CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal is one in a series of appeals brought by Jory A. Jovaag related to the termination of her 29-year purported common-law marriage to Donald R. Ott, and Ms. Jovaag’s action against Mr. Ott over the division of the couple’s jointly held property.[1]
The present appeal is of the trial court’s order to release funds to Mr. Ott that were deposited with the court by Janus Services, LLC (Janus). Ms. Jovaag, who is proceeding in propria persona, asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering the funds released to Mr. Ott, and in denying her request to stay the proceedings pending a federal district court action related to this case.

Defendant Darrolynn Patricia Harris pleaded no contest to numerous counts of unlawfully possessing prescription drugs and possessing prescription drugs for sale. She was placed on probation, with execution of a 12-year sentence suspended. After the trial court found she violated the terms of her probation, it ordered her to serve the 12-year sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding she violated her probation. Alternatively, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the 12-year prison term rather than reinstating probation. For reasons that we will explain, we disagree with defendant’s contentions but will modify the judgment with respect to some of the fees and fines imposed.

Defendant Morgan Hicks pleaded guilty to numerous counts of residential burglary, receiving stolen property, identity theft, and grand theft in exchange for a 22‑year prison term. On appeal, he claims that he was entitled to additional conduct credit under the October 2011 version of Penal Code section 4019,[1] and he seeks correction of errors on the abstract of judgment. The Attorney General concedes that the abstract must be corrected, and we will so order. We reject defendant’s claim for additional conduct credit.

Oscar A. appeals from a judgment after he admitted committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under 14 years of age and the juvenile court declared him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Oscar argues: (1) the juvenile court erred in finding he was not suitable for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ); and (2) the probation condition prohibiting him from using or possessing sexually explicit material is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Attorney General suggests the probation condition be modified to address Oscar’s concerns but argues the juvenile court properly denied DEJ. We modify probation condition No. 26, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Jaelyne Nickerson (Defendant) appeals from an order revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the 10 year sentence previously imposed, but suspended, by the court. She argues the court violated her right to due process by ordering her probation revoked without engaging in an impartial evaluation of whether her violation of the terms of her probation was significant enough to “merit[] imposition of the ten-year prison term . . . .” (Capitalization omitted.) She also argues the court erred by ordering her to pay the full amount of restitution sought by one of her victims, Cal State Fullerton, because a portion of that sum was not supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioners S.C. (Mother) and K.N. (Father) filed petitions for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order denying Mother reunification services as to her three children, and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order denying her services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).[2] We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Regina C. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from a March 2013 juvenile court order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for her seven-month-old son, Joshua. The court reached its decision having denied the parents services to reunify with Joshua, who suffered repeated physical abuse at the hands of his father. The court found mother, by her omission, also inflicted severe physical harm on Joshua and that it would not benefit the infant to pursue reunification services with mother. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).) We agree with the juvenile court and deny this petition.

Mariah A., petitioner, in propria persona, filed an extraordinary writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452)[1] regarding her minor child, Gabriella A. (three years old). Petitioner seeks relief from the juvenile court’s order issued at the status review hearing terminating petitioner’s reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for Gabriella.[2] We grant the petition.

K.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the disposition hearing placing her daughter, Brooklyn S., with Brooklyn’s maternal grandparents. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in its placement of Brooklyn. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

K.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the disposition hearing placing her daughter, Brooklyn S., with Brooklyn’s maternal grandparents. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in its placement of Brooklyn. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Following his conviction for first degree murder, Miguel Angel Enciso appeals on the following bases: First, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support first degree murder based upon lying in wait because there is a lack of evidence of watchful waiting or surprise attack. Second, defendant asserts the trial court violated the hearsay rule and defendant’s right to confrontation by permitting evidence that his girlfriend had a tattoo bearing his name, accompanied by angel wings, because the tattoo amounts to nonverbal conduct intended as a substitute for verbal expression. Third, defendant maintains the prosecutor committed misconduct by referencing the tattoo and calling defendant the “angel of death” because the comments amounted to improper denigration. Fourth, defendant contends the prosecutor committed repeated instances of misconduct during cross-examination of defendant, that the admonishments given were inadequate, and that his motion for mistrial should have been granted on this basis. Lastly, defendant asserts that because there is no jury instruction regarding self-defense and its applicability to lying-in-wait murder, the jury instructions given, coupled with misstatements of the law by the prosecutor during closing argument, amount to instructional error as the jury was led to believe complete and imperfect self-defense were unavailable to defendant. We disagree with defendant and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury convicted defendant Douglas Castellanos Sorto of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 459, 460) after he was found inside a neighbor’s house. He contends that the trial court erred, first, by allowing the prosecutor to impeach him by stating he had been convicted of a “serious and violent” felony and, second, by instructing the jury on sexual battery as a possible intended target offense for the charged crime of burglary. Sorto also claims there was insufficient evidence of intent to commit either theft or sexual battery to support the burglary conviction.
We affirm the judgment.

Petitioners S.C. (Mother) and K.N. (Father) filed petitions for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order denying Mother reunification services as to her three children, and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order denying her services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).[2] We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Brian Lee Grayson pleaded guilty to one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under age 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to the low term of three years in prison for this offense. He has filed a timely notice of appeal. We order the trial court to modify the restitution fine order and to correct the calculation of defendant’s pretrial custody credits, but otherwise affirm the judgment.