CA Unpub Decisions

On two separate occasions, defendant A.B. stole a cell phone from a bus passenger and an iPod from a high school student. The juvenile court found that defendant had committed two counts of grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)). The court committed defendant to the custody of the probation department, and approved his placement in Camp Sweeney.

A jury returned a verdict against Chandra Kamhout on her complaint against The Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons) and E. & J. Gallo Winery (Gallo). Kamhout appeals from the judgment, and Vons and Gallo cross-appeal, challenging the superior court's determination that their memorandum of costs was untimely. Court reverse the court's rejection of the memorandum of costs and remand for further proceedings, but Court otherwise affirm the judgment.

In 2006, manufacturers of luxury goods Louis Vuitton Malletier (Louis Vuitton), Christian Dior Couture, S.A. (Dior) (collectively, Louis Vuitton/Dior), and Burberry Limited (Burberry), sued George and Marijeanne Antounian (the Antounians), among others, in federal court, asserting claims for trademark infringement and counterfeiting alleged to have occurred at the Antounians' store in Santee Alley in downtown Los Angeles. Burberry dismissed its claims against the Antounians in March 2007. In April 2007, the federal district court denied the Antounians' motion for summary judgment, and in June 2007 the district court granted Louis Vuitton/Dior's motion to dismiss the Antounians from the litigation, on the condition that the two manufacturers pay the Antounians $75,875 in attorney's fees and costs.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jimmy Burton guilty of the second degree murder of Keith Hardy (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] finding the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).[2] Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life. In his timely appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court's admission of redacted recordings of jailhouse conversations between defendant, codefendant, and two others violated his federal constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (2) the trial court erroneously failed to adequately instruct the jury on the prosecution's burden of proving identity for the purpose of a third party culpability defense, (3) the trial court erroneously and prejudicially failed to instruct the jury that statements by accomplices must be corroborated and viewed with caution, and (4) the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that the prosecution eyewitness Desiree S. had received an offer of leniency. Defendant further contends the cumulative effect of the alleged errors requires reversal.
Cout affirm.

On remand from this court, the trial court confirmed an arbitrator's award of compensatory and punitive damages to Elizabeth Rene Raymond. The court concluded that the arbitrator did not commit legal error in finding Larry Flynt and his company L.F.P., Inc. (the Flynt defendants) liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The Flynt defendants appeal. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate the arbitration award.

Giovanni Taylor appeals a judgment following conviction of making criminal threats (count 1) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2). (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 245, subd. (a)(1).) Court affirm.

On May 19, 2009, Battle was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including receiving stolen property, second degree burglary of a vehicle, grand theft exceeding $400, possession of ammunition, and identity theft.
On July 1, 2009, pursuant to a plea bargain, Battle pleaded no contest to all nine counts. The trial court sentenced Battle to five years in prison and gave him 69 days of total presentence credit; 46 days actual custody and 23 days of conduct credits.

In 1994, Juan Carlos Garcia pleaded no contest to one count of second degree burglary of an automobile. (Pen. Code, § 459.) In 2009, Garcia filed a motion to vacate the no contest plea, a petition for writ of error coram nobis and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. These pleadings sought to set aside the no contest plea entered in 1994 on the grounds the trial court failed to advise Garcia of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (a), and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The trial court denied the motion.

In 1994, Juan Carlos Garcia pleaded no contest to one count of second degree burglary of an automobile. (Pen. Code, § 459.) In 2009, Garcia filed a motion to vacate the no contest plea, a petition for writ of error coram nobis and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. These pleadings sought to set aside the no contest plea entered in 1994 on the grounds the trial court failed to advise Garcia of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (a), and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.[1] The trial court denied the motion.
We conclude the advisement given to Garcia at the time he entered the no contest plea substantially complied with section 1016.5, subdivision (a). We further conclude Garcia's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised in the context of a statutory motion under section 1016.5 or in a petition for writ of error coram nobis and habeas corpus relief is unavailable to Garcia as he is not presently in custody as a result of the burglary conviction.

In 1994, Juan Carlos Garcia pleaded no contest to one count of second degree burglary of an automobile. (Pen. Code, § 459.) In 2009, Garcia filed a motion to vacate the no contest plea, a petition for writ of error coram nobis and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. These pleadings sought to set aside the no contest plea entered in 1994 on the grounds the trial court failed to advise Garcia of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (a), and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.[1] The trial court denied the motion.
We conclude the advisement given to Garcia at the time he entered the no contest plea substantially complied with section 1016.5, subdivision (a). We further conclude Garcia's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised in the context of a statutory motion under section 1016.5 or in a petition for writ of error coram nobis and habeas corpus relief is unavailable to Garcia as he is not presently in custody as a result of the burglary conviction.

Defendant Richard Bojorques appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of first degree murder. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the testimony of witnesses who did not themselves perform the DNA testing and autopsy. Court agree with respect to the sufficiency of evidence and reduce his conviction to second degree murder.

Defendant Iaoshua Meadows appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of evading an officer with willful disregard and three counts of first degree burglary. Defendant contends the trial court erroneously believed that consecutive sentences were mandatory under the â€

Plaintiffs and appellants Howard Entertainment, Inc. and Scott Howard (together Howard) appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Lisa Kudrow and Big Fouche Productions, Inc. (together Kudrow). Howard also appeals from an order denying his motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.[1]
Howard contends that a triable issue of material fact precluded summary judgment, the trial court erred in excluding the conclusions and opinions in his expert's declaration on the ground of lack of proper foundation, and the court erred in denying his request for a continuance of the motion hearing to submit a supplemental expert declaration. Howard also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to section 473. In that motion, Howard requested that he be permitted to file his proposed supplemental expert declaration that was attached to his concurrent motion for new trial, and requested reconsideration of the trial court's ruling on Kudrow's motion for summary judgment.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining Kudrow's objections to the expert's declaration. The trial court, however, abused its discretion by not exercising its discretion in denying Howard's request for a continuance, or it was not clear that the trial court exercised its discretion, which in itself is a basis to remand. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions to exercise its discretion to determine if Howard may have a continuance to file a supplemental expert declaration. Court need not reach the issue of the propriety of the trial court's order denying Howard's motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or the issue concerning due process claims.

A jury found defendant and appellant Hugo Rosales guilty of attempted robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 211,[1] specially finding the robbery was in the second degree and defendant personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant admitted the truth of the recidivist allegations, including a prior serious or violent conviction within the meaning of both the three strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court imposed a ten-year prison term, selecting the middle term of two years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus five years for the section 667 finding and one year for the weapon enhancement.[2] In his timely appeal, defendant contends the trial court failed to obtain an adequate waiver of his Boykin/Tahl[3] constitutional trial rights prior to accepting his admissions of the recidivist allegations and violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments by refusing his request to modify the pattern instruction on evaluation of eyewitness testimony (CALJIC No. 2.92) by eliminating the â€