CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant L.J. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order issued at a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[1] terminating his parental rights as to his seven-year-old daughter, A.J., and two-year-old son, S.J. He contends the juvenile court violated Penal Code section 2625 by conducting the hearing in his absence and without a waiver. He also contends trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

A jury convicted appellant, Ramon Diaz Leyva, of receiving a stolen vehicle (count 3/Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property (count 4/Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)).
On April 12, 2012, the court suspended imposition of sentence in count 3 and placed Leyva on probation for three years on the condition he serve his first year of probation in local custody. In count 4, the court ordered Leyva to serve one year in local custody but stayed the punishment imposed on that count.
On appeal, Leyva contends the court erred when it sustained his convictions on both counts. We will find merit to this contention and reverse Leyva’s conviction on count 4. In all other respects, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Alphonso Markus Durazo of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), and he admitted serving five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Sentenced to 11 years in prison and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and assessments, he now appeals, raising multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Malcolm Rosemond of shooting at a motor vehicle and six counts of assault with a firearm. He contends (1) his convictions must be reversed because his due process rights were violated when the trial court found he was competent to stand trial; (2) his sentence should be vacated because the trial court was unaware of its sentencing discretion when it imposed the upper term; and (3) an incorrect amount of fees was imposed at sentencing.
We agree with his contention concerning the amount of fees, which we will order corrected, but disagree with his other arguments and affirm his convictions and judgment.

Plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) took J.B. (minor; born August 2012) into protective custody when he was released from the hospital after both minor, and defendant and appellant K.M. (mother), tested positively for amphetamines. Mother, and defendant and appellant E.B. (father) (collectively “parents”), had failed to reunify with three previous children. The department placed minor with the prospective adoptive parents (PAPs) on August 10, 2012. The juvenile court denied parents reunification services due to their failure to reunify with the three other children. On March 5, 2013, the juvenile court terminated parents’ parental rights.
On appeal, mother contends insufficient evidence supported the court’s determination the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. Father does not independently challenge the juvenile court’s order, but maintains that should mother prevail, his parental rights must also be reinstated. (In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100, 102, 110.) We hold substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed in San Bernardino County alleging that defendant and appellant D.C. (minor) committed the crime of vandalism with damages under $400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (B)(2)(A), count 1.) A juvenile court placed him on informal probation, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, with certain terms, including the completion of 40 hours of community service, attendance at a victim’s awareness class, and payment of victim restitution in the amount of $158.99.[1] At an appearance review hearing six months later, it was reported that minor had failed to complete any of the required terms. The court granted him an extension to complete the requirements and ordered him to appear on August 20, 2012. Minor failed to appear on that date. The court issued a bench warrant, but held it until September 19, 2012, and ordered minor to appear on that date. On September 19, 2012, minor failed to appear again, so the court announced that it would terminate the informal probation and reinstate the petition. Defense counsel objected, but later withdrew the objection. The court terminated the informal probation and reinstated the petition.

Defendant was charged with one count of residential burglary, with the enhancing allegation that a person other than an accomplice was present within the residence at the time of the burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21); count 1.)[1] He was also charged with misdemeanor use of force against a peace officer. (§ 243, subd. (b); count 2.)[2] Two prison priors were also alleged. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Prior to trial, defendant waived his right to a jury trial as to count 2 and pleaded guilty.
A jury found defendant guilty on count 1 and found the section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) allegation true. In a separate proceeding, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prison prior allegations. He admitted both allegations, which the court then found true.
The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of four years on count 1 and imposed two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. The court also imposed a concurrent term of six months in county jail on count 2.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the felony conviction only.

A jury convicted defendant Robert Andrew Esparza of attempted voluntary manslaughter (count 1—Pen. Code, §§ 664, 192),[1] a lesser, necessarily included offense of the charged crime of attempted murder; shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 2—§ 246); unlawful possession of a firearm (count 3—§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and active participation in a criminal street gang (count 4—§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury additionally found defendant personally discharged a firearm in his commission of the count 1 offense (§§ 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), personally used a firearm in his commission of the count 2 offense (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and committed both the count 1 and 2 offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

The defendant committed crimes of sexual violence in the early 1990’s. Convicted of those crimes, he served a substantial term in state prison. Before his release, however, the district attorney filed a petition for his commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq.)[1] A jury found the allegations of the petition true.
Committed as an SVP to the State Department of State Hospitals (formerly the Department of Mental Health) for an indeterminate term, the defendant appeals. He contends: (1) his commitment violated several of his constitutional rights, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the commitment, (3) his imprisonment was unlawfully extended by holds imposed by the Board of Parole Hearings; and (4) a regulation used to impose a hold was invalid. We conclude that the defendant’s contentions are without merit. Therefore, we affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging appellant C.C. committed petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. The court found appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, adjudged appellant to be a ward of the court, and ordered appellant committed to the joint supervision of the Probation Department and the Department of Child and Family Services (“DCFS”) for suitable placement.

Defendant and appellant Joseph Bates was convicted by jury in count 1 of first degree residential burglary and in count 3 of burglary of a detached garage, both violations of Penal Code section 459. The trial court sentenced defendant to the midterm of four years in count 1 and stayed the sentence in count 3 under Penal Code section 654. An error in calculating custody credits was corrected by postjudgment order.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. On April 17, 2013, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, asking this court to independently review the record for arguable appellate contentions under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. No supplemental brief has been filed by defendant.
We have completed our independent review of the record. Our review of the record reveals no arguable contentions on appeal. The record contains substantial evidence that defendant entered a residence and its detached garage without permission of the owner. The owner and her family were living in a hotel at the time, because the house had been damaged in a fire shortly before the burglary. A neighbor called 911 after seeing two men going in and out of the residence loading items onto a truck. Officers responded and took defendant and another man into custody at the scene. Property belonging to the owner of the house was in the truck.
The jury was properly instructed on the law. The sentence imposed was within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.)

Defendant and appellant Garr Child Care Inc. appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Geraldine Kyles and against defendant, following a bench trial, for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Defendant contends that the trial court erred because plaintiff was terminated for abandoning her employment with defendant. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Steven H. Marcus appeals from the default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Carmen M. Wyns-Bills in this action for damages. Marcus argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying successive motions for mandatory and discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), and the judgment is void for lack of proper service of the first amended complaint (FAC). We affirm.