CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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D.U. (mother) appeals from 2010 juvenile court orders regarding her sons, 11-year-old Sergio, 9-year-old Joel and 4-year-old Isaiah. Specifically, the juvenile court denied mother's request to regain custody of the three children and terminated parental rights to Sergio and Isaiah. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388 & 366.26.)[1] Mother raises numerous arguments, including that the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 request and rejecting her argument that termination would be detrimental. On review, we will affirm.
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Defendant Michael Laszlo Streib was charged, by first amended information, with grand theft of parts of a stamp mill from the Mount Lily Mine, the property of Mark Wolff (Pen. Code,[1] § 487, subd. (a); count I); grand theft of parts of a mine and mine equipment from the Buchanan Mine, the property of Howard Mason (§ 487, subd. (a); count II); and grand theft of parts of a mine and mine equipment from the Starr King Mine, the property of Mark Knowles (§ 487, subd. (a); count III).[2] A jury convicted him of count I, but acquitted him of counts II and III. Sentenced to two years in prison, he now appeals, claiming the trial court erred by having the prosecutor provide an index of exhibits to the deliberating jury. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
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Salvador Garcia Reyes (appellant) was charged in counts 1 and 5 of rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2));[1] in counts 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12 of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); in counts 8 and 13 of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)); in count 10 of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)); in counts 14 and 15 of rape of a spouse (§ 262, subd. (a)(2)); and in count 16 of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)). It was further alleged as to counts 1, 2, and 12 that appellant tied or bound his victim (§ 667.61, subd. (b); in counts 1 through 13 that the statute of limitations was extended (§ 803, subd. (f)(1)); and in counts 1 through 16 that appellant committed sex offenses against multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b)-(e)(5)).[2] The alleged victims of appellant's acts were his two stepdaughters and his wife.[3]
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Appellant Eduardo Guerrero was charged with six counts of criminal conduct stemming from allegations that he entered the land of a business proprietor, used a knife in a threatening manner, forced a victim at knifepoint into one of the proprietor's trucks and then drove off. The six counts included kidnapping during commission of a carjacking (Pen. Code, § 209.5, subd. (a), count 1);[1] carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a), count 2); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 3); felony false imprisonment (§ 236, count 4); attempted arson (§ 455, count 5); and taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 6). Appellant was found guilty by a jury on counts 3, 4 and 6 only. During the trial, a witness who was present at the business premises on the morning of the alleged crime testified that appellant told him that a car stereo appellant was carrying was â€
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Jason Monroe Kelly (appellant) was charged on August 8, 2008, in a second amended information[1] with one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187).[2] It was further alleged that appellant had suffered a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he committed the murder while engaged in a kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17). On August 19, 2008, the trial court conducted a Marsden (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) hearing and denied appellant's request for new counsel.
A year later, on August 20, 2009, the People amended the information to change the firearm enhancement to allege a violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Then, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to the murder charge and admitted the strike allegation, the firearm enhancement, and the allegation that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The kidnapping allegation was dismissed. On October 8, 2009, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for an aggregate indeterminate term of 70 years to life. Appellant sought and obtained a certificate of probable cause on December 9, 2009. On appeal, appellant contends only that the trial court erred when it denied his Marsden motion. We disagree and affirm. |
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J.A. (Mother) and R.A (Father) (collectively, the parents) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights concerning their daughter, K.A., pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] They also purport to appeal from prior orders in this juvenile dependency case. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the parents have waived any arguments pertaining to orders for which the time for filing an appeal has expired. We reject the remaining arguments on their merits and affirm the court's order.
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Jasmine D. appeals the orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 959.) We therefore deny her requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Jasmine's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide Jasmine the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. |
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R.G. appeals the summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (all further statutory references are to this code) petition in the juvenile dependency case of her son, Adrian G. R.G. contends the court abused its discretion by denying the petition, which sought unsupervised visitation. We affirm.
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Under the terms of an agreement with the prosecutor, appellant Thomas Francis Riley pled guilty to three counts of second degree commercial burglary. The trial court imposed a stipulated sentence of two years in prison. Riley also accepted civil liability for eight additional charged burglaries, which the prosecutor dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
In a written statement provided to the probation department by one of the victims, Mona Wong valued her loss at $55,940. Although at a restitution hearing Wong gave somewhat lower purchase prices for some of her lost property, the trial court accepted her previous higher estimates and ordered Riley to pay Wong restitution in the amount of $55,940. On appeal Riley contends the trial court abused its discretion when it did not at least lower the amount of restitution due Wong to a sum of the average of the varying estimates Wong provided for each item. As discussed below, we are not persuaded by this contention and affirm. |
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Hunter Coleman Porter pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, [1] subd. (b)) and admitted enhancements for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), commission of a felony for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), under a plea agreement in which he acknowledged possible maximum punishment of 26 years in state prison as well as a specified fine and parole. On the day of his sentencing hearing, Porter unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds his attorney's investigator failed to interview witnesses assertedly exonerating him of the crimes and he was under the influence of marijuana and heroin when he entered his plea.[2] Porter was later sentenced to a 26-year prison term.
On appeal, Porter contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing to determine whether substitute counsel should have been appointed to file a formal motion before denying his request to withdraw the guilty plea. Because we conclude Porter did not seek to discharge his retained attorney and there was no colorable basis for withdrawing his plea, we affirm. |
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