CA Unpub Decisions

rancisco Ulloa appeals from the judgment following his conviction by jury of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)[1] The jury convicted his codefendant, Randy Crespin, of second degree robbery and also found that Ulloa used a firearm during the robbery. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) Crespin is not a party to this appeal. The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years in state prison (a 5-year upper term for robbery and a 10-year firearm use enhancement). Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting an unauthenticated, undated MySpace photograph that appeared to depict appellant holding a gun. We agree that the prosecution's failure to authenticate that photograph should have barred its admission, but conclude that the error was harmless. We affirm and remand with directions to correct a citation in the abstract of judgment.

Appellant Kechun Li appeals following entry of judgment in her favor and against respondents David Chen and the Academy of Chinese Performing Arts (ACPA) in the amount of $2,390.36 for services rendered plus interest. Li contends that the trial court erroneously found her to be an independent contractor hired by respondents and asks that we modify the judgment to reflect her status as their employee. Li also challenges a postjudgment order awarding respondents $1,650 for attorneys' fees incurred in opposing her motion for relief from an order striking her memoranda of costs. Li's challenges are without merit, and we affirm.

Reggie Peters (appellant) appeals from a 12-year state prison sentence he received (subject to local custody credits) following his convictions for involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)[1]), with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and a separate conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). He contends the personal use enhancement must be vacated because the conduct underlying his involuntary manslaughter conviction, brandishing a firearm, was a misdemeanor. Alternatively, he argues that the aggravated 10-year term he received for personal use of a firearm was an abuse of discretion. We disagree with appellant's first contention, and conclude that he has forfeited the second by failing to object at sentencing. Even if not forfeited, we conclude that the trial court's choice of the aggravated term for the enhancement was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Nancy Dow Moody (wife) appeals from a pendente lite order requiring her to pay attorney fees and costs incurred by Peter Moody (husband) during the appeal of a prior order in this marital dissolution action. She contends the pendente lite order, which was issued under Family Code section 2030[1] based on husband's financial need, is inconsistent with this court's ultimate disposition of the appeal for which the fees and costs were awarded. Wife also argues that the award was an abuse of discretion, that the court placed unreasonable restrictions on her ability to present evidence of husband's financial situation, and that section 2030 is unconstitutional. We affirm.

Washington Hospital and other defendants[1] appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike respondent's complaint under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) They contend the court erred in ruling that the causes of action against them did not arise from activity protected by the statute, because the claims were based on or in connection with acts of a hospital peer review committee. We will reverse the order.

This action was brought by two elderly tenants, Mercedes Recto and Elsa Burgess (plaintiffs), who shared a large house in San Francisco's Mission District with numerous other tenants, against the property's owner, Villa Jacinto (defendant). Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant on August 7, 2007, alleging multiple causes of action including breach of the warranty of habitability, constructive eviction, negligent maintenance of the premises, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In essence, plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to substandard living conditions during their entire five-year tenancy. Furthermore, plaintiffs claimed that in 2007, defendant commenced a construction project that made the residence so uninhabitable that they were forced to leave the premises for their own health and safety. After a jury trial, judgment was entered on the jury's special verdict in defendant's favor on the two causes of action submitted to the jury––breach of the implied warranty of habitability and wrongful collection of rent for an uninhabitable dwelling.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim the â€

Defendants United Law Group, Inc. (ULG) and Sean Alan Rutledge appealed from the denial of their special motion to strike the complaint of plaintiff Cu Phan under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16 or the anti-SLAPP statute).[1] Shortly after oral argument in this court, ULG filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. We therefore issued our opinion (affirming the court's order denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion) solely as to Rutledge. On April 7, 2011, we ordered that the appeal proceed against ULG because the United States Bankruptcy Court had granted relief from the automatic stay of proceedings under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law. We now issue our opinion as to ULG, affirming the court's order denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.

A jury convicted defendant and petitioner Robert Walter Sanders of one count each of domestic battery with bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) and aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), with a finding of great bodily injury (§§ 667.5, 1192.7, 12022.7, subd. (e)) for each count. After bifurcation, defendant admitted he had a prior prison term. The court sentenced him to a total of seven years, consisting of three years for the domestic battery and four years for the enhancement. The sentence on the assault count was stayed pursuant to section 654, and the court struck the prior prison term for purposes of sentencing.
Defendant's lawyer filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Having examined the record we find no error.

This is an appeal from an order for probation imposed after defendant Hoyt Tim Gipson was convicted of two felony drug counts. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash a search warrant. We conclude the order for probation should be modified in certain respects. As modified, the order will be affirmed.

In August 2005, Michael R. was sentenced to the California Youth Authority (CYA)[1] and the juvenile court found that his violation was a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) offense.[2] On April 19, 2007, we affirmed the original judgment of the juvenile court stating, in the facts of our opinion, that the juvenile court found Michael's offense was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense.
Subsequent to August 2005, but prior to April 2007, the juvenile court received a letter from CYA and a different judge, believing he was correcting clerical error, amended the order to state the offense was not a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. This â€

A jury found defendant and appellant David Alejandro Arevalo guilty of committing a forcible lewd act upon Jane Doe 1, a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a total term of six years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends prosecution of this case was constitutionally and statutorily barred by Penal Code section 654[1] and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett), because the People were aware of defendant's involvement in this case at the time he pled guilty to committing another lewd act upon Jane Doe 2 in 2009 in case No. SWF027618, and the crimes were part of the same course of conduct.[2] In the alternative, he argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss on the grounds now raised in this appeal. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Kenneth Mitchell and Rebecca Mitchell (Grandmother) (collectively referred to as the Grandparents) petitioned the family court for visitation with their grandson, D.M. The family court denied the Grandparents' petition. The Grandparents raise four arguments on appeal. First, the Grandparents assert the family court erred by concluding that Family Code section 3102,[1] which concerns visitation, is unconstitutional as written. Second, the Grandparents contend the family court erred by not determining if section 3102 is constitutional as it relates to the facts of the instant case. Third, the Grandparents assert the family court did not adequately analyze the position of D.M.'s mother, Victoria (Mother) regarding visitation. Fourth, the Grandparents contend the family court erred by considering the Grandparents' lack of a preexisting relationship with D.M. We affirm the judgment.

When the victims -- Linda Andrade and her adult daughter, Yvonne Torres -- got home, defendant Ruben Andrew Neer was already inside. He held a knife to the daughter's throat, demanded the keys to the mother's van, and made both women go into a closet. He rummaged around and stole several other items before leaving in the van.

Sometime between March and April 2008, defendant Christina Relea Lee took checks from her parents' personal checkbook and subsequently helped her boyfriend cash several of the checks at banks located in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. Defendant was convicted of possession of stolen property, burglary, and possession of a completed check with the intent to commit fraud.