CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Charles Andrew Satrustegui (appellant) of one count of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422)[1] (count 1) and one count of resisting arrest (§ 69) (count 2). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation for a period of three years. Appellant was required to serve 43 days in county jail.
Appellant appeals on the grounds that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial by: (1) the last-minute amendment of the information before trial; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct sanctioned by the trial court. Appellant also argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment under Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett).

A modification decision.

Kevin Earl West appeals the judgment (order revoking probation) entered following his plea of no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) Court modify the judgment in various respects and affirm the judgment as so modified.

This is the third appeal that has arisen from a jury verdict in favor of defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Professional Building Contractors, Inc. (PBC) on its cross-complaint for bad faith against plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent Essex Insurance Company (Essex). Previously, we affirmed an order conditionally granting Essex's motion for new trial on the issue of punitive damages, in which the trial court ruled it would deny the motion if PBC consented to a remittitur of punitive damages in an amount equal to the compensatory damages award. Thereafter, we affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's rulings on several posttrial motions brought by PBC. This time, PBC appeals from the punitive damages judgment ultimately entered by the trial court on the ground that the court miscalculated the amount of punitive damages by awarding a figure equal to the compensatory damages amount as reduced to account for a third-party settlement.
Court reverse. The one to one ratio between punitive and compensatory damages should have been calculated using the jury's compensatory damages award. The amount of the jury's compensatory damages award was not altered by a setoff for a third-party settlement.

Appellants Andrew Tjia and his wife Sycamore Choi were found liable by a jury for various labor law violations and tortious conduct, including human trafficking and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, they contend no substantial evidence supports the verdict on the tort causes of action, the trial court committed instructional and evidentiary errors, and improperly awarded treble damages. Court affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Donna S. appeals from the dependency court order denying her request to terminate its jurisdiction over her two children, P.S. and H.S. Because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Donna S. still posed a risk of harm to the children. Court affirm the order.

Stephanie C., the mother of four young children, appeals from the juvenile court's March 4, 2010 order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to two of the children, three and one half year old Marina S. and two year old Omar S., Jr., and denying without a hearing her petition pursuant to section 388 to modify a prior court order and to return custody of those two children to her or, in the alternative, to provide her with reunification services and allow unmonitored visitation. Court affirm.

Alma G. appeals from the denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition, in the dependency proceeding concerning her daughter Angela. We affirm, as we explain:
When Angela was born, in November of 2007, Mother was herself a dependent child of the juvenile court. She was not in school, and had been out of contact with DCFS since May of 2006. DCFS deemed her "awol." Then, in January 2008, when Mother was 16 years old, police responded to a domestic violence incident between Mother and her adult boyfriend, Fernando Salazar-Sanchez. DCFS learned of the incident, and also learned of an earlier domestic violence incident between the two. Angela was detained (as was Mother, in a different foster home) and a section 300 petition filed on, inter alia, allegations concerning the incidents of domestic violence. Mother and child visited, and DCFS observed that the two were bonded and that Mother was devoted to her child.
Over the next months, the petition was sustained, with amendments, and reunification services were ordered. Throughout 2008, the dependency progressed successfully. Mother completed parenting classes, began therapy, enrolled in school, received domestic violence counseling through a program at school, and otherwise complied with her case plan. For most of the period, Mother and Angela were placed in the same foster home. DCFS reported that they had a good and loving relationship and a significant bond and reported on the foster mother's observation that Mother was a responsible parent. By December of 2008, DCFS was recommending that Angela be returned to her mother's custody, on the condition that Mother remain in placement, receive family maintenance services, and otherwise cooperate with DCFS.

Paul John Acosta appeals from the judgment following his guilty plea to possession of drugs in a jail facility (Pen. Code, §§ 4573.8)[1], resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), and admission that he suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b) – (i); 1170.12, subds. (a) – (d)) and a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court denied a Romero motion to strike the prior strike conviction (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and sentenced appellant to the low term of sixteen months state prison, doubled to two years eight months based on the prior strike. The trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement and ordered appellant to pay a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $60 court security fee (§ 1465.8), a $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and submit to DNA testing (§ 296, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a request for certificate of probable cause which was denied by the trial court. (§ 1237.5, subd. (a).) The request for certificate of probable cause alleges, among other things, that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

The prosecution presented uncontested evidence that defendant Ronnie Derek Meeks had the motive and opportunity to stab the victim 19 times, while she was alive, before administering the lethal blunt force trauma to her head. The prosecution also introduced compelling DNA evidence she had been murdered in defendant's motel room and he had dumped the body, together with bloody sheets, pillows, and gloves, into a dumpster, as well as evidence he had received a cut on his hand as a result of the victim's defensive moves. A jury convicted him of murder in the first degree, involving the use of torture and the personal use of a knife.
On appeal, defendant, who represented himself at trial, contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to allow his standby counsel to make his closing argument. Standby counsel had prepared the trial for three years and had attended the entire trial. Although we agree with defendant the court abused its discretion by holding him to his election to represent himself without any indication on the record that it considered the factors necessary to justify its refusal to allow standby counsel to give a closing argument, Court do not find the error prejudicial. Court also reject defendant's claims of instructional error and therefore affirm the judgment.

K.P. (appellant), the mother of the minors C.J. (born October 2002) and L.B. (born November 2008), appeals from the juvenile court orders sustaining a dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300; undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) and denying reunification services to appellant (§§ 300, subd. (b); 361.2; 361.5, subd. (b); 395).
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the denial of services, reunification services were in the minors' best interests, and the court abused its discretion in not providing services under section 361.2. Court shall affirm.

This appeal challenges an order of the probate court that removed a trustee and ordered the trustee's legal counsel to refund to the trust a portion of the fees received by counsel. Appellant is not the former trustee, Andrew R. Clark, Jr., but instead is his attorney, Rebecca E. Moore. Respondents Judith Bristol and Laura Morris are the cotrustees who were appointed in place of Clark.
Moore contends the trial court erred by: (1) removing Clark as trustee; (2) ruling that legal fees not authorized by prior court order could not be paid to the trustee's attorney; and (3) requiring the return of legal fees â€

On September 6, 2009, defendant Derrick Lamont Hackett forced his way into a residence with the intent to commit larceny. The victim was home; defendant fled and was later arrested.
Defendant was subsequently charged with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). It was also alleged pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12 that defendant was previously convicted of a serious or violent felony.
Defendant pleaded not guilty and made an oral Marsden motion, which the trial court denied. (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.) The court then granted the prosecution's motion to amend the complaint to allege that the residence was occupied during the burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), and an additional strike enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).
Defendant then pleaded no contest to first degree burglary and admitted a prior strike. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to an aggregate term of eight years in state prison (the middle term of four years doubled for the prior strike) and agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations.

In December 2009 officers spotted a wanted parolee in a car being driven by defendant Joshua Allan Penn.[1] Defendant failed to yield to several pursuing officers. He stopped long enough for the parolee to get out, and the parolee was taken into custody. Defendant sped away onto a freeway and narrowly avoided accidents with other motorists. The chase continued until a highway patrolman used his car to force defendant's car off the road. After the two cars collided, officers pulled defendant from his car and took him to the ground. He resisted them until he was handcuffed. One officer received a minor injury to his wrist.