CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Defendant Earl Stefanson appeals from the judgment convicting him of, among other things, the murder of one ex-girlfriend, the torture of another, and assault with a deadly weapon on a third former girlfriend. The court imposed two consecutive life sentences plus an additional consecutive nine-year, eight-month term. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. Like the trial court, court conclude that the asserted juror misconduct was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants guilt. Accordingly, court shall affirm.
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It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 25, 2010, be modified as follows: On page 5, line 7 of the fourth full paragraph, following ( 1170, subd.(b).), add as footnote 2 the following footnote, which will require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
2 An upper-term sentence imposed pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b), does not run afoul of the constitutional limitations imposed in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270. (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 842-855.) |
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Fields prevailed on a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) as to all of the causes of action in a second amended complaint filed by Yang and was awarded $25,789.50 in fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c). Court affirmed the trial courts order granting the anti-SLAPP motion in a nonpublished opinion. (Yang v. Fields (Feb. 28, 2008, B194124).) In a separate nonpublished opinion, Court reversed the attorney fee award, because a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike may recover fees and costs only on the motion to strike, and the trial court had improperly included in the award fees and costs unrelated to that motion. (Yang v. Fields (May 8, 2008, B196322).) Court then remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the amount and fees and costs to which Fields was entitled under section 425.16, subdivision (c), including fees and costs on appeal. (Ibid.)
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jury convicted Steven McKneialy (defendant) of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). Defendant admitted having suffered two prior convictions (strikes) for serious or violent felonies. ( 667, subds. (b)(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12,
subds. (a)(d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law. Defendant appeals on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion and violated due process when it denied defendants Romero motion. |
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After the trial court denied Nicholas Browns (defendant) motions under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and Penal Code section 1538.5,[1] and found no relevant discovery pursuant to his motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974)
11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), defendant entered a no contest plea to possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant admitted a prior conviction. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years under various terms and conditions, including serving 365 days in jail. Defendant appeals on the ground that the trial court erred by denying discovery of police records. He asserts that review of the records is required. |
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A jury found defendant and appellant Rashad Johnson guilty of four counts of robbery, petty theft, possession of a firearm, and of possession of ammunition. The trial court sentenced defendant to, among others, concurrent sentences on the counts concerning firearms. On appeal, defendant contends that the court should have stayed, under Penal Code section 654, one of those counts. He also contends that the court imposed an improper fine. court remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.
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Plaintiff Harrison-Van Horn, Inc. alleges its insurance broker Charles Hill Agency and agent Ken Gorelick (collectively Charles Hill) breached their contractual and common law duties to procure business interruption insurance. The trial court held release agreements between plaintiff and parties in underlying litigation barred any action for negligence or breach of contract against Charles Hill. Though Charles Hill was not a party to the release agreements, the trial court found language in the agreements purporting to release all other persons or agents was unambiguous and benefitted Charles Hill. The trial court granted Charles Hills motion for summary judgment. Court conclude that whether the parties to the release agreements intended to release Charles Hill is a triable issue of fact. court reverse the judgment. |
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M.J. (mother) appeals from the judgment of April 1, 2009, declaring her daughters, Je. and E., and her sons, Jo. and Jon., dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the sustained allegations of the petition concerning mothers failure to protect Jo. and Jon. or the order removing E., Jo., and Jon. from her custody. court hold substantial evidence supports the findings and order, and affirm the judgment.
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Samuel Joe Frazier appeals from the judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, his no contest plea to selling, transporting, or offering to sell a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), his admission he was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c), and his admission he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subd. (b)-(i).) He was sentenced to prison for a total of nine years, consisting of the low term of three years, doubled to six years by reason of his prior strike conviction, plus three years for the firearm enhancement. As part of the negotiated plea, one count of possession for sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11351) and one count of carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm (Pen. Code, 12031, subd. (a)(1)) were dismissed and appellant agreed to waive 150 days of his actual 242 days of presentence custody credits. He was granted a certificate of probable cause. |
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In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300 et seq.), Victor O. (Father), has appealed from an order that denied his section 388 petition and terminated his parental rights. Father contends he was never given proper notice of certain hearings and therefore his section 388 petition requesting that the trial court vacate orders from hearings dating back to the adjudication and disposition hearing should have been granted. He asserts that (1) the court abused its discretion in not granting his petition and (2) he has suffered prejudicial error because notice provisions in the dependency court statutes and Penal Code were not followed on his behalf.
Court find that although there was a failure to follow certain notice provisions, the error was not prejudicial; moreover, denial of Fathers section 388 petition was not an abuse of discretion. The order denying his section 388 petition and terminating his parental rights will be affirmed. |
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On October 25, 2008, appellant James Hagans, accompanied by two other men, walked up to Ashley Wilson and Destiny Pitts at a bus stop. After talking with the two women for a few minutes, the three men turned around and got in a huddle and began talking among themselves. During the not long conversation, Ms. Pitts heard one of the men say, Do it, and, an instant later, all three men turned back toward Ms. Pitts and Ms. Wilson, at which time Hagans pointed a gun at the two women, and demanded their purses. When Ms. Wilson froze, Ms. Pitts handed both of their purses over to one of Hagans cohorts. The three men then ran down the street. Ms. Pitts knew Hagans as B.G.
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Miriam C., mother of M.C., appeals from the order of the juvenile court that terminated her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) First, mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her reunification services and setting the permanent planning hearing. Because mother was not properly notified of her obligation to petition for extraordinary writ review of this order, Court construe her challenge as a petition for writ of mandate. Second, mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the parental-relationship exception to adoption. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Because the evidence supports the courts rulings, we deny the writ petition and affirm the order terminating mothers parental rights.
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