CA Unpub Decisions

Anne E. Houle appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing her employment discrimination and defamation complaint against respondents Northrop Grumman Corporation and Northrop Grumman employee Alan Steinke. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Johntai Jackson, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered following the trial court’s granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendants and respondents JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (the Banks). We affirm. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to shorten the time for hearing on the motion and set the hearing within the applicable statutory time frame. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 438, subd. (e) & 1005, subd. (b).)[1] It also properly exercised its discretion to decline to order an additional continuance of the motion.

Brandon G. (the minor) appeals from the order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging he illegally possessed a firearm (former Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1))[1] and committed an assault with a firearm upon Star J. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). He contends (1) the order sustaining is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination as a result of certain sustained objections; and (3) declaring the gun possession crime a “felony” was error. We affirm.

Louis Joseph Hunyadi appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2), counts 1 and 2),[1] and two counts of making criminal threats (§ 422, counts 3 and 4). The jury also found true the special allegations that appellant personally used a firearm (§12022.5, subds. (a) and (d)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 20 years and four months, imposing consecutive sentences on each of the four counts. Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the consecutive sentences imposed on counts 3 and 4 violated section 654 because the criminal threats were incidental to the assaults with a firearm.
We hold that the trial court erred in failing to stay the sentences for the criminal threat convictions (counts 3 and 4) pursuant to section 654 and will modify the judgment accordingly. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

Jonathan Huynh appeals from his judgment of conviction by jury verdict of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). He argues his constitutional rights to remain silent, to due process, and a fair trial were violated by the court’s order that he could not present a defense without admissible evidence of the foundational basis, which could only come from defendant’s testimony. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his Pitchess motion, and that the court erred in imposing a $520 assessment and surcharge. Respondent concedes error with respect to the last issue.
We conclude that defendant’s rights were not violated by the trial court’s order that his testimony was necessary to lay a foundation for the defense that the victim died during a consensual episode of sexual asphyxiation. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for discovery of material in the personnel files of two investigating detectives, as related to the defense that his statements to them were coerced. We shall conditionally reverse the judgment to allow the trial court to conduct the appropriate in camera review, as we explain. We reverse as to the $520 penalty assessment imposed on the restitution fines.

Appellant Janet C. Majors was convicted on her plea of nolo contendere of a felony violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (d),[1] theft by noncaretaker from an elder adult. The court dismissed two charged felony violations of section 476a, subdivision (a), issuance of nonsufficient funds checks in an amount in excess of $450.
At the time of sentencing, on January 4, 2012, the court granted Major’s motion pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) and reduced the offense to a misdemeanor.[2] The court placed Majors on formal probation for a period of three years, ordered her to serve 60 days in jail and 160 hours on a work program, awarded 3 days of actual custody credits, but no conduct credits. The court also imposed a $100 restitution fund fine, $40 court security fee, $71 jail booking fee, $30 criminal conviction assessment, and $240 per year payment for probation supervision. The court ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $14,046.06, plus interest at 10 percent per year.
Majors filed a timely notice of appeal on January 31, 2012, challenging only the amount of restitution ordered.

Jose Alberto Montano (appellant) appeals from a trial court order denying his nonstatutory motion to vacate his guilty plea to two counts of sale or transportation of cocaine. He contends the motion should have been granted on the ground that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to fully advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. We dismiss the appeal because appellant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause as required by Penal Code[1] section 1237.5. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1).)[2]

In May 2011, a jury found defendant Jesse Mario Garza guilty of felony stalking and misdemeanor trespass related to a series of events that took place in November and December 2010. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found defendant had prior convictions, including a serious and violent felony conviction. In July 2011, defendant was sentenced to a total of six years in prison and received 330 days of presentence credits pursuant to section 4019 of the Penal Code. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his felony stalking conviction pursuant to section 646.9, subdivision (a). The record shows sufficient evidence to sustain the stalking conviction; we therefore affirm.
Defendant also argues he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits pursuant to section 4019, as amended in 2011. Because defendant committed the crimes and was sentenced before the operative date of the 2011 amendment to section 4019 (October 1, 2011), which operates prospectively only, he is not entitled to any additional presentence conduct credits.

In this personal injury case, we are called upon primarily to determine whether juror declarations may be used as admissible evidence to support a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. Ever since the California Supreme Court handed down the leading case on this issue, People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342 (Hutchinson), courts have struggled to determine whether such declarations recount “overt acts” or “subjective mental processes,” evidence of the former being admissible and of the latter inadmissible. The trial court in this case decided that the declarations were inadmissible and denied the part of a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct.
Portions of the declarations arguably gave evidence of admissible “overt acts.” Because the trial court stated what its ruling would be if the declarations had been admitted, however, we affirm the order denying the motion for new trial. The defendant also failed to present evidence of error regarding excessive damages for pain and suffering. Accordingly, we also affirm the denial of the motion on the basis the damages were excessive.

In this juvenile dependency case, twin boys were removed from the custody of their mother, Teresa N. (mother), and father, Robert M. (father). After reunification efforts failed, the juvenile court found the twins likely to be adopted and entered an order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 366.26.)[1] Mother appeals, challenging the termination of her parental rights as to one twin only, Robert. Mother asserts insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Robert was likely to be adopted. We agree, reverse the juvenile court’s order, and remand for the juvenile court to hold a new hearing under section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for Robert.

Appellant, V.B., a minor, was placed on probation after being adjudged a ward of the court in 2009 and continued on probation after being readjudged a ward in 2010. In November 2011, he admitted allegations he violated his probation, and the court ordered that appellant be placed under the care, custody, and control of the probation officer for suitable out-of-home placement. The instant appeal followed.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

Appellant/defendant Shannon Dion Shine was convicted of count II, corporal injury to a cohabitant with a prior conviction (Pen. Code,[1] § 273.5, subds. (a), (c)); count III, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and count IV, corporal injury to a cohabitant with a prior conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). He had three prior strike convictions and one prior prison term enhancement. He was sentenced to an aggregate third strike term of 50 years to life plus one year for the enhancement.
On appeal, defendant argues the court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence as propensity evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109, and asserts such evidence violated his constitutional right to due process. Defendant also contends the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss his prior strike convictions and instead imposed two third strike terms. We will affirm.

R.V. (Father) is the father of D.V., who was detained as a newborn in September 2011, and later declared a dependent child. Father asks this Court to issue a writ directing the juvenile court to: (1) vacate its May 29, 2012, order setting a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 266.26;[1] and (2) hold a hearing on the issue of preferential relative placement of D.V. with Father’s mother. Specifically, Father contends the juvenile court erred at the six-month review hearing when it: (1) failed to allow Father a meaningful opportunity to be heard on whether Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) had properly evaluated his mother’s home for preferential relative placement; and (2) failed to perform its duty to determine whether preferential relative placement was appropriate under section 361. As discussed post, we deny the writ petition.

K.L. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders (1) denying her petition to modify a court order related to her daughter, N.B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388),[1] and (2) terminating her parental rights to N.B. (§ 366.26). Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her petition to modify a court order because Mother proved that (1) her circumstances had changed, and (2) it would be in N.B.’s best interests to order reunification services. Mother asserts the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights because the court should have applied the parent-child bond exception. We affirm the judgment.