CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff, Nake M. Kamrany, appeals from a judgment entered after a demurrer dismissal. The first amended complaint was brought against defendant, Hafizah Shahryar, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of Ishaq Shahryar and the trustee of the Ishaq M. Shahryar Trust. Judgment was entered in defendant’s favor after the demurrer on the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend on laches grounds.

Rickey M., Sr. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders on a petition under section 342 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] pertaining to his son Seth M. (now age 16). Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his requests for continuances of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings and violated his due process right to a contested disposition hearing. We agree and reverse.

On April 7, 2011, an amended information was filed, charging appellant Alvaro Ruiz in count 1 with the robbery of William Carrillo (Pen. Code, § 211), and in count 2 with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a). In connection with count 1, the information alleged that appellant personally used a firearm in the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)), and that the offense had been committed in association with, and for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The information also alleged that appellant had suffered a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations. At appellant’s request, the trial court bifurcated trial on the prior conviction allegation.

Defendant David Robert Akkerman was charged by information with one count of petty theft with a prior theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 666), as well as prior offense allegations (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)). Defendant entered a no contest plea, admitting one prior theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)). The factual basis for the plea is as follows (as established in defendant’s probation report): On August 17, 2010, at a Target store in Los Angeles County, store security personnel observed defendant select a piece of luggage and fraudulently return it with an old receipt for a cash refund of $54.86.

Plaintiff Michelle Riley appeals a judgment in favor of defendants trustee of the Mixsell Revocable Living Trust, Century 21 and Diane Long on her slip and fall personal injury action. In a special verdict, the jury found that defendant Century 21 was negligent, but that these defendants did not cause harm to Riley. We conclude, among other things, that the trial court did not commit error by denying Riley's request to call an expert in radiology to testify at trial. We affirm.

Appellant Johnny Gonzales Romero appeals his convictions for first degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to support the convictions. In addition, he contends the court made inappropriate statements to prospective jurors at the beginning of voir dire and failed to properly exercise its discretion when imposing consecutive sentences for the two counts. Finally, he contends -- and respondent agrees -- that the sentence imposed for the attempted murder count was unlawful, that custody credits were miscalculated, and that the abstract of judgment cited the incorrect statutory subdivision for one enhancement. We remand for correction of the sentencing errors, but otherwise affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Capitol Films U.S., LLC (Capitol), a film production company, appeals the judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the second amended complaint against defendant and respondent Aon/Albert G. Ruben Insurance Services, Inc. (Aon), an insurance broker. The trial court found Capitol’s claims for professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Appellants Pedro Gabriel Trejo and Jesus Marquez were convicted following a jury trial of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 812, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The jury found true the firearm allegations that a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)), and did so causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)). The jury also found true the criminal street gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury acquitted appellants of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).[2] The court sentenced each appellant to state prison for 50 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for conspiracy plus 25 years to life for the firearm allegation that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. The court stayed the remaining firearm and gang enhancements pursuant to section 654. Appellants were ordered to pay jointly and severally $7,500 in victim restitution.
Appellants contend (1) the trial court violated their constitutional rights to confront witnesses by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the two key witnesses; (2) the victim restitution order constituted an unauthorized sentence in the absence of a murder conviction; and (3) the true findings on the firearm enhancements must be reversed as inconsistent with the jury’s verdicts acquitting appellants of murder. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, Robert McCaskill, of heroin sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). The trial court found defendant had: incurred a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12); served four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)); and sustained two previous convictions for violations of Health and Safety Code sections 11379, subdivision (a), and 11352, subdivision (a) (Health & Saf. Code § 11370.2, subd. (a)). The trial court struck the prior prison term and drug conviction findings. Defendant was sentenced to six years in state prison. We affirm the judgment. We remand with directions to amend the abstract of judgment.

Appellant Jerome Jeffrey Belser, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] with findings that he had suffered a prior felony conviction of attempted first degree burglary (§ 664/459) within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 14 years in state prison, consisting of eight years on the burglary charge based on the middle term of four years doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and a one-year enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).[2]
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a prior attempted burglary because the offenses lacked sufficient similarities, and also erred by instructing the jury that it could consider appellant’s prior criminal conduct for an improper purpose. We affirm.

Appellant Warner Emmanuel appeals from a money judgment in favor of respondent Rosina Nesbitt, individually and as trustee for the Rosina Nesbitt Trust. He contends (1) there was insufficient evidence of his finances to support the award of punitive damages; and (2) the Rosina Nesbitt Trust should not have been awarded attorney fees. We conclude the punitive damages award must be stricken on the basis of insufficient evidence, but we will sustain the award of attorney fees.

In this consolidated appeal, appellant Millennium Corporate Solutions (Millennium) appeals from a money judgment following a jury verdict and from a postjudgment order awarding it a pro tanto credit as a result of a settlement by a joint tortfeasor, Sherry Lopez. Millennium contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to bifurcate trial; (2) the trial court erred in conditionally granting Millennium’s motion for a new trial because the negligent interference claim was preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Code sections 3426 to 3426.11 (CUTSA); (3) the court erred in denying Millennium’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; and (4) the court erred in calculating the credit for the Lopez settlement. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the bifurcation motion and the motion for a JNOV, but erred in conditionally granting the motion for a new trial. We further conclude the court did not err in calculating the offset credit for the Lopez settlement. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a recalculation of the amount of the money judgment against Millennium.

Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing her daughter from her care after a second supplemental petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. Because there was sufficient evidence of a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety, and emotional needs if she were allowed to be in petitioner’s care, the petition will be denied.

Phillip Eban Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon his plea of no contest to assault with intent to commit a sex crime (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a))[1] in exchange for a sentence not to exceed four years in prison. His court appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.