M.
Filed
6/20/12 In re Jayden M. CA5
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re JAYDEN M., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JAYDEN M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F063353
(Super.
Ct. No. JW125448-02 )
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
Gillian
Black, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Sean M.
McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Following a
contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile
court found true allegations that Jayden M. (appellant) unlawfully
purchased and possessed tobacco and tobacco paraphernalia (Pen. Code,
§ 308, subd. (b))
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] (count 1); resisted and obstructed a peace
officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2); and violated probation (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3). The court ordered that appellant continue on
probation with a placement at Camp Owen, after which he would be released to
the custody of his mother.
On appeal,
appellant contends there is insufficient
evidence to support the finding that he obstructed or delayed a peace
officer because the officer was not engaged in the lawful performance of his
duties when he detained appellant. He
also contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied his motions to
suppress and dismiss. We disagree and
affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At 7:00
a.m. on June 14, 2011, Bakersfield Police Officer Felipe Juarez was dispatched
to a home on Park Way, in the City of Bakersfield. Upon arrival, he discovered appellant
sleeping in a chair in the backyard of the home. Juarez asked appellant what he was doing
outside, and appellant said his mother would not allow him inside. Juarez had no information about why he had
been dispatched to this address, so he decided to contact appellant’s mother to
determine why she had called the police, and asked that appellant remain in the
chair while he did so.
As Officer
Juarez approached the back door of the house, appellant stood up and ran out of
the backyard. Juarez ordered appellant
to stop numerous times, but he continued to run. Appellant was eventually apprehended and the
officer “took him to the ground.â€
Appellant was uncooperative and struggled. Juarez struck appellant once in the face with
his fist and once in the midsection with his knee to subdue and
After
appellant was placed in handcuffs, Officer Juarez did a “quick search†for
weapons and escorted him back to his mother’s house. At the residence, Juarez searched appellant
and found a Bic lighter, a glass tobacco pipe, and an empty container that had
an odor of marijuana.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
Appellant,
age 16, testified on his own behalf that he was asleep in a chair in the
backyard all night because his mother would not let him into the house because
he was not following her rules. When
Officer Juarez woke him, appellant told him what he was doing outside. Appellant acknowledged that he knew Juarez
was an officer because he was in full uniform, but claimed he never heard
Juarez tell him to stop running.
Appellant got up and ran because he “freaked out†and did not know
whether he was going to be arrested. He
knew Juarez was chasing him, but claimed that he knelt down on the ground to
surrender. According to appellant, while
Juarez chased him, the officer fell and when he resumed the chase, he was angry
and said he was going to “beat [his] ass.â€
Juarez then slammed appellant down, hit him approximately five times in
the face, and struck him once with his knee.
Appellant denied struggling with Juarez.
Appellant admitted he had a container with marijuana residue in it in
his possession at the time.
DISCUSSION
I. THE LEGALITY OF
THE DETENTION
Appellant
contends there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that he
obstructed or delayed an officer because Officer Juarez was not engaged in the
lawful performance of his duty when he detained appellant. We disagree.
The same
standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of
the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction.
(In re Cheri T. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Jose R.
(1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In
either type of case, we must determine whether, on the entire record viewed in
the light most favorable to the People, a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People
v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
“In making this assessment the court looks to the whole record, not just
the evidence favorable to the respondent to determine if the evidence
supporting the verdict is substantial in light of other facts. [Citations.]â€
(People v. Holt (1997) 15
Cal.4th 619, 667.)
“Substantial
evidence†in this context means “evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.†(
578; accord, People v. Hill (1998) 17
Cal.4th 800, 848-849.)
For a
violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), the prosecution must prove: (1)
the defendant willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer; (2)
when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties; and (3)
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1);
1325, 1329.) Thus, before a person can
be convicted of this offense, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense against him was
committed. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815; see also
1179, 1214-1215 [prosecution must prove every element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt].) “‘The rule
flows from the premise that because an officer has no duty to take illegal
action, he or she is not engaged in “duties†for purposes of an offense defined
in such terms, if the officer’s conduct is unlawful.…’ [Citation.]â€
(In re Manuel G., supra, at p.
815.)
Appellant
argues that Officer Juarez was not acting lawfully because the detention was
not reasonable. Appellant is correct
that well-established rules governing police conduct apply here: that an
investigative stop or detention is justified if the circumstances known or
apparent to the officer include specific and articulable facts that make the
officer suspect (1) some activity related to crime has taken place, is
occurring or is about to occur, and (2) the person to be stopped is involved in
that activity. The requisite facts must
be such as would cause any reasonable officer in a like position, drawing on
his or her training and experience, to suspect the same criminal activity and
the same involvement by the person in question.
(In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d
888, 893.)
According
to his testimony, Officer Juarez responded to a relatively early morning call
from appellant’s mother and found appellant asleep in the backyard. Appellant told him he was outside because his
mother would not allow him into the residence.
Juarez, who was provided no further information when dispatched, then
determined that he needed to contact appellant’s mother “to validate his
statement; make sure that’s the reason he wasn’t inside.†Juarez ordered appellant to stay in the chair
while he made contact with his mother.
Juarez then ran, leading to a struggle between the two and the eventual
apprehension of appellant. The question
presented is thus whether Juarez’s actions were reasonable.
After
having learned of a call to the police department by appellant’s mother, from
police dispatch, and speaking to appellant, a minor, it was reasonable for
Juarez to suspect either that appellant might be beyond the control of his
parent (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601) or that appellant’s mother failed
to provide adequate care for him (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds.
(b), (c)). In order to investigate
either situation, Juarez requested that appellant remain seated while he
contacted his mother inside the house.
Juarez’s action in detaining appellant for the length of time it would
take to contact his mother in the residence was reasonable.
Section
148, subdivision (a)(1), uses the word “delays†in addition to “resists†and
“obstructs.†Officer Juarez had the
legal right, indeed duty, (see In re Tony
C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894) to detain appellant. Therefore appellant, “if he was aware of the
officer’s desire, had the concomitant duty to permit himself to be
detained.†(People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985-986.) Thus, appellant’s flight and struggle with
Juarez delayed the officer’s performance of his official duty, violating the
statute.
Appellant
relies on In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1638 (Eskiel), in which
an officer on patrol heard a report of a possible gang fight involving 10 to 12
people, including one possibly armed.
While the officer proceeded to that location, he was advised by
broadcast from other units that they were pursuing several people on foot
through a park. The officer drove to the
other side of the park to cut off the persons being pursued. He saw several individuals and ordered them
to stop. They instead attempted to
conceal themselves in a nearby creek.
After being ordered to reveal themselves, the defendant and three others
exited the creek. A pat-down search of
the defendant revealed a bag of cocaine.
The defendant was subsequently convicted of possession and resisting
arrest. (Id. at pp. 1641-1642.)
The
defendant brought a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the detention
was unlawful. He interposed a “
contents of the radio broadcast the officer overheard. The officer testified at the suppression
hearing that the only reason he detained the defendant was because he was
fleeing from other officers and thereby resisting arrest. None of the other officers testified at the
suppression hearing and the prosecutor failed to establish an evidentiary basis
for the information contained in the broadcast.
(Eskiel, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1642.) The court in
which could not be traced back to its source, was nothing more than an
anonymous tip, and the officer’s observation of the defendant in the general
location identified in the broadcast was “wholly insufficient to justify a
detention.†(Id. at p. 1644.) Since the
detention was unlawful, the defendant’s suppression motion should have been
granted. In addition, the defendant’s
flight from the attempted unlawful detention could not support the finding that
the defendant had resisted arrest. (
We find
present here. While Officer Juarez
arrived at the residence without information regarding the nature of the
summons, other than that appellant’s mother had called, he immediately found
appellant who admitted that he had been excluded from the house by his
mother. Such information directly
provided Juarez with reasonable suspicion that appellant could have been a
delinquent or at risk. As stated in
had come upon a gang fight or a person armed with a rifle it would not be
necessary to rely upon the radio broadcast to furnish reasonable suspicion to
detain.†(Eskiel, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1644, fn. 2.) Here Juarez personally had reasonable
suspicion to detain appellant.
Appellant
also argues that, even if the initial detention was lawful, Officer Juarez’s
use of unreasonable force rendered the arrest unlawful. Where an arrest is made with excessive force,
the arrest is unlawful. (
161, 167.)
Appellant’s
account of the arrest differed from Officer Juarez’s account. But appellant’s assertion that there was
excessive force that rendered his arrest unlawful would require that we credit
appellant’s account of the arrest and reject the testimony of Juarez, which the
trial court found credible. This we
cannot do. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility].)
Substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the detention was lawful
and that appellant committed a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) and
his claim to the contrary is rejected.
II. MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
Appellant
contends that the juvenile court’s denial of his suppression motion was error
and, as a result, the juvenile court’s true finding on count 1 must be
vacated. Officer Juarez’s search
following appellant’s arrest led to the discovery of the tobacco paraphernalia
evidence underlying the court’s true finding of a violation of section 308,
subdivision (b). As argued by appellant,
since “flight alone does not provide probable cause for arrest,†his arrest was
not lawful, the subsequent search was not lawful and the true finding on count
1 must be reversed. We disagree.
Following
the People’s case, the court heard and denied appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1. Denial of a motion to suppress evidence under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 is subject to the same standard of
review as a denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section
1538.5. The juvenile court finds the
facts, selects the applicable rule of law, and finally applies the rule of law
to determine if there has been a constitutional violation. (People
v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140.)
The factual determinations of the court are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Ibid.) We independently
review the court’s selection of law and application of that law to the
facts. (Ibid.)
In order to determine whether
Officer Juarez had cause to arrest appellant, we first ascertain when the
arrest occurred and what that arresting officer knew. (People
v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 409.)
We must accept the trial court’s express or implied findings on disputed
factual issues in the first step of this inquiry where those findings are
supported by substantial evidence. (
We then decide whether the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest
constituted adequate cause. For this
question we use our independent judgment. (Ibid.)
As
discussed above, the evidence before the court was that Officer Juarez had some
reasonable suspicion that appellant was either a delinquent or at risk. He was therefore entitled to detain him for
the purpose of dispelling or confirming those suspicions quickly and by the
least intrusive means. (
435, 440.) Juarez asked appellant to
stay in the chair while he contacted appellant’s mother in the house. Appellant then ran, causing the officer to chase
him. When he attempted to apprehend him,
appellant struggled to keep his hands free and brought his knees up, physically
resisting Juarez’s efforts to detain him.
When a peace officer has the legal right to detain a person, and that
person delays or obstructs the officer, the person commits a misdemeanor. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1);
at pp. 985-986.) At this point, Juarez
had probable cause to arrest appellant for obstructing or delaying an officer
in the performance of a lawful duty.
Incident to
a lawful arrest, a police officer may search and seize items from an arrestee’s
person. (People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, 90.) The search may also include entry into
defendant’s pockets. (
420, 424; People v. Limon (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 524, 536.) The lawful search
incident to appellant’s arrest led to the discovery of the tobacco
paraphernalia evidence underlying the court’s true finding on count 1.
We find no
merit to appellant’s argument that the juvenile court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress or that the juvenile court’s true finding on count 1 must be
vacated.
III. MOTION TO
DISMISS
Appellant
contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss
counts 1 and 2 of the petition for insufficiency of the evidence, pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1.
We disagree.
Welfare and
Institutions Code section 701.1 is substantially similar to Penal Code section
1118 and as such is treated identically.
(In re Anthony J. (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 718, 727.) Under section
1118.1, a defendant can move for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency
of the evidence before submission of the case to the trial court or jury. (See People
v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 5 [section 1118.1 gives the
defendant “the power to move for an acquittal for insufficient evidence as a
matter of lawâ€].)
“‘The
standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of
acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an
appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, that is, “whether from the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the
existence of each element of the offense charged.â€â€™ [Citation.]
‘The purpose of a motion under section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as
possible those few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a
prima facie case.’ [Citations.] The question ‘is simply whether the
prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury
for its determination.’ [Citation.] The sufficiency of the evidence is tested at
the point the motion is made.
[Citations.]†(
200.)
We
independently review a trial court’s ruling under section 1118.1 as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. (People
v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1213.)
Appellant
was charged in count 1 of unlawful purchase and possession of tobacco and
tobacco paraphernalia (§ 308, subd. (b)) and in count 2 with resisting and
obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). At the close of evidence, appellant moved to dismiss
both counts for insufficiency of the evidence.
Appellant
argues the motion to dismiss as to count 1 should have been granted because his
arrest was unlawful, the subsequent search was not a search incident to a
lawful arrest, and the evidence obtained thereby should have been excluded. According to appellant, the only evidence
supporting count 1 was the Bic lighter, tobacco pipe and an empty container
found on his person. Since the evidence
was unlawfully seized, absence of any evidence warrants dismissal of count 1.
Appellant
argues the motion to dismiss as to count 2 should have been granted because he
was not lawfully detained at the time he fled from Officer Juarez. Because the detention was not lawful, Officer
Juarez was not acting in the lawful performance of his duties, and appellant’s
flight did not resist, delay, or obstruct the officer in the performance of his
duties, as required by section 148, subdivision (a)(1), and count 2 should have
been dismissed.
Here, there
was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s denial of appellant’s
motion to dismiss. As discussed at
length above, Officer Juarez had an articulable suspicion that appellant was
either a delinquent or an at-risk youth.
In order to ascertain what the situation was, Juarez asked appellant to
stay in the chair while he went to talk to appellant’s mother. But appellant ran and Officer Juarez pursued
him. Once Juarez was able to physically
seize appellant, appellant obstructed and delayed Juarez’s attempt to detain
him. At this point, Juarez had cause to
arrest appellant. When he did so, a
search incident to the arrest discovered the tobacco paraphernalia.
The
juvenile court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1, and we reject his claim to the
contrary.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
_____________________
Franson, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________
Gomes, Acting P.J.
_____________________
Detjen, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The
testimony regarding the odor of marijuana was allowed; when the prosecutor
asked Officer Juarez whether he located anything else, Juarez said marijuana
residue. Appellant objected to the
testimony regarding marijuana residue, and the court sustained the objection.
