CA Unpub Decisions

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) filed September 2, 2010,[1] that appellant, Tony Y., a minor, committed vandalism resulting in damage of less than $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(B);[2] count 1) and possession of vandalism tools (§ 594.2, subd. (a); count 2), and that he committed the former offense for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (d) (section 186.22(d)). On October 12, appellant admitted the allegations of the petition and the juvenile court declared the count 1 offense to be a felony. On November 24, at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court continued appellant as a ward of the court,[3] continued him on probation, ordered that he serve 365 days in the Tulare County Youth Facility, and declared a maximum term of physical confinement (MTPC) for the two instant offenses of three years two months, consisting, presumably, of three years on count 1 and two months on count 2.[4]
On appeal, appellant contends the instant adjudication cannot stand because (1) he did not admit the allegations of the petition, and (2) the record does not establish that the court advised appellant of his constitutional rights, as it was required to do before taking his admissions. Alternatively, appellant argues that if the record shows he admitted the allegations of the petition, the court erred in finding the count 1 offense was a felony. Finally, he argues that the court erred in failing to declare that offense to be a felony or a misdemeanor.

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real party in interest. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Penal Code section 995a, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to remand a matter to the magistrate for the correction of “minor errors of omission” if it can be “expeditiously cured or corrected without a rehearing of a substantial portion of the evidence.” In our view, the omission here—the identification of defendant as the perpetrator shown in the video—should be so characterized. Although it is true that this identification goes to the heart of the People’s case, this is not dispositive. (See Caple v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 594.) If the testifying officer had used the word “defendant” instead of “suspect” when describing the video, the People’s case would have been complete. A single question on remand will be sufficient to correct the omission. (Cf. Garcia v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 803.)

A jury convicted defendant Darryl Crawford of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1), counts 4 (victim Cassandra Crawford) and 3 (victim Jermaine Mims)) and one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 2). Crawford contends the court erroneously admitted certain testimony by a police officer, erred in instructing with CALCRIM No. 371, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for assault with a deadly weapon.

A jury convicted Paul Joseph Christopher of assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code,[1] § 220, subd. (a)(1)) and three counts of misdemeanor battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). The jury found Christopher was armed with and used a deadly weapon during the assault (§ 12022.3, subds. (a) & (b)). Christopher admitted three probation denial prior convictions. (§ 1203, subd. (e).)
The trial court sentenced Christopher to a determinate term of 14 years, consisting of the middle term of four years for the assault plus 10 years for the weapon enhancement under section 12022.3, subdivision (a). The sentence for the armed enhancement charged under section 12022.3, subdivision (b) was stayed pursuant to section 654. Sentences for the misdemeanors were imposed as time served. The court also sentenced Christopher in three other cases in which his probation had been revoked. Those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the 14-year term in the current case.
Christopher filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible, but not arguable issues. We offered Christopher the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. Christopher asked for and received an extension of time. Christopher filed his brief after the extension of time had expired, however, the court accepted the brief and it is discussed below.

In this unfortunate case, the appellant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, unlawfully entered an occupied dwelling in order to steal a slice of pizza. He undoubtedly terrified the teenage girls who were inside the house and he has now been convicted of first degree residential burglary. While we are satisfied appellant was properly convicted, we can only observe it is sad that he has incurred a conviction for a serious felony for such a trivial goal, getting a slice of pizza.
Reece Peter Holliday was convicted, following a jury trial, of residential burglary where there were persons present inside the dwelling. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The trial court granted Holliday five years formal probation.
Holliday filed a timely notice of appeal. In his appeal he contends there is not sufficient evidence to prove that he intended to steal pizza when he entered the dwelling. We will find there is sufficient substantial evidence in this record to prove his intention to steal. Accordingly, we will affirm.

A jury found Ricky Paul Peete guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)),[1] and found not true an attendant gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated court trial, the court found that Peete had suffered one prior strike (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and one prior prison term conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Peete to a total term of five years in prison.
On appeal, Peete contends that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude statements that he made to a police officer immediately after being advised that he was under arrest, on the ground that the statements were obtained during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda[2] warnings. We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the statements were admissible because they were not the product of an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and its progeny.

Defendant pleaded no contest to numerous charges arising from his prosecution for injuring three children and an adult while driving drunk. He challenges the trial court’s calculation of presentence conduct credits and its imposition of a booking fee. Both of his claims are without support in the law and we will affirm the judgment.

This is a companion to a separate appeal filed by plaintiff Eliceo Olaiz Bernal from his conviction for three counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under 10 and three counts of committing a lewd act on a child, with a multiple victim enhancement. The facts are set out in detail in the opinion in that case and we incorporate them into this opinion. (People v. Bernal (May __, 2012, G044064) [nonpub. opn.].)
As a result of his convictions defendant was required to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290, subdivision (b) (all further statutory references are to this code). Section 1203e, subdivision (a) mandated the probation department to “complete a Facts of Offense Sheet,” which must contain, among other things, the “circumstances of the offense for which registration is required” and the “results of the State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO).” The SARATSO is documented using a method described as the “Static-99 risk assessment scale” (both documents collectively referred to as the SARATSO assessment). The purpose of the SARATSO assessment is to “predict[] sex offender risk of recidivism.” (§ 290.04, subd. (a)(2).)

Defendant Bob Grayson appeals from the judgment in favor of plaintiff Kelly Johnson in her quiet title and slander of title action. He contends the record does not support the quiet title decree or the elements for slander of title. Additionally, he challenges the award of attorney fees on the grounds the tort of another doctrine does not apply and plaintiff failed to differentiate between recoverable and unrecoverable fees. He also argues the award of inconvenience damages has no legal basis.
Although we conclude plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and legal expenses, we reverse the award in this regard and remand the matter to the trial court to redetermine the appropriate amount to which plaintiff is entitled in a manner consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
In her respondent’s brief, plaintiff requests attorney fees on appeal. We deny the request.

Following a jury trial, the trial court extended appellant’s involuntary commitment as a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. Appellant contends constitutional and instructional errors compel reversal, but we disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Appellant was born in 1960. While growing up in the Philippines, he began using drugs and alcohol and was physically abusive to one of his family’s house servants. He also experienced hallucinations, and at one point was committed to a mental health facility, where he received electroconvulsive therapy.

A jury convicted Joel Torrejon Miranda of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.) The jury also found Miranda fled the scene of the crime (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and had suffered a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) with a prior conviction (§ 191.5, subd. (d)). Miranda contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether a second driver’s speeding was a superseding and intervening cause of the victim’s death. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

Defendant Eliceo Olaiz Bernal was convicted of six counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under age 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) and three counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). As to the latter charges, the court found true a multiple victim enhancement. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(4).) After striking three counts of the section 288.7, subdivision (a) counts, the court sentenced defendant to 120 years to life.

Appellant, Raymond Antonio, pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and was sentenced to a stipulated 16‑month term. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm

On June 3, 2011, after the court stated an indicated sentence of five years, appellant, Jose Tobias Alvarez, Jr., pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a))[1] and admitted a prior drug offense enhancement allegation (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)). On June 29, 2011, the court imposed a five-year prison term, consisting of the two-year lower term on the substantive offense and three years on the enhancement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Insofar as the record reveals, he did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.