CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Paul Vernon Crumal was charged with committing six felony sex offenses against one of his nursing patients. The jury found him not guilty of three of the charges and convicted him of lesser included misdemeanors on the other three. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence he had committed sexual misconduct against one of his other patients, and in admitting certain statements of the victim under the fresh complaint doctrine. Finding these claims unmeritorious, we affirm.

Defendant Charles Rice contends the trial court committed reversible error when it found that he was liable as a comaker of a promissory note and rejected his contention that he was a surety. Rice asserts that the other comaker of the promissory note assumed the obligation and, by operation of law, Rice's status changed from being a principal to being a surety. Furthermore, Rice argues he was exonerated from liability because the plaintiff and the other comaker altered the interest rate on the loan.
We conclude that the trial court's implicit findings of fact concerning the absence of a surety relationship are adequately supported by the evidence. Consequently, Rice has failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in determining he was not a surety. Therefore, the judgment will be affirmed.

Appellant, Martin S., a minor, was initially adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in February 2009, following his admission that he committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)). The juvenile court placed appellant on probation.
In May 2009, and again in November 2009, appellant admitted allegations that he violated his probation. On each occasion, the court continued appellant as a ward of the court and continued him on probation.
In the instant case, in June 2010, following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the court found true an allegation that appellant committed a violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(1) (exhibiting a deadly weapon), and that in committing that offense he acted for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)). In August 2010, following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court again continued appellant as a ward of the court, placed him in the custody of the Tulare County Probation Department (TCPD), and ordered that he serve 365 days in the TCPD Youth Facility.
On appeal, appellant contends the court erroneously (1) failed to consider whether appellant was eligible for the deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790 et seq.),[1] and (2) failed to declare, on the record, whether the instant offense was a felony or misdemeanor. The People concede these points. We will find both of appellant's contentions meritorious and remand for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial, Joel Alonzo Bennett, appellant, was convicted of two felony counts of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. 1.)[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that appellant had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and had seven prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)). The trial court sentenced appellant to two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms in prison, plus one year for the prior prison term.
Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it gave a pinpoint instruction requested by the prosecution; when it denied his request to represent himself; and when it imposed an incorrect sentence. He also contends his sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment. We disagree and affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), a jury convicted appellant, James Arthur Carter, Jr., of felony possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 1) and resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2), a misdemeanor. The court imposed the two-year midterm sentence on count 1 and sentenced appellant to time served on count 2.
Appellant's appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant, apparently in response to this court's invitation to submit supplemental briefing, has filed a brief in which he argues, as best we can determine, as follows: (1) the court erred in denying his suppression motion; and (2) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of appellant's constitutional right to due process of law. We will affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant William Charles Clerk (who is also known as William Charles Lane) was found guilty of felony driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety of persons or property while fleeing from pursuing police officers (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and the allegation that appellant had suffered two prior strikes (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i))[1] was found true. The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life in state prison.

Petitioner A.H. (father) is the father of X.H., born earlier this year and detained shortly after birth. In this writ petition, father challenges the juvenile court's orders denying him reunification services and setting a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for July 13, 2011. As discussed below, we cannot find that the juvenile court abused its discretion. This is because: 1) father made no effort until very recently to seek treatment for the problems that caused the removal of X.H.'s brother in 2001; and 2) it is not in X.H.'s best interest to pursue reunification with father because father plans to establish a family with X.H.'s mother, who was convicted of killing X.H.'s half sister in 2001.

On May 26, 2010, an information charged defendant and appellant Steven Anthony Dlugitch with one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11378. The information also alleged that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). The information further alleged that defendant suffered the following prior convictions under Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d): (1) felon in possession of a firearm under Penal Code section 12021, with a gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22; and (2) robbery under Penal Code section 211. Furthermore, the information alleged that defendant had served a prison term for each of the prior convictions under Penal Code section 667.5.

Jaqueline S. appeals dispositional orders denying her reunification services in the juvenile dependency cases of her daughters, S.C. and L.C. (together, the children). She contends the court erred by finding she had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to removing two of her other children from her custody and the subsequent termination of her reunification services and parental rights to those children. She also asserts the court abused its discretion by determining it was not in the children's best interests to provide services to her. We affirm the orders.

Richard E., the biological father of Breanna S., and Michael B., an alleged father of Breanna, appeal following a hearing on a supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387) in Breanna's juvenile dependency case. Richard contends that the court erred by denying his requests for presumed father status and visitation. Michael contends that the court erred by denying him the opportunity to prove presumed father status and by denying his request for a continuance. We dismiss both appeals.

In February 2005 Rosa Rebecca Reynoso was charged with transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1); possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code § 11378; count 2); and failure to appear while on bail (Pen., Code § 1320.5; count 3). Reynoso pleaded guilty to count 2 (possession for sale of methamphetamine), in exchange for probation and dismissal of counts 1 and 3.
In February 2010 Reynoso admitted a probation violation for failing to report to the probation department. She was sentenced to 240 days modified custody with credits of 189 days and one year of additional probation.
This appeal proceeds in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).

The juvenile court adjudged 16-year-old Blake S. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on true findings that he committed misdemeanor battery upon his mother, Elena S. The court placed Blake on probation and included among his probation conditions a Fourth Amendment waiver. Blake appeals, contending: (1) substantial evidence does not support the court's true findings; and (2) the court erred by requiring a Fourth Amendment waiver probation condition. We find his arguments unavailing and affirm the order.

This breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and fraud action brought by plaintiff Michael C. Behnke against his residential property insurer─defendant State Farm General Insurance Company (State Farm)─arose from an attorney fees dispute between State Farm and the law firm of English & Gloven, which Behnke had selected as his independent Cumis counsel[1] to defend him against a third-party lawsuit. In his fee agreement with English & Gloven, Behnke agreed to be personally liable for the firm's fees in the event State Farm failed to make full and timely payments. After objecting that English & Gloven's fees were excessive and attempting to replace the firm as Behnke's independent counsel, State Farm allowed English & Gloven to continue representing Behnke and allegedly promised at a January 2004 meeting to pay all of English & Gloven's fees that State Farm had not paid as of the time of the meeting. State Farm eventually paid $50,000 to settle the underlying lawsuit against Behnke. By that time, English & Gloven had billed State Farm a total of about $199,000 in fees and costs. The attorney fees dispute arose when State Farm paid $140,000 to English & Gloven but refused to pay the remaining $59,000. Meanwhile, Behnke signed a promissory note in the amount of $127,000 in favor of English & Gloven secured by a deed of trust on his home. State Farm obtained an order compelling mandatory binding arbitration under Civil Code[2] section 2860, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 2860(c)), and the arbitrator reduced the disputed $59,000 attorney fees claim by $16,000 to $43,000, which the arbitrator awarded to English & Gloven with interest. English & Gloven foreclosed on the deed of trust given by Behnke, and State Farm paid English & Gloven's reduced attorney fees claim with interest.

Steve Kelley, a former editorial cartoonist for the San Diego Union-Tribune (Union-Tribune) who was terminated by the newspaper in 2001, and Steve Breen, Kelley's successor at the Union-Tribune, entered into a contract with Universal Press Syndicate (UPS) to produce a comic strip called "Dustin" (the Dustin Project). After Breen withdrew from the Dustin Project and UPS terminated the contract, Kelley filed this action against The Copley Press, Inc. (Copley Press) and the Union-Tribune Publishing Company,[1] the owners of the Union-Tribune, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations (first cause of action), intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (second cause of action), and unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 17200 (third cause of action). Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication, and the trial court granted summary judgment in respondents' favor.
On appeal, Kelley claims that the trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law for respondents on each of his three claims. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on Kelley's claim of intentional interference with contractual relations, but that the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law on Kelley's claims of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and unfair competition. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.