CA Unpub Decisions

Lindsay Dunlap appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Starz Home Entertainment, LLC (Starz) on its complaint against Dunlap alleging causes of action for breach of contract, fraud and negligent and intentional misrepresentation arising out of Dunlap’s sale of a license to certain rights she claimed to own to the “The Man from U.N.C.L.E” and “The Girl From U.N.C.L.E.” (the UNCLE television series). Dunlap asserts several errors on appeal. Specifically she claims that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause in the parties’ contract that designated New York as the proper forum for any dispute between the parties. In addition, Dunlap argues that the special verdict the jury used in this case cannot support the judgment because questions in the verdict omitted certain elements of the claims and/or were biased, ambiguous and confusing. Finally she argues that the punitive damage award must be reversed because Starz failed to present sufficient evidence of her ability to pay the award.
As we shall explain, only Dunlap’s argument on the punitive damage award has merit. Accordingly, we reverse the award of punitive damages and affirm in all other respects.

On August 23, 2011, this court vacated an order by the juvenile court committing L. L. (appellant) to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF).[1] The Attorney General filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of California challenging this court’s opinion. The Supreme Court granted the petition and deferred the matter pending In re Greg F., S191868, which was under consideration at the time.
The Supreme Court has now transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration in light its decision in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393 (Greg F.). We requested additional briefing from the parties. Having reconsidered the matter, this court concludes that no change is required of our August 23, 2011 disposition. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s order committing appellant to DJF is once again vacated and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for proper disposition.

Norman Kenneth Keating appeals his multiple convictions of grand theft, forgery, second degree commercial burglary and theft and his sentence. As to his convictions, appellant claimed that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically he asserted that the prosecution failed to present evidence that he had the specific intent to commit any of the charged crimes and that there was little evidence linking him to the commission of the crimes. In a prior opinion, we affirmed appellant’s convictions concluding that appellant failed to demonstrate that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and that circumstantial evidence presented during the trial supported appellant’s convictions on all charges. Our conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence is unchanged here.
As to appellant’s sentence, we previously concluded that appellant was entitled to the benefit of 2009 amendments to Penal Code section 4019 which increased the good conduct credits available to a defendant for presentence custody in a local detention facility. The amended statute became effective after appellant was sentenced and while the prior appeal was pending. Appellant argued the amendments to Penal Code section 4019 must be applied retroactively to all sentences not yet final on appeal. In our prior opinion we concluded that the amendments were retroactive and that appellant was accordingly entitled to recalculation of his presentence custody credits. Therefore, we modified appellant’s sentence accordingly and directed the abstract of judgment to be amended to correctly reflect the credits to which appellant is entitled.
The California Supreme Court granted review in this case. On May 15, 2013, the Supreme Court transferred this matter back to this Court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314. Upon remand the parties were granted the opportunity to file supplemental briefs as to the impact of Brown on this case, but did not do so. Because the Supreme Court in Brown concluded that the 2009 amendments to Penal Code section 4019 did not apply retroactively to a defendant who committed his offenses prior to the provision’s effective date, we now affirm both the judgment and the original sentence.

Jasmine R. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order, made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,[1] terminating parental rights with respect to her children, half-siblings H.P. (now 12) and T.K. (now four). Appellant contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition seeking return of the children to her care or, in the alternative, (2) the court improperly terminated parental rights after finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s order.

In this insurance coverage dispute, plaintiffs Sylester Flowers, Helen Chiongson-Flowers, Alta Tierra Properties, LLC, The Apothecary Eastmont Town Center, Inc., and Ramsell Holding Corporation appeal from the order of the trial court finding that the underlying action at issue here alleged a single claim under the applicable policy, thus triggering the per-claim limit of liability only, and not the aggregate policy limit. We affirm.

Joseph Byrne appeals from a judgment awarding him attorney fees incurred in litigation against his brother, respondent James Byrne. The litigation arose out of disputes stemming from the brothers’ decision to end their joint operation of Peninsula Heating and Appliance, Inc. (PHA), a company they had inherited from their father.
Joseph and James eventually resolved the litigation by entering into a settlement agreement. When James failed to fulfill certain of his obligations under that agreement, Joseph moved to enforce it. The trial court granted his motion in part. Because the agreement provided for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce it, and the trial court found Joseph was the partially prevailing party, it ruled he was entitled to an award of attorney fees for a portion of the underlying litigation. After reviewing the parties’ voluminous submissions on the attorney fee issue, the trial court awarded less than 10 percent of the amount of fees claimed.
Dissatisfied with the award, Joseph now appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him all of his requested fees. We discern no abuse of discretion and therefore affirm.

Veta, a partnership, appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of HDN Group (HDN), also a partnership, on Veta’s first amended complaint against HDN and on HDN’s first amended cross-complaint against Veta.[1] We conclude the trial court erred in concluding Veta’s first amended complaint failed to state claims for fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in striking allegations from Veta’s first amended complaint under the statute of frauds and parol evidence rule, in failing to grant Veta leave to amend, and in restricting trial on HDN’s cross-complaint to the issue of damages owed to it. On the other hand, the trial court properly concluded Veta failed to state a claim for breach of contract.

Defendant, a petite-120-pound woman, stabbed her 220-pound-male roommate in the back during an altercation in which he pummeled her in the face, bloodying her nose and blackening her eyes. Defendant testified she stabbed her roommate in self-defense, and the trial court allowed her to recount a number of prior violent incidents between them, but prevented defendant from testifying that on one occasion her roommate threw her down the stairs and on another occasion threatened to kill her. The jury was instructed on antecedent threats, but convicted defendant of felony assault. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court’s ruling violated her right to testify and constituted an abuse of discretion. We agree the court erred, but after a review of the entire record, conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We will affirm.

Petitioner Arlyne M. Diamond owns a townhouse-style unit in the Casa Del Valle common interest development, which is managed by real party in interest Case Del Valle Homeowners Association (Association). After Diamond failed to pay a $9,750 special assessment by the due date, the Association’s collection efforts included recording an assessment lien on her townhouse property and filing the instant action for judicial foreclosure. Diamond moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Association could not foreclose because the assessment lien was not valid, since the Association had not complied with the pre-lien and pre-foreclosure notice requirements set forth in the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Sterling Act), Civil Code sections 1367.1 and 1367.4.[1] The trial court denied the summary judgment motion, finding that the Association had substantially complied with the statutory notice requirements.

This appeal is one in a series of appeals brought by Jory A. Jovaag related to the termination of her 29-year purported common-law marriage to Donald Ott, and Ms. Jovaag’s action against Mr. Ott over the division of the couple’s jointly held property.[1]
The present appeal is of the trial court’s order to release funds to Mr. Ott that were deposited with the court by Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (Schwab). Ms. Jovaag, who is proceeding in propria persona, asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering the funds released to Mr. Ott, and in denying her request to stay the proceedings pending a federal district court action related to this case.

The issue in this case is whether the Monterey County Superior Court has territorial jurisdiction over criminal charges against petitioner Michael Fortner arising from alleged acts of domestic violence and mayhem that occurred in Hawaii. These counts are charged in an information that also charges Fortner with acts of domestic violence against the same victim in California more than a year later. The superior court overruled Fortner’s demurrer and denied his motion to dismiss. It found that it did have jurisdiction over the Hawaii offenses. Fortner seeks writ relief from the superior court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. We conclude that the superior court’s order is not supported by substantial evidence, and we grant relief.

Appellants Brian Driscoll, et al. were employees of respondent Granite Rock Company. The parties became embroiled in a wage and hour dispute. In 2011, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of respondent. Both parties filed an appeal from this judgment, appeal No. H037662. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order on respondent’s motion for attorney fees, granting it in part, and denying it in part. On May 1, 2012, the trial court entered an amended judgment encompassing the attorney fees award. Appellants filed another appeal in this court from the order awarding attorney fees and the amended judgment, appeal No. H038272.

This appeal is one in a series of appeals brought by Jory A. Jovaag related to the termination of her 29-year purported common-law marriage to Donald Ott, and Ms. Jovaag’s action against Mr. Ott over the division of the couple’s jointly held property.[1]
The present appeal is of the trial court’s order granting Janus Services, LLC’s (Janus) special motion to strike (“anti-SLAPP” motion) against Ms. Jovaag, and dismissing Ms. Jovaag’s cross-complaint against Janus. Ms. Jovaag, who is proceeding in propria persona, asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Janus’ anti-SLAPP motion, because it applied the wrong legal standard under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

Defendant John Collado was convicted by guilty plea of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and sentenced to three years in state prison. His sole contention on appeal is that he was entitled to conduct credit calculated under the October 2011 version of Penal Code section 4019[1] rather than the conduct credit statutes in effect at the time of his January 2011 offense. He claims that even if the statutory language of the October 2011 version of section 4019 does not apply to him, it would violate equal protection to deny him the benefit of its provisions. We reject his contention and affirm the judgment.