CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition thereto, which we conclude adequately address the issues raised by the petition. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.) We conclude that the trial court erred in denying petitioners' summary judgment motions when the declaration of real parties in interest's (real parties) expert offered in opposition to that motion did not satisfy the requirements of Health and Safety Code section 1799.110, subdivision (c).[1]

Morrison, Jr., pled guilty to one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and admitted that he had suffered four prior prison terms (§ 667.5). In return, the remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to the stipulated term of seven years in state prison with credit for time served. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order a probation report, thereby preventing him from establishing an adequate record. Court reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Leonard Rudolph Kemp confronted a 16-year-old boy and his friend in the street and took the boy's cellular telephone. When the boy gave chase in an attempt to get his phone back, defendant shot at him at point-blank range, wounding him in the shoulder.
Defendant was convicted of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and robbery, along with personal use of a firearm enhancements.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant A.L. (minor) committed the offense of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496 subd. (a).) A juvenile court found the allegation to be true. Minor was on probation at the time he committed the current offense. The juvenile court continued him as a ward in his mother's custody, with additional terms of probation, including the condition that he pay restitution to the victim.
Minor now challenges the juvenile court's order for victim restitution. We affirm.

Chelsea F. appeals findings and orders entered at a permanency plan and selection hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny appellant's requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Chelsea's counsel asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her client the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. Counsel also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88.) The requests are denied.

Defendants Meikel Jerome Cooper and Eric Glenn Little engaged in a gun battle against defendant Obadiah Baldwin and Baldwin's cohorts that resulted in the death of Baldwin's friend, Carey Mercer. A jury found Little, Cooper and Baldwin guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter, respectively. The jury convicted Cooper of attempted voluntary manslaughter of Baldwin, Cooper and Little of discharging a firearm from their vehicle, and Baldwin of public fighting and assaulting Cooper and Little with a firearm.
Baldwin contends he was denied due process by a late amendment to the information. Baldwin and Little challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting some of their convictions. Baldwin and Cooper challenge some of the jury instructions, and all three defendants assert the trial court committed sentencing errors by failing to stay some sentences under Penal Code section 654, in pronouncing sentence, or by failing to award custody credits. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)

The San Diego County District Attorney filed a petition alleging that the minor was a person subject to juvenile court jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he committed two robberies in July 2010. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.) Counsel sought the minor's release from custody at a contested detention hearing. The court initially issued bench warrants for two witnesses subpoenaed by the minor, but later recalled the bench warrants on grounds the minor had no right to subpoena witnesses for that hearing.
The minor's petition for writ of mandate seeks enforcement of the subpoenas, arguing that the victims' testimony was relevant to the question whether the minor was a danger to the community and should be released pending the jurisdictional hearing. We issued an order to show cause, but ordered that the juvenile court conduct a rehearing on detention "with the subpoenaed witnesses' compelled attendance." We noted that if the case posed a question of broad public interest that was likely to recur, we could exercise our inherent discretion to consider the merits of the minor's claim. (See In re Dennis H. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 350, 352, fn. 1.) Having considered the record and established case law, we deny the petition.

Tamara Lynn Teague entered a negotiated guilty plea to petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 484) -- admitting she was previously convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and was imprisoned therefore (Pen. Code, § 666), and that she was in violation of probation in three misdemeanor cases -- in return for a stipulated disposition of formal probation with 365 days in local custody. In exchange, the People dismissed the balance of the complaint as well as a pending traffic matter. In accordance with the plea agreement, at sentencing the trial court suspended imposition of sentence for three years, ordered Teague to serve 365 days in jail, granted her formal probation and awarded 37 days' credit. The court sentenced Teague to 322 days in custody on her misdemeanor probation violations, with the sentence to run concurrently to that ordered in the current case. Teague was ordered to pay a fine of $800; a fee of $38 pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.5; a court security fee of $30; and a $30 criminal assessment fee; as well as $200 in fines pursuant to Penal Code sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.44, which was suspended unless probation is revoked.
Teague did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

California's statutory scheme creates classes of parents, including mothers, presumed fathers and biological fathers. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 825 (Kelsey S.).) Mothers and presumed fathers, unless shown to be unfit to parent, have a statutory right to withhold consent to their child's adoption. (Ibid.) The consent of a biological father (who is not also a presumed father) is not required for adoption; the adoption may proceed if the court determines adoption is in the child's best interests. (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1052 (Michael H.).)
If not a statutory presumed father under section 7611, a biological father may attain presumed father status if he promptly demonstrates as full a commitment to his parental responsibilities as the mother allows, and the circumstances permit, after he learns the mother is pregnant with his child. (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.) If the court determines the father has promptly demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities, the court may not terminate his parental rights absent a showing of his parental unfitness. (Ibid.; Michael H., supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1051-1052.)

In this habeas proceeding, Lester Cherry argues there is no evidence to support the Governor's reversal of his grant of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) in 2009. Applying the deferential "some evidence" standard, we conclude the record supports the Governor's finding that defendant poses an unreasonable risk of current dangerousness if released into the community. Court also reject defendant's assertions that the Governor's review constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto application of a law, and that the Governor failed to give his case individualized consideration. Accordingly, we deny defendant's request for relief.

Raquel C. appeals a judgment declaring her minor daughter, Leila C., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivision (b), based on findings Leila had multiple injuries, inflicted nonaccidentally, that would not have occurred unless they were the result of her parents' unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions. Raquel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings. Court affirm the judgment.

F.T. (Father) appeals an order denying his motion to move with his son, J.J. (Child) to the State of Washington. On appeal, Father contends: (1) he has a presumptive right to change Child's residence and L.J., Child's mother (Mother), did not carry her initial burden to show Child would suffer detriment were he to move with Father to Washington; (2) the trial court did not apply the proper legal standards in determining whether his move-away motion should be granted; and (3) Mother's criminal conviction for battering Child raises a rebuttable, if not conclusive, presumption that Mother should not have custody of Child.

Financial Casualty and Surety (Financial) appeals the denial of a motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond after the court changed the defendant's arraignment date without notice. We reverse the order.