In re J.A.
Filed 8/1/12 In re J.A. CA2/8
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
In re J.A., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B237589
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. CK 90193)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Robert L. Stevenson, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Michelle L.
Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John F.
Krattli, Acting County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel,
and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * * * * *
The court
found that eight-year-old J.A. was a child described in subdivisions (a) and
(b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.
serious physical harm inflicted on the child by a parent and of a failure on
the part of a parent to protect the child from physical harm. The court declared J.A. to be a dependent of
the court but the court found no clear and convincing evidence that there was a
substantial risk if J.A. were returned to his mother. Accordingly, the court placed J.A. with his
mother and ordered unannounced visits by the Los Angeles County
(DCFS), examinations of J.A. by DCFS and individual counseling for mother.
E.J.,
J.A.’s mother, appeals, claiming that the evidence does not support the
jurisdictional finding. We conclude to
the contrary and therefore affirm.
1. Factual Findings by the Court
The court
found that mother had physically abused J.A. by striking him on the leg with a
telephone cord. On prior occasions,
mother had struck J.A. with belts. This
physical abuse was excessive and caused J.A. unreasonable pain and
suffering. The foregoing endangered
J.A.’s physical health and safety.
2. The Evidence
J.A. came
to school on May 20, 2011,
complaining of pain to his leg. A member
of the school staff looked at J.A.’s leg and saw a bleeding puncture wound on
the back of the calf about a quarter of an inch long and deep. J.A. told the staffer that mother had gotten
mad at him and hit him twice with a telephone charger cord, causing the leg to
bleed. J.A. said mother beats him with a
belt when he misbehaves. She also slaps
J.A. with her open hand. J.A. would try
to cover himself with blankets or a pillow so that the blows would not hurt so
much.
DCFS and
the police were called and interviewed J.A.
Both agencies confirmed J.A.’s physical condition and his explanation of
his condition.
J.A. was examined at the
Violence Intervention Program clinic of LAC+USC hospital the next day. He now denied that anyone had hit him. However, the examination disclosed a fading
bruise on his left thigh, abrasions to his left knee and right thigh, red
linear marks on his left shoulder, a scar on his right elbow, several loop
marks on his left leg and one loop mark on his right leg. The bruises and loop marks were not
consistent with J.A.’s story that he fell.
DCFS worked
out a safety plan that called for a continuation of the investigation and left
J.A. with mother upon her promise not to use corporal punishment.
In June
2011, mother and father
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] agreed to a family safety plan worked out by
DCFS. The plan called for six months of
counseling.
In July and
August mother became uncooperative and failed to show up at several scheduled
meetings. When DCFS managed to see
mother and J.A. at the end of July, J.A. denied that mother hits him. At the end of August, mother told DCFS that
she wouldn’t participate in the family plan DCFS had worked out, that she
disagreed about the physical abuse allegations and that DCFS could take her to
court if it wished.
In
September, DCFS tried twice to meet with mother but without success. At the end of the month, when DCFS managed to
contact mother, she became angry and told DCFS that she would not participate
in family or individual counseling.
DCFS
detained J.A. and his 14-year-old sister E.A. on September 30, 2011, and filed the section 300
petition on behalf of both children. The
allegations involving J.A.’s sister were eventually dismissed.
At the
detention hearing on October 5, 2011,
the court placed J.A. and his sister with father and ordered monitored visits
by mother as to J.A. In substance,
mother denied the abuse.
Mother
continued with her denials during the jurisdictional
hearing on November 15, 2011. J.A. also denied that mother had abused him,
blaming children at school for the tell-tale marks on his body. The court rejected mother’s denials as
inconsistent with the evidence and told J.A. that he was trying to protect his
mother. The court then made the factual
findings that are set forth above.
Appellant acknowledges that the
substantial evidence standard governs and goes on to state: “. . . mother accepts the
finding that she struck J.A. with a phone cord and used a belt as
discipline.” Section 300 speaks of “serious
physical harm” to the child. Mother goes
on to contend that, despite her concession on appeal that she struck J.A.,
there is no substantial evidence of serious physical harm.
Appellant
relies on the circumstances that the court struck the allegation that the phone
cord caused a bleeding laceration on J.A.’s leg and that it is possible that some
of J.A.’s injuries were inflicted by other children at school.
Appellant
overlooks an aspect of the substantial evidence standard that is dispositive of
this appeal. If there are two reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, one which supports the trial court’s
decision and one which does not, this court must
rely on the first inference. (
Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) While it may be a
reasonable inference that some of J.A.’s injuries were caused by fights at
school, this is not the inference that we will draw. We must draw the inference that striking an
eight year old with a belt poses a risk of serious physical harm, which is
certainly a reasonable inference.
That the
trial court struck the allegation that mother had inflicted a bleeding
laceration has no effect on our duty to draw inferences that support the trial
court’s decision. Appellant acknowledges
on appeal that she struck J.A. with a phone cord and also hit him with a belt
as a way of disciplining him. The inference
that supports the trial court’s decision is the reasonable one that such
practices create a risk of serious physical harm.
We do not
find it particularly difficult to conclude that hitting a small child with an
object ‑‑ any object ‑‑ endangers the child. An eight-year-old boy is not a football
player wearing protective padding; an eight-year-old child is small, vulnerable
and easily hurt. J.A.’s statement that
he tried to hide under pillows and blankets to lessen the hurt is very possibly
the best evidence that mother’s blows created a real risk of harm.
We agree
with respondent that this case is much like In
re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438, a case where the mother
had struck her three year old with a belt.
The point is that children should not be hit with objects, if they are
going to be hit at all. The
“distinction” urged by appellant between this case and Mariah T. ‑‑ that, unlike in Mariah T., there was no “deep purple bruising” in this case ‑‑
is unpersuasive. Nor are we moved by the
circumstance that in In re David H. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644-1645, the abuse was palpably more serious than in
this case. Clearly, mother in this case
has more going for her than in some others, David H.
included, but that does not detract from the fact that she seriously endangered
J.A.
That
mother’s other children report no physical abuse and that mother was supported
by a number of strong character references is to her credit and undoubtedly
contributed to the nuanced approach the trial court took in placing J.A. with
her. In a class of cases where good news
is not common, it is refreshing to see improvement and hope for the future.
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
FLIER,
J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J. RUBIN,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] They
are not married and father does not live with mother.
