CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jacory Noel Brown entered a negotiated plea of no contest to pimping a 14-year-old minor (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)) and engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse with her. (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison and imposed other orders. Over defendant's objection that it lacked the authority to impose it, the court imposed a no-contact order prohibiting contact between defendant and the victim. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose a no-contact order. The People concede the error, and we agree.
Because a no-contact order is a form of punishment imposed for the commission of a crime, it must have a statutory basis in order to be valid. As Penal Code section 12 provides: â€

The annual San Diego Pride Parade (hereinafter, the Pride Parade or the parade) is a celebration of the local gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered communities. Four members of the City of San Diego Fire-Rescue Department (the Department) -- John Ghiotto, Chad Allison, Jason Hewitt and Alexander Kane (the Firefighters) -- were given a direct order to participate in the Pride Parade against their will.
After being forced to participate in the Pride Parade, the Firefighters filed a lawsuit against the City of San Diego (hereafter, the City) and the Department,[1] alleging, among other things, that they were subject to unlawful sexual harassment during the parade and that the order requiring them to participate in the parade violated their right to free speech under the California Constitution. The Firefighters prevailed only on their sexual harassment claim, for which they were individually awarded damages ranging from $5,000 to $14,200. The trial court awarded attorney fees to the Firefighters in the amount of $532,980.35 and costs in the amount $61,383.51.
The City appeals from the judgment, challenging the outcome of the sexual harassment claim and the award of attorney fees and costs. The Firefighters appeal from the ruling against them on the cause of action for violation of their right to free speech under the California Constitution, and they also cross-appeal from the order granting attorney fees.
As we will explain, the parties' arguments lack merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment. Court shall remand to the trial court to determine the attorney fees recoverable by the Firefighters on appeal.

Plaintiffs and appellants Dale S. Gribow and Law Offices Dale S. Gribow commenced this action against defendants and appellants Don C. Burns, Glen S. Robinson, and Law Offices of Robinson Burns.[1] Gribow, Burns, and Robinson are attorneys. In the controlling pleading, the third amended complaint (TAC), Gribow alleged, in essence, that Burns and Robinson left Gribow's firm to form a competing law firm and solicited clients away from Gribow and to the new firm, thereby breaching various duties owed to Gribow. Gribow alleged five causes of action in the TAC labeled: (1) fraud and deceit; (2) intentional interference with contractual relationship; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) declaratory relief; and (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Defendants filed a special motion to strike the second, third, and fifth causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,[2] commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court found that all three causes of action were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because they arose, at least partly, from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, i.e., the solicitation of Gribow's clients. The court further found that Gribow did not establish a probability of prevailing on the second and third causes of action because defendants' activity was within the litigation privilege provided by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court therefore granted the motion as to these causes of action. The court denied the motion as to the fifth cause of action, stating that the litigation privilege did not apply to contract claims and its application to this claim did not further the policies underlying the privilege.
Defendants appealed from the denial of their anti-SLAPP motion as to the fifth cause of action, and Gribow appealed from the granting of the motion as to the second and third causes of action. Reviewing the matter de novo, we affirm the trial court's ruling striking the second and third causes of action and reverse the decision as to the fifth cause of action. Although Court do not disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the litigation privilege does not apply to Gribow's fifth cause of action, Court conclude that Gribow has not established a probability of prevailing on the claim.

On September 9, 2009, Sheriff's deputies responded to several calls within a few blocks of each other. One woman said she saw two black adult males knocking on the sliding glass doors at the rear of her home. The men told her they had been shot at and needed a place to hide. When the woman told them she was going to call the police, they left and jumped over the neighbor's fence.

On April 20, 2007, appellant, Richard Portillo, waived his constitutional rights and pled no contest to allegations in case No. VCF181003 (181003B) that he transported methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), count one) and possessed methamphetamine while in possession of a handgun (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a), count two). Appellant also admitted allegations in case No. VCF181823 (181823) that he committed second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)[1] and committed his offense while on bail on another pending criminal action (§ 12021.1).

Steven Phillip Velderrain appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree attempted murder, one count of first degree robbery, and one count of first degree burglary and found true firearm enhancements. Velderrain contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports his first degree robbery and premeditated attempted murder convictions; (2) the court erroneously admitted into evidence a recorded jailhouse telephone call between a witness and an inmate in violation of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, and the court erroneously failed to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 358 on how to evaluate the telephone call; (3) the court erroneously failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on attempted robbery as a lesser included offense of robbery; (4) the court erroneously denied the release of juror information and denied his motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct, without an evidentiary hearing; (5) the prosecutor committed error when she failed to timely disclose her correspondence with a victim/witness concerning early termination of his probation; (6) the court erred in doubling the firearm enhancements under the â€

This case involves a situation in which a minor who is a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 is charged with crimes that makes him eligible for a wardship under section 602 of that code.[1] In that situation, section 241.1 contemplates that certain procedures be followed to ascertain which status, dependency or wardship, is appropriate for the minor. C.S., the minor herein, contends those procedures were not followed in his case, and therefore he was improperly made a ward of the court. He also contends the procedures respecting the deferred entry of judgment program were erroneously ignored. While we do not believe these alleged procedural deficiencies are cause for reversal, Court do agree with minor that some of the conditions of his probation must be modified to comport with due process. Court will modify those conditions accordingly and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

We appointed counsel to represent Florencio Tecomulara Gomez on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Gomez was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, to assist the court in conducting its independent review, counsel set forth the facts and possible issues. Court have reviewed the possible issues cited by counsel and have independently examined the record. Court found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Court affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, to assist the court in conducting its independent review counsel set forth the facts and provided the court with information as to issues that might arguably support an appeal. The only issue suggested by counsel is as to the sufficiency of the evidence Gomez violated probation. We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Marlon Ontiveros Solis appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) - counts 1 & 2) and one count of failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290 - count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding the trial court found that defendant was subject to the one strike provision pursuant to Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d)(1) because he had suffered a prior conviction of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)) in 1995. The trial court also found that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 50 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of six years.
On appeal, defendant raises several issues relating to the admissibility of evidence. He also contends that the trial court improperly withheld disclosure of psychiatric records. Court find no error and affirm.

G.V. (appellant) appeals from an order of the juvenile court filed April 14, 2010, terminating jurisdiction over appellant's son I.V. (minor), giving minor's mother (mother) physical and legal custody of minor, and allowing appellant professionally supervised two-hour visits with minor one time per week. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 302, subd. (d), 362.4.)[1] Appellant argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process when it denied his motion for a continuance of the trial at which appellant planned to challenge the proposed visitation order. Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's requirement that the visits be supervised and that the order was an abuse of discretion because he cannot afford to pay for supervision. Court reject the arguments and affirm.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Andrew D. Johnson of multiple sex crimes and battery upon a separate victim. The conviction in the criminal trial came after pretrial proceedings that included a mental competency determination. (Pen. Code, § 1368.) Defendant, through appointed counsel, raises numerous issues on appeal. Concerning the competency trial, defendant argues that (1) the prosecutor improperly exercised peremptory challenges against African-American prospective jurors on the basis of race; (2) the court erred when instructing the jury on the law of competency; and (3) the jury's verdict finding defendant competent to stand trial is not supported by substantial evidence.
Concerning the trial of criminal charges, defendant argues that the court erred in (1) denying defendant self-representation; (2) denying a defense motion to dismiss the venire after defendant became disorderly and was removed from the courtroom in front of the prospective jurors; (3) failing to order a second competency hearing during trial; (4) failing to hold a hearing on defendant's request for substitute counsel; (5) instructing the jury on sexual penetration with a foreign or unknown object when only a foreign object was alleged in the information; and (6) failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses for rape and forcible sexual penetration. Defendant also asserts that insufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict on rape and forcible sexual penetration of one victim, and battery causing serious bodily injury to a second victim.
We have carefully considered each of these claims, as detailed in the discussion below, and find no merit to defendant's contentions. One contention is a matter of some controversy today, and concerns defendant's claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation. Defendant contends that a jury's finding that he was competent to stand trial obliged the trial court to find him competent to conduct his defense at trial. We conclude that a trial court does not violate the constitution in denying self-representation at trial to a defendant who meets the minimal standard of competency to stand trial but who suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. (Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, , 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2387-88 (Edwards).) court affirm the judgment.

Alejandro G. Ruvalcaba pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted a gang enhancement allegation. The trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison. Ruvalcaba appealed his sentence. After Ruvalcaba's opening brief was filed in this matter, the trial court recalled the sentence, imposed and suspended a new and different prison term, and granted Ruvalcaba probation.
Despite several record references by the court and in the written orders to imposition of a seven-year prison term, Ruvalcaba argues that the court actually imposed a five-year prison sentence, and that if the court imposed a seven-year sentence it applied the wrong gang enhancement term. He also contends that the record must be clarified to reflect that he was awarded conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code section 4019 as amended in 2009, providing for one day of conduct credit for each day of actual custody.
court conclude the court correctly imposed a seven-year prison sentence that included a five-year gang enhancement. We will also order correction of the probation order to reflect appropriate conduct credits.