CA Unpub Decisions

Cosme Enrique Sanchez appeals from an order of the superior court, denying his petition under Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (b) to destroy his arrest records of July 20, 1967. We affirm.
Appellant was charged in 1967 with various burglary and robbery counts, including assault with intent to commit robbery, in violation of the version of Penal Code section 220 in effect at the time.[1] The information alleged the offenses occurred on July 17, 1967. He was convicted by jury of robbery and assault with intent to commit robbery.
A new case was brought against appellant in 1978. A June 1978 amendment to the information erroneously described his prior conviction as assault with intent to commit rape, rather than assault with intent to commit robbery.

Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office filed a petition alleging that defendant and appellant R.F. committed a second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211.[1] It was further alleged that a principal was armed with a weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
The juvenile court found the allegation in count one to be true, but found the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), allegation not to be true. It ordered that appellant be placed in a camp community placement program for a period not to exceed six years.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that appellant committed a robbery under section 211. Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that he had the requisite intent to commit a robbery, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor.
We conclude that the juvenile court's finding is supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Luz Angelica Gonzalez appeals the judgment entered following her plea of guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and her admission of a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, (a)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)[1] We order the judgment modified to strike an order directing Gonzalez to pay $268 in attorney fees and, as so modified, affirm.

Victor Manuel Diaz appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a), count 1)[1] and robbery (§ 211, count 2). The jury found to be true the personal firearm use allegation within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The trial court found to be true the allegation that appellant had suffered a prior felony strike within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate state prison term of 28 years. Appellant contends that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing intrinsic and extrinsic impeachment of a key prosecution witness with his â€

Plaintiff and appellant Alvin E. Cox appeals an order denying his motion for preliminary injunction. We affirm.
This is a dispute concerning commercial real property located at 1050 W. Alondra Boulevard in Compton (the Property). The Property was apparently previously used as a gas station and is now abandoned. Cox contends that the Property contains underground storage tanks that are leaking hazardous materials.
Defendant and respondent Douglas Oil Company of California (Douglas) owned the Property about 30 years ago. Douglas is a subsidiary of defendant and respondent ConocoPhillips Company (ConocoPhillips). Defendants Armen Louisian, Petros Sarafian, and Karapet Sarafian (the Current Owners) are the current owners of the Property. These defendants have defaulted in the trial court and are not parties to this appeal. Cox contends that he is the holder of a promissory note executed by the Current Owners, as well as an associated deed of trust secured by the Property.

Taylor John Horsley appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, (a)(1).) We reject Horsley's claim of instructional error and affirm the judgment.

Errol J. Scorza appeals a judgment of conviction of rape in concert, forcible oral copulation, forcible oral copulation in concert (4 counts), sexual penetration by a foreign object (2 counts), and aggravated kidnapping, with a finding that the kidnapping substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim. (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 288a, subds. (c) & (d), 289, subd. (a)(1), 209, subd. (b)(1), 667.61, subds. (a) & (d).)[1]
We appointed counsel to represent Scorza in this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) On October 18, 2010, we advised Scorza that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. Subsequently, we granted Scorza three extensions of time to submit a supplemental brief. We have received a response from him contending that the statute of limitations bars his prosecution in this case. Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124, we present a factual and procedural summary of the case and a brief discussion of Scorza's contention.

Marco Antonio Bravo appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea to transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,[1] § 11379, subd. (a)). Appellant was granted five years probation with the condition that he serve 120 days in county jail, with 56 days presentence custody credit. He contends that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing both to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, and to seek a plea to a charge with lesser consequences. We affirm.

In an amended information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney, defendant and appellant Pedro Luis Madrigal was charged with carjacking using a firearm (count I; Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)),[1] assault with a semiautomatic firearm (count II;§ 245, subd. (b)), and attempted murder (count III; §§ 664/187, subd. (a)). As to all counts, it was alleged that appellant personally used a handgun within the meaning of section 12022.5, and section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). It was further alleged that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b). It was also alleged that appellant had prior convictions that could subject his sentence to enhancements within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 667.5. Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
Trial was by jury. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. Specifically, it found the attempted murder to be deliberate and premeditated, and it found the allegations that appellant personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury to be true. The jury also found that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court found three of appellant's four prior strike allegations to be true.

Appellants Levik Beginyan, Vahe Yapundjian, and Azatui Yapundjian challenge a trial court order denying their petition for writ of mandate. The thrust of appellants' claim on appeal is that that they had a vested right to continue operating their business as a banquet hall and that conditions imposed by respondent City of Glendale (the City) to renew their conditional use permit (CUP) for alcohol sales impacted that right.
The problem for appellants is that they only sought a CUP for alcohol sales, which was granted, with conditions. They never sought a CUP to operate a banquet hall. Thus, the relief they sought in their petition for writ of mandate (and the relief they seek on appeal) does not correspond to what they request from the City.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying appellants' petition for writ of mandate.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Noe Contreras of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of assault with a firearm, and of evading an officer, and the jury found true gang and personal gun-use allegations. Defendant makes three contentions on appeal: first, the trial court erred by not bifurcating the gang allegations; second, the court should have excluded prior crimes evidence; and, third, the court erred by instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Benedek Sandor Virag (Virag) was convicted on two counts of robbery. On appeal, he contends that the trial court should not have imposed two enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2).[1] He theorizes that the second enhancement should have been stayed pursuant to section 654.
We find no error and affirm.

Images Everywhere, Inc. (Images Everywhere), and John Shawn Productions, Inc. (JSP), appeal a defense judgment in favor of Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. (Six Flags), and Qualex, Inc. (Qualex), after a jury verdict. Images Everywhere and JSP provided consulting services to Six Flags pursuant to a letter agreement. They contend Six Flags breached the letter agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating their consulting services in December 2006 and contracting with Qualex (formerly Event Imaging Solutions, Inc.) instead. We conclude that the plaintiffs have shown no prejudicial error and will affirm the judgment.

Rick Robison was convicted of multiple offenses related to a string of bank robberies in Mendocino county and was sentenced to a 16-year prison term. Robison's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.[1] We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment.