CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Erica Cassandra Valenzuela is serving a 10-year prison sentence for repeatedly slashing her boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend in the face and arms with a sharp object.

On August 15, 2011, a jury found defendant Jose Leon Aguilar guilty of operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801 (count 1)) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a) (count 2)). In a bifurcated trial, the court found true the allegations that defendant had a prior conviction for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (Pen. Code, § 666.5), and that he had a prior conviction for which he served a prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to prison for a total term of four years. He appeals, contending the trial court erred in instructing the jury and ordering him to reimburse the county for court-appointed counsel.

Defendant and appellant Danny Lopez is serving a three-year state prison term after a jury found him guilty of a 2011 attempted robbery with a deadly weapon enhancement in case No. SWF1100369. He is also serving a concurrent two-year term for a 2009 conviction for unlawful entry of a motor vehicle, after his probation was revoked, in case No. SWF029661. Defendant appeals from both cases.

On June 1, 2011, a jury found defendant Patrick Mark Dillon guilty of premeditated murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and that he personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23)). On August 15, 2011, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life. He appeals, contending the evidence is insufficient to establish premeditation. We affirm.

On March 29, 2011, a jury found defendant Jacqueline Staten guilty of grand theft (Pen. Code,[1] § 487, subd. (a); count 1), petty theft by embezzlement (§ 484, subd. (a); count 2), unlawful use of an access card in excess of $400 (§ 484g, subd. (a); count 3), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 4). The jury further found true the allegation that defendant committed count 4 by an express or implied threat of force or violence upon the victim. Defendant admitted that she committed the charged offenses while “out on bail.” (§ 12022.1.) On April 28, 2011, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and granted defendant formal probation for three years on the condition, among others, that she serve 365 days in county jail. She appeals.

As a result, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for the personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a total of 16 years to life, plus the usual fines and fees.
Defendant now contends:
1. The trial court erred by failing to define “provocation.”
2. The trial court erred by failing to instruct on perfect and imperfect self-defense.
We find no error. Hence, we will affirm.

Defendant William Thomas Hussey appeals from his conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and elder abuse causing death (§ 368, subd. (b)(1), (b)(3)(B)). He contends the trial court erred in refusing his counsel’s request to modify the flight instruction to inform the jury that flight was circumstantial evidence of guilt, and as such, was subject to all the restrictions on the use of circumstantial evidence. We find that any error was harmless. Defendant also contends, and the People agree, that the parole revocation fine imposed under section 1202.45 must be changed to match the restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4. We will order the minute order and abstract of judgment to be amended accordingly.

L.F., Sr., and Liliana A. (together, the parents) appeal following the dispositional hearing in the juvenile dependency case of their son L.F., Jr., and daughter Paloma F. (together, the children). The parents contend that the court erred in denying them an evidentiary hearing on their request for relative placement. Additionally, L.F., Sr., contends that the court erred in removing the children from his care, and Liliana contends that the court erred in denying her reunification services. The parents join in each other's contentions. We affirm.

Proceedings in mandate after the superior court granted petitioner's motion to compel arbitration and denied request that it order individual, rather than classwide, arbitration. William S. Dato, Judge. Petition granted and remanded with instructions.

Alvaro Miranda and Danny Luna filed a class action complaint against Truly Nolen of America (Truly Nolen) alleging violations of California's wage and hour laws. Truly Nolen moved to compel arbitration of the claims under arbitration agreements signed by the parties and requested that the court order plaintiffs to arbitrate on an individual and not a class basis. The arbitration agreements did not contain a specific provision pertaining to the availability or unavailability of classwide arbitration. After briefing and a hearing, the court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but rejected Truly Nolen's request that the court order individual arbitration, relying on Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 (Gentry).

Daniel Manley appeals his sentence following a guilty plea to two counts of committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)[1] Manley contends the trial court abused its discretion by not granting him probation and by ordering him to pay an administrative screening fee. (§ 1463.07.) We determine that imposition of the fee was unauthorized, and strike it. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Arturo Gomez pleaded no contest to receipt of a stolen vehicle and transportation of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced him to a stipulated four-year prison term and granted a certificate of probable cause.
Defendant contends he should have been sentenced to jail rather than prison because prospective application of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (Stats. 2011, ch. 15) violated his federal and state equal protection rights.
But defendant was sentenced in this case after the effective date of the Realignment Act. There is no issue regarding prospective or retroactive application of the law. Instead, defendant stipulated to the prison sentence as part of his plea agreement, and the prison sentence was authorized by Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (a), because defendant was already sentenced to prison in a prior case.
We will affirm the judgment.

E.B., father of 12-year-old El.B., five-year-old R.B. and three-year-old E.B., Jr., appeals from a juvenile court order awarding custody to mother, denying visitation for father, and terminating the dependency.[1]
On appeal, father contends the denial of visitation lacks evidentiary support and exceeds the juvenile court’s discretion. We disagree and will affirm the order.

Following an unreported pretrial conference, defense counsel indicated that defendant Alberto Hernandez desired to resolve the case as outlined by the trial court. Defendant would plead guilty to petty theft with a prior and the trial court would sentence him to the low term of 16 months in prison, doubled for a prior strike, but the trial court would dismiss a second strike allegation. The prosecutor objected to the proposed resolution and asked the trial court to state a reason for dismissing the second strike allegation. The trial court replied, “I think . . . it’s unconstitutional and cruel and unusual punishment to do life for a petty theft.” The prosecutor said “[i]t sounds like . . . you disagree with the three-strikes law, because a three-strikes law petty theft can result in that;” the trial court answered, “yeah, I guess I do in that.” Defendant pleaded guilty and the trial court sentenced him to prison for the low term of 16 months, doubled for a prior strike.

Appellant C.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment and dispositional order adjudging him a ward and ordering him home on probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 800.) He contends the juvenile court erred by (1) failing to hold a Marsden[1] hearing when appellant’s mother inquired about obtaining new counsel, and (2) including a maximum period of confinement on the dispositional order.
We conclude (1) the juvenile court’s obligation to hold a Marsden hearing was not triggered because there was no clear indication that appellant desired a substitution of trial counsel on the ground of counsel’s alleged deficiencies; and (2) we agree with appellant and the Attorney General that the maximum period of confinement should be stricken from the dispositional order.
We will strike the maximum period of confinement from the dispositional order and otherwise affirm.
Recitation of the underlying facts regarding appellant’s offense is unnecessary in light of his contentions on appeal. The facts relevant to his contentions are recited in the discussion.