CA Unpub Decisions

In this third appellate chapter of what has become an epic post-conviction procedural saga, defendant Charles Fordjour challenges the judgment of conviction which the trial court reinstated in his absence when he failed to appear at a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. At the urging of the prosecutor, who stated that he was acting on the advice of the Attorney General's office, the court ordered the motion off calendar and reinstated the judgment without making any attempt to secure defendant's attendance, even though it knew that his absence was the result of his having been turned over to federal immigration authorities. The success of this prosecution strategy has cast this court yet again onto previously uncharted procedural waters. We have concluded that the court's actions violated defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to be present during proceedings against him, as well as this court's prior mandate, and thus compel us once again to reverse the judgment, even though it may now be impossible to reinstate it.

Joseph Colapietro is the father of A.C., a developmentally disabled adult born with Down Syndrome. Anna Trechter is A.C.'s Aunt. Joseph and Anna brought a petition in the trial court for conservatorship of A.C. A.C.'s mother and sister, Pamela and Sara DeAngelo brought a competing petition for conservatorship. Pamela and Sara prevailed, and were appointed conservators of A.C. Joseph and Anna appeal this decision.

Defendant Ramiro Orozco appeals a judgment entered following a jury trial during which he was convicted of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664, subd. (a)),[1] kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), inflicting corporal injury on a spouse with a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (e)(2)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), making criminal threats (§ 422), and torture (§ 206).
On appeal, defendant asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of his attorney's failure to request certain jury instructions. In addition, defendant argues the trial court erred in its instructions, its imposition of sentence, and its failure to award the correct number of custody credits.
During the pendency of this appeal, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (H036434, In re Ramiro Orozco on Habeas Corpus) on the ground that his counsel was ineffective. We ordered the writ petition considered together with the appeal.

A jury found Thomas Gilbert Pando (defendant) guilty of grand theft, and found it to be not true the property he took was valued in excess of $200,000 within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years' formal probation. One of the terms and conditions of probation is that defendant serve 270 days in the Orange County jail. Substantial evidence supports defendant's conviction of grand theft. We affirm.

Plaintiff Julia Knapp, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, appeals from the trial court's order denying her motion for class certification as to her claims against defendant AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AWS), for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), and fraud. Knapp's claims are based on the allegation that AWS's descriptions of its wireless service plans as providing a certain number of minutes each month for a certain rate were misleading in light of AWS's billing practice of rounding up any partially used minutes for a call to the next full minute.
We affirm. Substantial evidence showed AWS did not make uniform representations to proposed class members. Instead, as we discuss in detail post, the evidence showed the determination whether AWS made any misrepresentations or otherwise engaged in any unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct, would necessarily involve the resolution of individualized issues as to each class member. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Knapp's motion for class certification on the ground common issues of law or fact did not predominate over individual issues.

Appellant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for fatally striking a fellow bar patron in the head with a pool cue. He contends the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction on self-defense, and we agree. However, given the circumstances of the killing, we do not believe it is reasonably probable appellant would have obtained a more favorable verdict had the instruction been given. Therefore, other than to modify appellant's presentence custody credits, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

In July 2008, a jury convicted appellant, Richard Charles Thomas, of participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)),[2] but was unable to reach a verdict on two other felony charges. In August 2008, the court found true a â€

A modification decision.

Defendant and appellant C.M. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition seeking return of her four-year-old son W.E. and two-year-old daughter S.E. Mother's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition. We reject this contention and will affirm the judgment.
I

Defendant and appellant J.V. (minor) was found by the juvenile court to have committed misdemeanor possession of a concealable firearm while a minor (Pen. Code,[1] § 12101, subd. (a); allegation 1); misdemeanor carrying a loaded firearm in a public place (§ 12031, subd. (a)(1); allegation 2); misdemeanor possession of live ammunition while a minor (§ 12101, subd. (b); allegation 3); and misdemeanor resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the discharge of a duty (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); allegation 4). Minor contends there was insufficient evidence that the ammunition in the firearm he possessed was live; thus, the true findings as to allegation 2 (carrying a loaded firearm) and allegation 3 (possession of live ammunition) should be reversed. We affirm.

After the juvenile court denied his motion to suppress, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1, defendant and appellant S.B. (minor) admitted that he possessed a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and was placed on probation. He contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.M. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, A.L., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. I.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding A.L. is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings the beneficial parent-child relationship and beneficial sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the order.

Under California's statutory scheme, classes of parents include mothers, presumed fathers and biological fathers. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.).) Mothers and presumed fathers have a statutory right to withhold consent to an adoption absent a showing of unfitness. (Ibid.) By contrast, a biological father who does not qualify as a presumed father has no statutory right to block the adoption of his child unless he proves it is in the child's best interests that the adoption not proceed. (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1052 (Michael H.).)

In April 2009 defendant Miguel Angel Delvalle saw his former spouse, Gypsy,[1] driving a car with her friend, Edward Jenkins, for whom she had left Delvalle, followed them to a liquor store, slashed the tires of their car, waited outside for them, then stabbed Jenkins repeatedly in the abdomen, and chased Gypsy down and stabbed her in the neck and face. When a police officer later approached Delvalle, who was in custody at a hospital, the officer identified himself and said, "You know why I'm here, don't you?" Delvalle immediately responded by making several self-incriminating statements.
A jury convicted Delvalle of two counts of attempted murder (counts 1 (victim: Jenkins) & 2 (victim: Gypsy): Pen. Code,[2] §§ 187, subd. (a), 664). The jury found that the attempted murder of Jenkins was willful, deliberate, and premeditated within the meaning of section 189; but the attempted murder of Gypsy was not. The jury found true sentencing enhancement allegations that Delvalle personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1); he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Jenkins within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Gypsy under circumstances involving domestic violence within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e). The jury found him not guilty of making a criminal threat (§ 422) as charged in count 3.
The court sentenced Delvalle to an indeterminate prison term of life with the possibility of parole for his count 1 conviction, plus a determinate term of 17 years for his count 2 conviction and the true findings on the enhancement allegations.