional order challenging the
finding he was not suitable for DEJ.  We
affirm.

FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                        Around
8:00 p.m. on August 12, 2012, J.L., intending to steal,
entered an apartment in the complex where he lived.  Moments later, the victim returned home and
confronted J.L., who fled, taking nothing.

                        The
victim identified J.L. to the police.  A
few hours later, officers interviewed the minor at his apartment.  The minor admitted the break in, stating he
wanted to “get money.”  He also admitted
previously stealing three bicycles, which he sold in order to buy marijuana.

                        The district attorney determined
J.L. was eligible for DEJ and the juvenile court ordered the probation
department to prepare a DEJ suitability report. 
The report indicated J.L. lived in a stable home with his mother,
stepfather, and younger twin sisters.  J.L.’s
mother reported he behaved well at home, but had been associating with
“negative peers,” who smoked marijuana.  She
reported J.L. began smoking marijuana and ditching school in seventh grade
after a family tragedy:  His uncle murdered J.L.’s two young cousins
and stabbed his aunt 19 times, though she survived.  Since then, the minor had trouble concentrating
in school.

                        The
suitability report further indicated J.L. was then currently enrolled as a
junior at Access Continuation.  He had
previously attended three different high schools, experiencing disciplinary
problems at each.  He attended the first
school as a freshman, but had significant truancy issues.  He transferred to a second high school as a
sophomore, but his continued truancy and marijuana use resulted in his transfer
to a third school.  He did not finish the
school year, however, because he was expelled for ditching and smoking
marijuana.

                        After
J.L.’s burglary arrest, his mother put him in a month-long residential
treatment program for his marijuana use.  Before entering the drug rehabilitation
center, J.L. attended counseling sessions for two months.

                        The
suitability report described J.L. “as a barely mature individual capable of
understanding the inappropriateness of his behavior.”  The report stated “the minor
has shown himself to be a threat to the property of others and should be held
accountable for his actions.  However, in
that this marks the minor’s first referral to juvenile court, it is felt less
restrictive measures should be afforded before href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">formal probation is considered.”

                        The report recommended J.L.
be granted DEJ on “the usual terms and conditions of probation,” together with a
10-part “additional specific program” that included submission to search and
seizure, therapy, 200 hours of community service, legal awareness and substance
abuse education, restitution, drug testing, daily attendance at school with “any
absence [reported] to Probation by 10:00 a.m. the same day,” obeying all school
rules, and a nighttime curfew.  However, the report
cautioned, that J.L.’s “success will not only depend on the minor’s commitment
to completion of his court orders and his compliance with the terms of DEJ, but
also on the parents [sic] ability to
provide the structure and supervision to ensure the minor maintains law abiding
behavior.”

                        At
the DEJ suitability hearing, J.L.’s counsel submitted “on probation’s
recommendation that he be found suitable.”  The juvenile court stated it had read and
reviewed the report, but rejected the DEJ recommendation.  The court explained:  â€œ[T]here are several reasons for my feeling he
is not suitable, his performance in school, behavior in school, substance abuse
issues that are documented in the report, all lead me to believe that he needs
more intensive supervision than that which would be provided on DEJ.  [¶] So accordingly, I am finding him to
be not suitable.”

                        Thereafter,
J.L. admitted the allegations of the section 602 petition, and the juvenile
court declared J.L. a ward of the court and placed him on “formal supervised
probation.”  The
court committed J.L. to a juvenile facility for 20 days, but postponed the
surrender date for four months until July 1, 2013, to allow J.L. to complete 20 days on
the juvenile court work program.  The
court told J.L. that if he completed the 20-day work program, complied with his
probation conditions, and violated no law, then “when you come back here to
turn yourself in on the 20 days, July 1st, I will vacate that commitment and
you wouldn’t have to do it.”

                        The
juvenile court imposed the standard probation conditions, including the
requirement that J.L. had to keep his probation officer informed of his phone
number and address and had to report to his probation officer “as instructed,”
together with the “additional” requirements the probation department had recommended
for J.L. in the DEJ suitability report (e.g., search and seizure, drug testing,
regular school attendance with absences reported to his probation officer,
curfew, etc.).

                        The juvenile court told J.L.,
“I just want you to understand I don’t want to see you do those 20 days in
custody.  But when you come back here [in
four months] that report needs to read in a very positive manner, needs to show
that you went to school every day, that there [are] no positive drug tests,
that you’re obeying all the conditions of probation and you have done the work
program, and then we will vacate that 20-day custody commitment.”

DISCUSSION

                        J.L.
argues the juvenile court abused its discretion to deny him deferred entry of
judgment.  We disagree, for reasons which
we will explain.  

> 

1. 
Deferred Entry of Judgment and
Standard of Review

                        Voters
enacted the DEJ provisions of section 790 et seq. as part of Proposition 21,
The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, in March
2000.  (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 558 (>Martha C.).)  “The sections provide that in lieu of
jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, a minor may admit the allegations
contained in a section 602 petition and waive time for the pronouncement of
judgment.  Entry of judgment is
deferred.  After the successful
completion of a term of probation, on the motion of the prosecution and with a
positive recommendation from the probation department, the court is required to
dismiss the charges.  The arrest upon
which judgment was deferred is deemed never to have occurred, and any records
of the juvenile court proceeding are sealed. 
(§§ 791, subd. (a)(3), 793, subd. (c).)” 
(Ibid.)

                        A minor is eligible for DEJ under section 790 if all of the
following circumstances apply:  “(1) The
minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the
commission of a felony offense.  [¶] (2)
The offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of
Section 707.  [¶] (3) The minor has not
previously been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority.  [¶] (4) The minor’s record does not indicate
that probation has ever been revoked without being completed.  [¶] (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age
at the time of the hearing. [¶] (6) The minor is eligible for probation
pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code.” 
(§ 790, subd. (a)(1)-(6); Martha C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 558-559; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(a)(3).)  Here, the parties agree J.L. is eligible for DEJ.

                        “While
such eligibility is a necessary condition for DEJ, it is not alone a sufficient
basis.”  (Martha C., supra, 108
Cal.App.4th at p. 560.)  The juvenile
court must also find the minor is “suitable” for DEJ in light of the factors
specified in section 791, subdivision (b) and rule 5.800(d)(3) of the
California Rules of Court.  (>In re Sergio R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
597, 607 (Sergio R.).)  These “‘suitability’ factors” include the minor’s age, maturity, educational background, family
relationships, motivation, any treatment history, and any other factors
relevant to the determination of whether the minor is a person who would be
benefited by education, treatment, or rehabilitation.  (Ibid.; § 791, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(d)(3).) 


                        “When the juvenile court denies a request for DEJ where the minor is
statutorily eligible, we review the decision under the abuse of discretion
standard.  [Citation.]”  (In re
Damian M. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Sergio R., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 607.) 

>2.  The Juvenile
Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion.

                        The juvenile court appears to have followed the procedures it was
supposed to follow, and considered the factors it was supposed to consider
regarding J.L.’s suitability
for DEJ.  Furthermore,
the juvenile court’s unsuitability finding is supported by the evidence.

                        The
probation department suitability report showed J.L. had an extensive history of
drug use, truancy, and discipline problems, all of which had resulted in him being
transferred from two high schools and expelled from a third.  Additionally, while the mother
reported these problems began in seventh grade after a family tragedy, and we
appreciate the difficulty the family must have had in dealing with that
unspeakable tragedy, the record demonstrates that J.L.’s parents were not able
to provide the structure and supervision necessary to ensure J.L. would succeed
on DEJ.

                        Under
these circumstances, the juvenile court’s conclusion J.L. “needs more intensive
supervision than that which would be provided on DEJ” supports the unsuitability
finding, and thus the denial of DEJ was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.  (>People v. Lamb (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th
575, 582 [abuse of discretion standard]; In
re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 682-683 [same].)

 

 

> 

>DISPOSITION

                        The
order is affirmed.

 

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    THOMPSON,
J.

 

I CONCUR:

 

 

 

O’LEARY,
P. J.

 

 

 

ARONSON, J.,
Concurring.

 

                        I
concur in the majority’s resolution of this appeal, but utilize a slightly
different analysis.  J.L. bases his
argument on the juvenile court’s imposition of nearly identical probation
conditions to those the probation officer sought when recommending deferred
entry of judgment (DEJ), and the court’s subsequent statement it would vacate a
20-day commitment if J.L. complied with those conditions.  J.L. contends this was inconsistent with a
finding J.L. would not benefit from education, treatment, and
rehabilitation.  Consequently, J.L.
concludes the court abused its discretion in denying DEJ because it
“implicitly” found J.L. would benefit from DEJ. 
(Martha C. v. Superior Court
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 562 [juvenile court erred in denying DEJ because it
implicitly found minor would benefit from education, treatment, and
rehabilitation].)

                        True, the court did not
directly address whether J.L. would benefit from education, treatment, and
rehabilitation.  The court instead based
its denial of DEJ on the finding that J.L. would benefit from the “more
restrictive commitment” of formal probation, and subsequently imposed a 20-day
custody commitment in addition to the probation conditions recommended by the
probation officer.

                        The custody commitment
demonstrates the court’s implicit conclusion J.L. lacked the >motivation to benefit from education,
treatment, and rehabilitation without the threat of confinement.  Motivation is a suitability factor for DEJ
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 791, subdivision (b), and
California Rules of Court, rule 5.800(d)(3).  Although the court could have imposed custody
had J.L. violated the probation conditions imposed under DEJ, I cannot conclude
the court arbitrarily or unreasonably decided J.L. required “more intensive
supervision.”  The court, of course, was
in the best situation to evaluate J.L.’s motivation.  Thus, the court could have concluded the most
effective and perhaps only way to motivate J.L. was to impose a specific
punishment and thereby impress on J.L. the consequences that awaited him if he
did not immediately and earnestly follow the court’s probation directives.  Because motivation is a suitability factor,
the comparative effectiveness of supervision under DEJ and formal, supervised
probation is a matter falling within the sound discretion of the juvenile
court.  J.L. has not shown the court
abused that discretion.

 

 

                                                                       

                                                                        ARONSON,
J.