CA Unpub Decisions

The Imperial County Department of Social Services appeals findings and orders extending reunification services to Amber G. to the 24-month date from the date her four children were removed from her physical custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5, subd. (b).)[1]

Jacqueline Mastrodimos pled guilty to four counts of forgery of checks. (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d).)[1] The trial court sentenced Mastrodimos to four years in prison and, pursuant to section 1202.4, imposed restitution orders in favor of three different parties, including an order in the amount of $165,358.10 in favor of Norma Clark for professional fees that the victim of the crimes owed Clark for investigating the fraud and restoring the victim's good financial standing. Mastrodimos challenges that restitution order, arguing among other things, that the order was improper because Clark was not a victim of the crimes. We conclude that Mastrodimos's argument has merit. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment awarding restitution to Clark, and we remand with directions for the trial court to hold a further restitution hearing to determine whether some or all of Clark's fees should be the subject of an additional restitution award to the victim.

Mother Ann G. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights to the minor, Tommy G., aged eight when the current of many related scenarios began. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1] Mother claims the parental bond relationship exception to adoption applied and that the adoption assessment report was inadequate because the report failed to evaluate the sibling relationship. We disagree with these assertions and affirm.

J.J. (father) and M.J. (mother) appeal from the orders of December 9, 2010, terminating parental rights to Jose J., Evelyn J., and Jonathan J. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father contends termination of parental rights to Jose and Jonathan without a finding of detriment violated due process. Mother's sole contention is her parental rights must be restored if father's parental rights are restored. As father did not object on due process grounds in the dependency court, he has forfeited the contention that termination of parental rights to Jose and Jonathan was improper, and there is no basis for excusing the forfeiture. The contention also fails on the merits, because the requisite finding of detriment was made. Because no argument is made by parents regarding termination of parental rights to Evelyn, they are deemed to have abandoned their appeal on that issue. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Accordingly, we affirm the orders.

The mother of three dependent children appeals from orders denying her motion for additional reunification services and terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

The father, B.G., and the mother, P.S., the parents of N.G., the child, appeal from an October 26, 2010 Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 parental rights termination order. The father contends the juvenile court violated his due process right by terminating his parental rights without first making a finding of parental unfitness or detriment by clear and convincing evidence at the disposition hearing on January 16, 2009. He also argues it was error to terminate his parental rights because he satisfied the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial relationship exception. The mother contends the parental rights termination order must be reversed because of noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. We agree with the mother. We remand for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act requirements. Upon remittitur issuance, if proper notice is provided and no tribe asserts the child is of Cherokee descent, the parental rights termination order is to be reinstated.

Mother B.M. and Father M.M. appeal the dependency court's denial of their section 388 petitions and termination of parental rights to their two youngest children A.M. and J.M. They contend the dependency court erred in summarily denying their section 388 petitions, in finding the beneficial relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and the sibling exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) did not apply, and in not removing conflicted counsel for the minor children in this case. We affirm.

The juvenile court adjudged minors Daniel G., D.G., A.G., Jeremiah J., Jermaine J., and C.J. to be dependent children of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (sibling abuse) on September 28, 2009, after Amanda W. (Mother) signed a waiver of rights and pleaded no contest to the petition.[1] The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a subsequent petition pursuant to section 342, alleging minors were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). On July 15, 2010, the court sustained the section 342 petition. Mother appeals from the court's orders, contending there was insufficient evidence to sustain the section 342 petition. We agree and reverse the July 15, 2010 orders.

Appellant Frank Myles appeals from the order granting probation entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of possession of marijuana for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359. The trial court placed appellant under terms and conditions of probation for three years.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Defendant Jose Aldana appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of five counts of second degree robbery, two counts of home invasion robbery, two counts of false imprisonment by violence, two counts of assault with a firearm, and one count each of first degree burglary and misdemeanor sexual battery. Firearm enhancement allegations were found true with respect to most of the charges. Defendant contends the trial court erred by informing the jury that he had escaped during trial. We affirm.

Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity to offenses arising out of an altercation he had with the victims – Hamed Arian and Ahmad Moshen. A jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a))[1] and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found appellant inflicted great bodily injury on the victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that he used a knife in attempting to murder the victims (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The jury determined appellant attempted to murder Arian with premeditation and deliberation but did not find this allegation to be true with respect to Moshen.
The sanity phase trial was waived and the parties stipulated appellant was not sane when he committed the offenses. Appellant was ordered committed to the California Department of Mental Health for placement in a state hospital until such time as sanity was restored with the maximum period of confinement to be life.
Appellant contends the attempted murder convictions should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill. We reject appellant's contention and affirm the judgment.

Laura Ann DeCrescenzo appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint against Church of Scientology International (Scientology) and Religious Technology Center (collectively, defendants) after the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend based on the statutes of limitations. Plaintiff contends she has adequately pled a combination of delayed discovery of her causes of action and a basis for equitable estoppel precluding defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Our review of this record compels the conclusion that plaintiff has adequately alleged that (1) she was unable to comprehend the wrongfulness of the defendants' conduct for a period of time and that her causes of action did not accrue until she did so and (2) even after her delayed discovery of her causes of action, the defendants' threats and intimidation caused her to delay filing her complaint. In addition, we reject defendants' contention that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from prosecuting her action by a federal court judgment that equitable estoppel was inapplicable because the facts alleged in plaintiff's prior complaint were insufficient to demonstrate reasonable reliance on defendants' representations. We hold that her allegations of additional facts in the present complaint establish a basis for reasonable reliance and such new allegations are not precluded by the federal judgment. We therefore will reverse the judgment with directions.