CA Unpub Decisions

Convicted of 18 sexual offenses against two victims—encompassing kidnapping, shackling and fetishes—and sentenced to 16 consecutive “One Strike” law terms of 25 years to life, defendant Shane Alan Wilson appeals. (Pen. Code, § 667.61.) He contends (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct through insinuating questions; (2) the trial court erred in misinstructing on consciousness of guilt, and in excluding impeachment evidence involving one of the victim’s appearances on The Jerry Springer Show; (3) defense counsel performed ineffectively concerning the admission of pornographic photos; and (4) his sentence is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.
Other than granting defendant an additional day of presentence custody credit, we shall affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant Ulysses Roberson was convicted of beating his four-year-old son to death. The People’s theory was that defendant led a quasi-polygamist cult. Defendant and one of his wives, Rosemary Judith Olive, are of different races (defendant is Black and Olive is White) and their four-year-old son Alexander Sol “Salaam” Olive, the victim, was mixed race.
The race issue caused defendant significant anger, which he focused on the victim long before the murder, referring to him as a “bad seed” and as “having a demon,” among other things. In December 1985 or January 1986, defendant beat the victim to death and disposed of the body; Alexander’s body was never found.
Defendant was charged with murder in 2001. The case went to trial in 2009; the jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder, necessarily rejecting alleged torture-murder and race-murder special circumstances (Pen. Code, § 190, subds. (a)(16) & (a)(18)), but convicted him of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 15 years to life, and he timely appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing expert testimony on cult behavior to explain why the witnesses did not promptly report the killing. Defendant further contends the trial court erred by modifying a cautionary instruction on the frailties of eyewitness testimony to apply to defense evidence, which consisted of witnesses who testified they had seen the victim’s age-progressed picture and subsequently reported seeing a child resembling that picture.
As we will explain, the expert testimony was not completely lacking in foundation and relevance, nor was it prejudicial. Further, any error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Nor was the instruction problematic in the manner briefed by defendant. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

Manuel V. (Father) appeals from the August 2, 2011 jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging Omar G. a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).[1] Father contends that the court improperly considered witness statements in the social studies because they were not admissible under section 355, subdivision (c)(1) and that his due process rights were infringed upon because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not call witnesses. Father also contends that the court erred in denying Father’s request to take judicial notice of the family law file and prior dependency file and erred in denying Father’s request to call paternal grandmother at the dispositional hearing. Further, Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding and that the court’s dispositional orders should be reversed. Angelica G. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. We decline DCFS’s invitation to dismiss the appeal as moot. We disagree with Father’s contentions and affirm the orders of the court.

This is the third appeal in this case, challenging the trial court’s entry of judgment entered pursuant to a valid covenant and agreement for parking. We find the judgment is properly modified, and as so modified, affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Keenan Keith Smith guilty of counts 1 and 2, attempted murder and of count 3, being a felon in possession of a gun. For the purposes of count 3, defendant agreed to stipulate he had a prior conviction. The stipulation, however, was not read to the jury until after the People presented its case-in-chief. Defendant now contends that his motion to dismiss, made under Penal Code section 1118.1,[1] should have been granted as to count 3, because there was insufficient evidence to support that count at the time the People rested. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Edgardo Herrera appeals his convictions for robbery (Pen. Code,[1] § 211) and the associated gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). He alleges on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to establish identity; that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement allegations; and that specific language in a jury instruction directed the jury to convict him. We affirm.

James McCollough appeals from a judgment entered following a bench trial in which the court concluded that he was not entitled to recover unpaid wages for services he performed as the pastor of Hillside Baptist Church of Puente California (the church). McCollough was the pastor for nine years before he was terminated and sought to recover almost $200,000, calculating his pay by relying on a written compensation agreement the former pastor had with the church and seeking 128 months of unpaid wages. The court determined McCollough had no written contract, and his oral contract of $200 per week was modified after the church could no longer afford to pay him. We conclude McCollough’s procedural and substantive challenges to the judgment do not warrant reversal. Thus, we affirm.

Petitioner T.G. challenges by pro per writ petition the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. Petitioner’s son had been detained at his birth, 18 months prior to the juvenile court’s May 2012 termination of services. His son was placed in his and the mother’s custody in January 2012, but they both almost immediately began using narcotics again. Petitioner contends that the juvenile court should have either allowed his 18‑month old son to be in his custody while he completed a one-year “recovery program” or continued reunification services for an extended period. We deny the petition.

In this appeal we will order correction of three apparent clerical errors in the abstract of judgment, two misstating court orders and one the defendant’s date of birth.
Accepting a sentencing offer from the court, defendant Juan Molina waived a preliminary hearing and entered no contest pleas to seven counts of aggravated lewd touching of his two daughters. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).)[1] Counts one through four of the first amended complaint involved a daughter who was 6 and 7 years old between August 4, 2009 and April 21, 2011. Counts five through seven involved an older daughter who was 12 and 13 years old during the same time period. The charges arose from the older daughter’s report to middle school personnel of defendant’s sexual assaults on her and her younger sister, including touching over and under clothing, oral copulation, and attempts at intercourse, all occurring in the family home.[2]
The court imposed sentence of 42 years in prison (seven fully consecutive six-year terms) and a $10,000 restitution fine. The court did not order payment of attorney fees, finding no ability to pay. The court also orally issued “a[n] order prohibiting visitation” between the defendant and the child victims “pursuant to section 1202.05 of the Penal Code.”[3]
In contrast to the court’s oral pronouncement, the clerk’s minutes form for the sentencing hearing includes a checked box for “PC 1202.05,” another checked box for “No Contact,” and a third checked box for “Stay away from” with the names of the victims written in. The abstract of judgment shows the year of defendant’s birth as 1991, rather than 1971. A section titled “Other orders” states in part: “PC 1202.05 ordered. No contact. Stay away from [child victims]” “Atty fines/fees,” giving no amount.

Ronald Forrest Rose appeals from the July 5, 2011 order committing him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health (DMH) for an indeterminate term pursuant to California's Sexual Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).[1] Appellant contends that the commitment violates due process because the 2009 version of the "standardized assessment protocol" underlying the evaluations leading to his commitment is invalid because it is not "standardized." Appellant further argues, that if this court finds that he forfeited the foregoing contention because his counsel failed to timely object, he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Lastly, he asserts that the indeterminate term of commitment violates the equal protection, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and due process clauses of the federal Constitution.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the commitment order.

In 2001 a jury convicted defendant Suleiman Abd Qazza, now a resident of Jordan, of one count of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) against his probation officer and found true he had a prior serious felony (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). The court sentenced him to seven years in prison.
In 2011 defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate his conviction. He made multiple claims in the petition including false arrest, search of his residence without consent or a warrant, false statements from the complaining victim, improper detention at the jail prior to transfer to ICE (United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and failure to provide an interpreter at trial. He also made what amounts to an insufficiency of the evidence claim and asserted his trial lawyer did not make any of the referenced arguments during trial. The court denied the petition on the grounds the remedy was not available to defendant and it had no authority or jurisdiction to vacate the judgment.
After defendant appealed we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case and the disposition. He did not argue against defendant but advised the court he had not found any issues to present on defendant’s behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)

Defendant Ruben Valli was convicted by a jury of nine counts of lewd acts performed upon a minor under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated), three counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), and one count of attempted forcible oral copulation (§§ 288a, subd. (c)(2), 664). The jury also found that as to three of the nine counts of lewd acts, defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) and as to all nine of these counts and the forcible oral copulation count, defendant committed the offenses on more than one victim (§§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(7), 667.61, subds. (b), (c), (e)). The court sentenced him to 90 years to life.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to cross-examine one of the child victims about earlier allegations of sexual abuse. Defendant also contends his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and that the judgment must be modified to reflect 954, rather than 953 days of presentence custody credit. We agree with the latter contention and modify the judgment accordingly. But we affirm the judgment as so modified. The trial court did not err in excluding the evidence and defendant’s sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

In these two appeals, we deal primarily with the accrual of a cause of action for breach of the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders to minority shareholders. Appellant Rebecca Goldstein (Appellant) seeks reversal of separate judgments granted in favor of two categories of respondents. In one is her ex-husband, Adam Markman. The other category consists of Michael and Suzette Kirby, Jon and Penny Fosheim, John Lutzius, Alison Cohen, Lynn Lewis, James and Sarah Sullivan, Craig and Stephanie Leupold, and Scott Griswold (Respondents).[1] Respondents obtained a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of their demurrer without leave to amend. Markman later obtained a judgment of dismissal after the court granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. Appellant separately appealed from both judgments; we have consolidated the appeals for oral argument and decision.
Both the demurrer and the motion rested on the same basis: Appellant’s claims were time-barred. She had waited too long to assert her claim that a corporate reorganization arranged by Markman and Respondents breached their fiduciary duties to her as a minority holder of stock in a company of which they were majority stockholders. Her other claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, and interference with contractual relations were similarly time-barred.
We affirm both judgments. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning that the limitation period on Appellant’s first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty began to run when her stock became restricted. The parties have agreed that event took place in May 2006. The remaining causes of action had, for the most part, even shorter limitations periods. The trial court correctly dismissed the lawsuit without leave to amend.