P. v. Baulknight
Filed 4/17/13 P. v. Baulknight CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ERIC BAULKNIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
D061905
(Super. Ct.
No. SCD234645)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
Defendant
Eric Baulknight pled guilty to committing crimes on June 5, 2011.
He also admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction and a prior
strike conviction. The court imposed a
13-year stipulated sentence.
Baulknight's
sole appellate contention is that the court erred in calculating his
presentence conduct credits. (Pen. Code,
in failing to award him enhanced presentence conduct credits under the current
version of section 4019. The contention
is without merit and we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL SUMMMARY
The
following factual summary is based on the probation report. On June
5, 2011, Baulknight punched his elderly mother after she refused to
give him money for marijuana, resulting in substantial
face. Later that evening, Baulknight was
transported to a mental health facility, where he attacked one of the nurses,
punching her in the jaw and
throat.
On February 15, 2012, Baulknight pled
guilty to committing willful cruelty to an elder adult resulting in great
bodily injury and an assault by force likely to inflict great bodily
injury. (§§ 368, subd. (b)(1), 243, subd.
(d).) On April 19, 2012, the court sentenced Baulknight to 13
years, and awarded him 320 actual days and 160 conduct credits. Baulknight was in continuous local custody from
the date he committed the crimes until he was sentenced.
DISCUSSION
Baulknight
contends the court erred in calculating his custody credits based on the prior
version of section 4019, rather than on the newer version of the statute that
became operative on October 1, 2011,
while he was awaiting sentencing.
Under
section 4019, defendants are entitled to earn credit towards their sentences by
performing additional labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and for good behavior
(§ 4019, subd. (c)). These credits
are referred to as conduct credits. (
793.)
The
Legislature has repeatedly amended section 4019 regarding the proper
calculation of conduct credits. When
Baulknight committed his offense in June 2011, individuals who had been
convicted of a serious or violent felony were entitled to two days of conduct
credits for every four days actually served.
(See Former § 4019, subd. (f); Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2;
former § 2933,
subd. (e)(1); see People v. Rajanayagam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48-49 (Rajanayagam).) However, when Baulknight was in local custody
awaiting sentencing, the Legislature amended section 4019 as part of the
Realignment Act and amended former section 2933. The amendments, which became operative on October 1, 2011, eliminated the prior
felony strike disqualification and increased the amount of conduct credits
earned by prisoners in local custody to one day of conduct credit for each day
spent in actual custody. (§ 4019, subds.
(b), (c), (f); Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53; see also Stats. 2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess.,
ch. 12, § 35
(Assem. Bill No. 17 (2011-2012 Ex. Sess.).)
In awarding
160 conduct credits to Baulknight, the court applied the former version of
section 4019 in effect at the time Baulknight committed his crime.
Baulknight contends the applicable conduct credits he accrued after the
amendment's operative date (October 1,
2011) should have been calculated using the more generous amended
rate. He argues the reduced conduct
credit award for his time served after October
1, 2011 violates section 4019 and his equal protection rights.
Baulknight
forfeited this argument by failing to raise the issue in the proceedings
below. By not objecting to the conduct
credit calculation, Baulknight waived his right to challenge any error in the
court's award amount. (
305, 312.)
We also
conclude the argument fails on its merits.
With respect to the October 1, 2011 amendment, section 4019, subdivision
(h) states: "The changes to this
section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined
to a county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or road camp
1, 2011. Any days earned by a
prisoner prior to October 1, 2011,
shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law." (Italics added.)
Baulknight
was confined for crimes committed in June 2011, which is before October 1, 2011. Thus, the amended statute's new credit calculation
rate is expressly inapplicable to Baulknight.
Although
recognizing that the first sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) states
that the amendment "shall apply prospectively" and "shall apply
to prisoners who are confined . . . for a crime committed on or after October
1, 2011," Baulknight nonetheless contends he is entitled to take advantage
of the amendment for local time served after
October 1, 2011, because the second sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h)
refers to days earned by a prisoner before the October 1 date. Baulknight argues that to give meaning to
this second sentence, the statute must be interpreted as providing that days
earned by a prisoner after October 1, 2011 must be calculated at the rate
established by the new law, even if the crime was committed before the October
1 date.
Several
courts have rejected the identical argument.
(See, e.g., Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th 42; People v. Ellis (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1546 (Ellis).) The Rajanayagam
court explained: "[S]ubdivision
(h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature intended the enhanced conduct
credit provision to apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes
on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision
(h)'s second sentence does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to
any other group, namely those defendants who committed offenses before October
1, 2011, but are in local custody on or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)'s second sentence
attempts to clarify that those defendants who committed an offense before
October 1, 2011, are to earn credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision
(h), we read the second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed
their crimes before October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct
credits, just under prior law. . . . To imply the enhanced
conduct credit provision applies to defendants who committed their crimes
before the effective date but served time in local custody after the effective date
reads too much into the statute and ignores the Legislature's clear intent in
subdivision (h)'s first sentence. [fn. omitted.] [¶]
subdivision (h)'s second sentence used the word 'earned.' And it is impossible to earn presentence
credits for an offense that has not yet been committed. But reading the first and second sentences
together, the implication is the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to
defendants who committed crimes before October 1, 2011, but who served time in
local custody after that date. To
isolate the verbiage of the second sentence would defy the Legislature's clear
intent in subdivision (h)'s first sentence and contradict well-settled principles
of statutory construction. . . . [W]e
find the enhanced conduct credit provision applies only to those
defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011." (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.
52.)
The
intent was to have the enhanced rate apply only to those defendants who
committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. [Citation.]
The second sentence does not extend the enhanced rate to any other
group, but merely specifies the rate at which all others are to earn conduct
credits. So read, the sentence is not
meaningless, especially in light of the fact the October 1, 2011, amendment to
section 4019, although part of the so-called realignment legislation, applies
based on the date a defendant's crime is committed, whereas section 1170,
subdivision (h), which sets out the basic sentencing scheme under realignment,
applies based on the date a defendant is sentenced." (Ellis,
supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.)
We agree
with the reasoning of the Rajanayagam and
Ellis courts and reach the same
conclusion. The plain language of
section 4019, subdivision (h) makes clear the amendment's new credit
calculation rate applies only to individuals who are confined for a crime
committed on or after October 1, 2011.
Reasonably read, the second sentence does not permit a court to ignore
this plain language. We thus reject
Baulknight's contention he is statutorily entitled to conduct credits at the
increased rate provided in the amended version of section 4019.
We also
reject Baulknight's argument that this interpretation of section 4019 violates
his constitutional equal protection
rights.
To succeed
on an equal protection claim, Baulknight must first show the state has adopted
a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an
unequal manner. (See
1185, 1199; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-837; Manduley
v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 571.) Second, Baulknight must show there is no
rational basis for the different treatment of similarly situated groups. (See
People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 397 [proper test for issues
concerning conduct credits is rational basis review].) Under this highly
deferential test, a statutory classification is constitutionally sound if there
are any reasonably conceivable facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification. (
For
purposes of Baulknight's appellate contention, there are two classes of
incarcerated inmates: (1) those in jail
on or after October 1, 2011, having committed a crime on or after October 1,
2011; and (2) those in jail on or after October 1, having committed the same
offense before October 1, 2011. Even
assuming these groups are similarly situated, the classifications bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
One of the
objectives of the Realignment Act and the amendment to section 4019 was to more
cost-effectively manage prison populations.
(See Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at pp. 54-55.) This goal is
achieved by the section 4019 amendment, as the fiscal crisis is ameliorated to
a degree by awarding additional conduct credits to those prisoners who
committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Although awarding enhanced credits
retroactively would have produced greater cost savings, the Legislature did not
choose this approach. Nonetheless, the approach
the Legislature did choose bears a rational relationship to cost savings.
Under the
rational relationship test, the Legislature is permitted to "experiment
individually with various therapeutic
programs related to criminal charges or convictions" (
561), so as "to control the risk of new legislation by limiting its
application" (People v. Lynch
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353, 361), and determine what works and what does
not. (See Warden v. State Bar
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 649 [reform measures can be implemented one step at a
time].) Because the deferential nature
of the rational basis test does not permit us to second guess the Legislature
and determine the most effective manner to achieve the legitimate state
interest, the classifications established in section 4019 bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Baulknight
contends the date of October 1, 2011 is arbitrary and thus has no legitimate or
rational public purpose. However, all
changes, additions or deletions to the code must have a beginning date. Equal protection of the law "does not
forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to
discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time." (Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505; see People v.
Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 188 ["[d]efendant has not cited a single
case, in this state or any other, that recognizes an equal protection violation
arising from the timing of the [operative] date of a statute lessening the
punishment for a particular offense"].)
Additionally,
the Legislature could have rationally believed that by making the 2011
amendment to section 4019 apply based on the offense date, it was
"preserving the deterrent effect of the criminal law as to those crimes
committed before that date. To reward
appellant with the enhanced credits of the 2011 amendment to section 4019, even
for time he spent in custody after October 1, 2011, weakens the deterrent
effect of the law as it stood when appellant committed his crimes. We see nothing
a legislative conclusion that individuals should be punished in accordance with
the sanctions and given the rewards (conduct credits) in effect at the time an
offense was committed." (
Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
