CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a jury found defendant and appellant Velia Marina Juarez guilty of one count of first degree felony murder. (See Pen. Code, § 187.) We will affirm the judgment.

Alfredo Rodriguez (appellant) was charged with an 11-count amended information. He pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon in counts 7 and 8 (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),[1] to resisting a police officer in count 9 (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), to hit and run in count 10 (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)), and to disobeying a court order in count 11 (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). Following trial on the remaining counts, a jury acquitted appellant of attempted murder in count 2 (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and of shooting at an inhabited dwelling in count 5 (§ 246), but convicted him of discharging a firearm with gross negligence in count 1 (§ 246.3, subd. (a)), of assault with a firearm in counts 3 and 4 (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and of shooting from a motor vehicle in count 6 (§ 12034, subd. (c)). Personal use of a firearm allegations attached to counts 3 and 4 were found true (§ 12022.5). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that appellant had a prior strike (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), that the prior strike was a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had suffered a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to a total determinate term of 22 years 4 months in prison as follows: On count 3, the midterm of three years, doubled by the strike allegation, plus the midterm of four years for the personal use of a firearm allegation, five years for the prior serious felony allegation, and one year, stayed, for the prior prison term allegation; on count 4, one-third the midterm of one year, doubled, plus 16 months for the firearm allegation; on count 1, eight months, doubled; on count 6, the midterm of five years, doubled, plus five years for the prior serious felony and one year for the prior prison term, all stayed; on count 7, eight months, doubled; on count 8, eight months, doubled; and on counts 9 through 11, 150 days with credit for time served.

Defendant Anthony Dewayne Cooper's probation was revoked after he was arrested for being a felon in possession of ammunition. He now claims (1) he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because he was represented at the revocation hearing by an attorney who, in prior revocation proceedings in the same underlying cases, had been relieved from representing Cooper after the court granted Cooper's Marsden[1] motion; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that he possessed ammunition; and (3) a new probation condition imposed by the court regarding persons with whom he must not associate should have included a knowledge requirement. We also consider the applicability of the January 2010 amendments to Penal Code section 4019, an issue we deem raised pursuant to our standing order filed on February 11, 2010.
We agree about the knowledge requirement and order a modification of the probation condition. The judgment is affirmed with this modification.

Defendant and appellant Jonathan Wilson was charged with two counts of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211, counts 1 & 2.) He entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to count 1. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining count. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that at the time of the plea, he was confused as to the evidence against him, and he told different people there could be evidence that could exonerate him. The People filed an opposition. The motion was heard, and the trial court denied it. The trial court then sentenced defendant to three years in state prison and dismissed the remaining count, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. In addition, the trial court ordered him to pay various fines and fees, including a booking fee of $79.86 to the City of Victorville.[1] Defendant did not raise any objections to the fees or fines.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal, challenging the validity of his plea. He filed a request for certificate of probable cause, which the trial court denied. He subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal, indicating he wished to challenge the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea, as well as the validity of his plea. He filed another request for certificate of probable cause, which the trial court also denied. We note an amendment that should be made in the abstract of judgment. Otherwise, we affirm.

Jose Sanchez-Macias entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The plea agreement provided Sanchez-Macias would receive ninety (90) days in custody as a condition of probation and that the remaining charge of the complaint -- possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) -- would be dismissed.
At sentencing on June 1, 2010, imposition of sentence was suspended for three years and Sanchez-Macias was placed on formal probation, which could be converted to summary probation if approved by the Probation Department after 18 months of formal probation, if successfully completed. Sanchez-Macias was given credit for time served of 93 days. The court ordered Sanchez-Macias to pay an $800 fine, which was satisfied by credit for time served, and to pay $200 in restitution and probation revocation fines pursuant to Penal Code sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.44, respectively. The court also ordered payment of a $30 court security fee and a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee. Notice of appeal was filed on June 14, 2010. A certificate of probable cause was granted.

Michele L. London (Michele) appeals from a postjudgment order entered on May 11, 2009, modifying a 2003 judgment that required her former husband, respondent Gary H. London (Gary), to pay her spousal support.[1] Michele and Gary were married almost 25 years and had no minor children at the time of judgment. In the 2009 order modifying the judgment, the trial court reduced spousal support by $1,300 per month, after finding Michele's income had increased by $1,500 per month.
On appeal, Michele claims the court erroneously failed to consider all of the required statutory factors for modification of spousal support, including Gary's ability to pay. (Fam. Code, § 4320; all statutory references are to the Family Code unless noted.) We conclude the court properly considered the relevant section 4320 factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining a material change in circumstances had occurred, justifying a reduction in spousal support.

L. S., the mother of 10-year-old S. W., appeals from an order of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court ordering a permanent plan of legal guardianship, appointing the child's maternal grandmother as guardian, and terminating the dependency.
Mother, appearing in propria persona, filed a seven-page document entitled â€

Minor D. T., age 17, admitted that he came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed robbery in which he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a pellet gun. In exchange, five related counts and an unrelated juvenile wardship petition were dismissed in the interest of justice. The minor was committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (the division).
On appeal, the minor contends the division commitment was an abuse of discretion because: (1) the juvenile court did not give appropriate consideration to less restrictive alternatives to the division; and (2) the evidence does not support the court's conclusion that the division commitment would benefit the minor. We affirm.

Defendant's wife obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) that required defendant to relinquish his firearms to law enforcement officers. As a result of the TRO, defendant's name appeared on a computer database which listed all persons who were prohibited from owning firearms but had firearms registered in their name.
On June 27, 2007, Department of Justice, Bureau of Firearms, Special Agent Lee Careaga found defendant's name on the database which showed that defendant had an AR-15 assault weapon and a SWD MAC 11 assault pistol (MAC 11) registered in his name. Defendant legally registered the weapons in 1990.

Lucy E. and Luis A., the mother and father of minors Sebastian, Alejandro and Victor, appeal from the order terminating their parental rights. Both parents contend the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied their respective Welfare and Institutions Code section[1] 388 petitions without a hearing and committed reversible error in terminating their parental rights when it found the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)( i) exception did not apply. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between two brothers, Carlos Garau (Carlos) and Cristobal Garau (Cristobal),[1] over control of their deceased mother's (the decedent) remains. Caught in the middle of this dispute, Holy Cross Mortuary of Culver City, California, Inc. (Holy Cross) brought a petition pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 7105, subdivision (c),[2] seeking an order determining whether Carlos or Cristobal had the right to control the decedent's remains. The trial court issued an order granting Holy Cross's petition and appointed Cristobal â€

The Helman Group, Ltd. (THG), Beacon Place Investments, LLC (BPI), Barry Helman and Andrew Helman (collectively appellants) appeal from an order of the superior court denying THG's motion to compel arbitration and for stay of this action brought by respondent Gregg Bond. For the reasons we explain below, we dismiss the appeal.

Mother, K.C., appeals from a dependency court order denying her reunification services with her minor child, Jasiah J. Her sole contention on appeal is that the Department of Children and Family services (DCFS) and the dependency court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) by making an insufficient inquiry into whether Jasiah had Blackfeet tribal ancestry. She contends that the matter must be remanded to the dependency court for compliance with the ICWA. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lawrence Reed appeals from the judgments entered after he pled guilty to sale, transportation, or offer to sell a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) in case number BA363782 and admitted a probation violation in case number YA071104, involving a conviction for infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] Defendant was sentenced to state prison in case number BA363782 for a total of four years, to be served concurrently with his previously imposed and suspended four-year sentence in case number YA071104.
Defendant challenges the propriety of the court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) and court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) imposed in case number YA071104. He also challenges the drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a)) imposed in case number BA363782, as well as the requirement that he register as a narcotics offender (id, § 11590, subd. (a)). We modify the judgment in both cases and affirm them as modified.