CA Unpub Decisions

Marlin Edwards was convicted of two counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422[1]), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236), and two counts of simple assault (§ 240). After allegations that Edwards served seven prior prison terms were found true, he was sentenced to a total term of nine years in state prison.
On appeal, Edwards contends that his sentence violates section 654 because the lower court imposed separate sentences for two offenses that Edwards committed during an indivisible course of criminal conduct. We reject this contention and, therefore, affirm the judgment and sentence.

Appellant James Gonzales, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from the dismissal of his civil action following the sustaining of respondent California Department of Health Services' (DHS) demurrer to his third amended complaint. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without granting him leave to amend, because it was reasonably possible for the defects in his complaint to be cured by an amendment. We affirm the dismissal.

Appellant Braulio Juarez and six other plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the Kmart corporation and 17 companies that provided janitorial services at Kmart stores in California alleging they had not been paid overtime or provided with required meal or rest breaks. The trial court declined to certify the class, ruling it was not ascertainable, that common issues did not predominate, and that class treatment was not superior to individual lawsuits. Appellants now appeal contending the trial court erred when it declined to certify the class. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm.

Defendant argues that he was erroneously denied the benefit of 2009 amendments to Penal Code section 4019, which increased the amount of good conduct and work credits a defendant may receive for periods of presentence custody. We agree and order the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect an increase in presentence custody credits.

Plaintiff Mario Patrick Katona, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant City and County of San Francisco (the city) on his complaint for damages arising out of injuries Katona suffered while he was an inpatient at the city's psychiatric facility. The city obtained judgment on the pleadings on the ground that as a public entity it is immune from liability for Katona's injuries. Katona failed to properly oppose the motion in the trial court. On appeal, he argues, in addition to other things, that he should be granted leave to amend to allege an exception to the city's statutory immunity. We shall affirm.

Ralph Baldenegro appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of 13 counts, including residential burglary, sexually assaulting his ex-girlfriend's 14-year-old daughter, inflicting corporal injury on his ex-girlfriend, who was also the mother of his six-year-old son, and kidnapping the boy. Appellant was sentenced to 94 years to life in prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction; that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial; that the evidence of intent was insufficient to support a conviction of robbery; and that the evidence was insufficient to support mandatory consecutive life terms. Court will affirm.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted appellant Rodney Jay Groh of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and the court sentenced him to state prison. Appellant's sole contention on appeal is the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.40,[2] which pertains to causation in murder.
We affirm.

Defendant Mark James Spencer appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of three counts of burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b) - counts 1, 2, 3)[1] and one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a) - count 5). Defendant also admitted the allegations that he had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends: the trial court's comment that a witness was â€

Brian Perez sued his employer for disciplining him in connection with Perez's failure to cooperate with the employer during an internal affairs investigation of another employee. The employer filed a motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti‑SLAPP statute),[1] and the trial court granted the motion. Perez appeals.

Defendant Jacob Michael Barnes stands convicted of attempted murder. He contends the trial court misinstructed the jury on the elements of that offense and its relationship to the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

This is appellant Robert Donald Charles, Jr.'s second appeal from the judgment. A jury convicted appellant of two counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code,[1] § 459; counts 1 & 3) and one count of theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd. (d); count 4), and acquitted him of a number of other counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 14 years 8 months. In appellant's first appeal (People v. Charles (Feb. 24, 2009, F053534) [nonpub. opn.]),[2] this court reversed appellant's burglary conviction on count 3, and remanded the matter with instructions to the trial court to hold a new hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Following remand, the trial court held a Marsden hearing. After finding the attorney-client relationship had irreparably broken down, the court relieved defense counsel and appointed substitute counsel. Appellant's new counsel filed a motion for a new trial. After hearing and denying the motion for a new trial, the court reinstated the judgment, striking appellant's conviction and sentence on count 3, which resulted in a total prison term of 12 years. In his second appeal, appellant raises a number of claims challenging the trial court's handling of the proceedings on remand. He also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his new trial motion. We affirm.

The Cochran Firm and Richard Barnwell for Real Party in Interest.
In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real party in interest (defendant). We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition thereto, which we conclude adequately address the issues raised by the petition. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.) Because the trial court erred in granting real party in interest's motion for change of venue, we grant the petition for writ of mandate to vacate that order.