CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings with respect to plaintiff Thomas M. Coleman's complaint that Wells Fargo acted negligently and breached its fiduciary and contractual duties by purchasing three securities for one of Coleman's Investment Management Accounts (IMAs). The lower court held that Wells Fargo could not establish either the existence of an arbitration provision in the IMA or an arbitration provision incorporated by reference. Court affirm.

Raymond Donald Chester appeals from an order denying his petition for conditional release to a more appropriate treatment facility under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 6608.[1] He contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that his petition was frivolous and dismissed it. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2009, appellant was committed as an sexually violent predator (SVP). (§ 6604.) One year later, he petitioned the court for conditional release under section 6608. He sought transfer to "an appropriate community treatment program," on the ground that the state facility in which he was committed could not provide appropriate treatment.

A jury found defendant and appellant Nader Eshaghian guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and he was sentenced to a total term of 12 years, having rejected a pretrial offer of three years. Eshaghian now contends that had his attorney properly advised him on the law of assault namely, that he could be found guilty of assault even though he did not touch the victim he would have accepted the offer. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Eshaghian's trial counsel was competent, and Court affirm the judgment.

Business and Professions Code section 6129 (§ 6129) provides that â€

Manuel Sandoval appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction on two counts of second degree murder with special findings that he personally used a firearm in committing both offenses (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). On appeal, appellant contends that the 25 years to life firearm enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) must be stricken. He argues that the firearm enhancement was not properly pleaded giving appellant adequate notice of a charge of a personal gun discharge enhancement under Penal code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Appellant claims that only a principal gun-discharge enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) was pleaded. Appellant contends that because the jury found not true the gang enhancement under subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), the personal gun discharge enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) must be stricken. As Court shall explain, appellant received adequate notice of a personal firearm use enhancement, and accordingly affirm.

Appellant Martin Trevino was convicted of one count of assault with a firearm and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, along with gang enhancements for each count and an enhancement for â€

Following a jury trial, the court extended appellant Joshua Colombini's commitment to the Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asks this court to conduct a review of the record and disposition of the case in accordance with the procedures outlined in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 and People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304. Court do so, and dismiss the appeal.

Appellant was convicted by jury of a felony violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a), stalking, and of a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1), battery. Imposition of sentence was suspended, with a probation term of three years, conditioned on service of a term of four months in county jail. He received presentence credit of 85 days for time served (43 days of actual custody credit and 42 days of conduct credits). He appeals.
Assigned counsel has submitted a Wende[1] brief, certifying that counsel has been unable to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also has submitted a declaration confirming that appellant has been advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court's attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.)
Court find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Stephanie Decker-Carlson appeals from the order denying her motion to set aside the parties' marital settlement agreement and the judgment incorporating that agreement. She argues that the settlement agreement and judgment should have been set aside based on mistake (Fam. Code, § 2122, subd. (e)),[1] because she learned after the parties settled the matter that respondent Eric Carlson's employee stock options, which were awarded solely to him, were more valuable than he had previously disclosed. Finding no abuse of discretion, Court disagree and affirm.

Appellant Toby James Coleman appeals from a sentence imposed by the trial court following a partial reversal and remand from this court (People v. Coleman (May 27, 2009, A121842 [nonpub. opn.] (Coleman I)). He contends the trial court abused its discretion in not reducing the amount of county jail time imposed at resentencing in light of this court's reversal of his conviction on one of two counts. Court discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the court's judgment.

This is an unfortunate exercise in frustration and futility.
Appellant was placed on felony probation, pursuant to a plea agreement, for a drug possession offense. It was alleged that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. At a contested probation revocation hearing, the court found that he had violated his probation by failing to submit to drug testing. The court, however, sustained an objection to the only evidence that appellant had actually been ordered to test. As appellant contends, and as the People concede, there was consequently no evidence to support a determination that appellant had failed to do anything required by his probation terms.
Court reverse.

Stephanie Decker-Carlson appeals from the order denying her motion to set aside the parties' marital settlement agreement and the judgment incorporating that agreement. She argues that the settlement agreement and judgment should have been set aside based on mistake (Fam. Code, § 2122, subd. (e)),[1] because she learned after the parties settled the matter that respondent Eric Carlson's employee stock options, which were awarded solely to him, were more valuable than he had previously disclosed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we disagree and affirm.

In 2009, Patricia Skidmore, acting in propria persona, sought to enforce a 1981 child support order. Skidmore then requested that the Solano County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) pay over to her all funds it collected in child support from the father of her child. She asserts that the trial court improperly relied on laches to deny the latter request. Court affirm.

A jury found appellant David Allen Knight guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)[1]) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664,192, subd. (a).) The jury also found that appellant personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of these offenses. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant first claims the prosecutor's closing argument created prejudicial error because it contained â€