CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Isaias Camacho Salazar of three counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted) and misdemeanor battery (§ 242). The jury also found true the allegation he committed the offenses against more than one victim. (§§ 667.61, subds. (a)-(e), 1203.066, subd. (a)(7).) Salazar argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights by admitting testimony from the mother of the minor victims describing their disclosure of sexual abuse. For the reasons expressed below, we modify the judgment to correct custody credits, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Samuel Robert Lopez of rape by use of drugs, sexual penetration against someone who was prevented from resisting by intoxication, and two counts of oral copulation against someone prevented from resisting by intoxication. Lopez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the rape and sexual penetration convictions. He also contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment for the two oral copulation counts. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jose Dejesus Gomez appeals after he was convicted by a jury of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).[1] He contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior uncharged conduct. We affirm the judgment.

Father Joseph O. and mother D.M. appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights to Jasmine O. D.M. contends the court erred by not applying the beneficial and sibling relationship exceptions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (v))[1] to termination of parental rights. Joseph contends the court erred by not applying the former exception. D.M. and Joseph join in each other's contentions. We affirm.

Ekaete Daniel Udoh entered a negotiated guilty plea to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a))[1] (count1); driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) (count 2); and driving with a blood alcohol of .08 percent or more and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)) with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) (count 3). The plea bargain provided for a six-year "lid." The court sentenced Udoh to five years in prison: the two-year middle term on count 2 plus three years for the personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement. The court stayed execution of a six-year middle term sentence on count 1, a two-year middle term sentence on count 3 and a three-year term for the enhancement on count 3 (§ 654). Udoh appeals.
Udoh contends the convictions on counts 2 and 3 must be reversed as lesser included offenses of count 1 and his sentence on count 1 cannot exceed four years. The People concede the lesser included offense analysis, but contend the claim is waived as a result of the plea bargain. Udoh additionally argues the case must be remanded for resentencing because the probation officer, the prosecutor and the court erroneously believed that Udoh was presumptively ineligible for probation.
We reject both of Udoh's sentencing contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted Shannon Kelly Shimp of two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code,[1] § 191.5, subd. (a)), and two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subds. (a), (b)). The jury also found true the allegation that Shimp caused bodily injury and death to multiple victims in the commission of all four counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 23558). The court sentenced Shimp to 16 years in prison.
Shimp appeals, contending the court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on excusable homicide, and (2) improperly imposing a $30 court security fee for each conviction. We affirm the judgment.

After defendant Ralph David Holmes pleaded no contest to robbery, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed him on five years' probation with various conditions.
One such probation condition -- reflected in the written order of probation -- was that defendant â€

Defendant Michael Caleb Cavalli pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).)[1] He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term of 10 years on the firearm use enhancement. Finding this contention to be without merit, we shall affirm the judgment.

Larry Etmon Clay appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] during the commission of which he inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The trial court sentenced Clay to five years in state prison. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Bennie Ray Townsel appeals from a permanent injunction issued under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6[1] prohibiting him from harassing plaintiff and respondent Lynn Anderson. Townsel contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that he committed a violent act, a threat of violence, or a course of conduct constituting harassment under section 527.6. We agree, and therefore, we reverse.

Joseph F. Doonan and Elizabeth M. Doonan executed a Family Trust in 1990. Appellant alleges that Elizabeth Doonan, his stepmother, wrongfully withdrew trust assets after Joseph Doonan's death, and converted them to her own use. Appellant claims that respondents assisted in the transfer of assets. He seeks an accounting, delivery of trust assets, and damages for respondents' alleged misconduct. The appeal is taken from the grant of respondents' motion for judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8.) We affirm.

Appellant Jorge Cisneros Garcia appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of forgery (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (b)).[1] He was sentenced to three years in state prison (two-year midterm plus one year for his prior conviction). He contends that his forgery conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud. We disagree and affirm.

Arturo Arita Mendez was convicted by jury of one count of committing an unlawful sex act with a child under age 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); count 1)[1] and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 2 and 3)). The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in state prison, plus 15 years to life. It imposed an indeterminate term of 15 years to life as to count 1, the upper term of 8 years as to count 2, and one-third the midterm of 2 years as to count 3.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the victim's statements, that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Appellant Guadalupe Garcia appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of possession of cocaine for sale (count 1) and possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (count 2). The jury found true criminal street gang allegations as to both counts and a firearm allegation as to count 1. The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for 13 years as a result of these convictions.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the firearm enhancement on count 1, the conviction for possession of cocaine for sale with a firearm on count 2, and the gang enhancements on counts 1 and 2. He further contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of possession of cocaine for sale while armed with a firearm in count 2. Finally, appellant claims that the court made errors in sentencing by selecting the upper term for the firearm and gang enhancements on counts 1 and 2 without submitting the determination to the jury, by failing to provide a statement of reasons for the upper term sentences on the enhancements, and by miscalculating his presentence conduct credits.
We affirm with directions to the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.