CA Unpub Decisions

John Joseph Guajardo was convicted of molesting his two granddaughters many times over a period of several years and received a determinate sentence of 19 years 8 months plus an indeterminate sentence of 90 years to life. He challenges his conviction on count 11, exhibiting harmful matter to a minor with intent to seduce (Pen. Code, § 288.2, subd. (a)[1]). He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of an intent to seduce and that the court should have instructed the jury on a lesser-included offense. We reject these arguments.
Guajardo and the People agree that an erroneously imposed restitution fine should be stricken and that the abstract of judgment must be amended to correct a clerical error. We order the necessary corrections and affirm the judgment.

Joaquin Betancourt appeals from a marriage dissolution judgment. He contends the court erred in failing to rule on his request for reimbursement of funds allegedly used to improve his wife's separate property asset (real property in Mexico). We reverse and remand to permit the court to rule on this issue.

Rodrigo Borja (Borja) was convicted of raping his niece when she was unconscious. He now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a second conviction that he conveyed a threatening message to dissuade his niece from testifying against him at trial. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(1).)[1] We find no error and affirm.

Jason S. (Father) appeals the disposition in a dependency case involving his son, also named Jason. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 395.)[1] Father is incarcerated while awaiting trial on a murder charge. Father’s challenge to dependency jurisdiction fails. The evidence amply supports findings that Father is a violent person who caused the death of a minor and poses a substantial risk to Jason’s health and safety.

Freddie Chacon and Raul Alberto Lopez appeal post-judgment habeas orders reducing their life-without-possibility-of-parole sentences to life with parole for aggravated kidnapping for ransom with special findings that they inflicted bodily harm and exposed the victim to a substantial likelihood of death. (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a).)[1] Chacon (age 17) and Lopez (age 16) were juveniles when they committed the offense. The United States Supreme Court has subsequently held that the sentences to life without the possibility of parole violates the Eight Amendment. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. __ [176 L.Ed.2d 825 ] (Graham).) Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering new trials or granting probation. We affirm.

A jury convicted Christopher Herrera (appellant) of attempted, willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a));[1] and shooting from a motor vehicle (count 2; § 12034, subd. (c)), with allegations as to both counts that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).[2] We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant James Fletcher of one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187)[1] (count 1) and one count of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder (§ 187) (count 6). The jury found that Fletcher committed count 1 willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, and it found the firearm and gang enhancement allegations true as to that count. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b).) The jury found that Fletcher personally used a firearm during the commission of count 6. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
A jury convicted defendant Jerry Burke of two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187) (counts 2 & 3). The jury found that counts 2 and 3 were committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, and it found the gang enhancement allegations to be true (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). In both counts 2 and 3, the jury found true the allegation that a principal personally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e)(1), but not true as to subdivision (d) of that statute.

Edward Chamberlin appeals from a judgment after court trial on his complaint against his former employer. He contends the trial court erred in finding he was paid for all his accrued vacation time and in awarding respondent the full amount of attorney fees it requested. We affirm.

S.L. was born in May 2010. Her father is appellant Willie L., her mother Ashley C. We have already met Ashley in a previous appeal, dealing with M.L., another child of Ashley and Willie. M.L. was born two years after her older sister S.L. In Ashley C. we denied Ashley’s petition for a writ of mandate vacating an order made in January 2013 that reduced Ashley’s visitation with M.L. – who was in the dependency system because Ashley was abusing methamphetamine at the time of her birth – in the wake of the termination of reunification services to Ashley.
The theme of drug abuse also turns out to be the leitmotif in Willie’s appeal concerning S.L. About six months after S.L.’s birth, around March 2011, Willie was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence. Because of his extensive criminal record, he went to prison and would remain there until December 8, 2011. In the meantime, in September 2011, Ashley was arrested for driving under the influence, which resulted in S.L’s being made a dependent of the juvenile court on November 16, 2011.

A jury convicted defendant Charles Dayton Langsdon of one count of second degree robbery, count 1 (Pen. Code, § 211; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), one count of attempted second degree robbery, count 2 (§§ 664, subd. (a); 211), and one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, count 3 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated trial, the court found true defendant had previously been convicted of four strike offenses (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(2)(A)), suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and suffered two prior felony convictions resulting in prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 35 years to life consisting of 25 years to life on count 1 plus consecutive 5-year sentences for two prior serious felony convictions. The court stayed a 2-year term on count 2 and an 8-month sentence on count 3. The court struck the prior strike convictions as to counts 2 and 3 and struck the remaining prior convictions as to all counts.
In his appeal, defendant alleges the court abused its discretion in refusing to strike all or some of his prior strike conviction as to count 1. He also contends that, because his sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence, the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Considering defendant’s criminal background, the court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from an action following a nonjudicial foreclosure. Makeda Karimlou (Karimlou) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Aurora Bank FSB (Aurora) after the trial court sustained Aurora’s demurrer without leave to amend. On appeal, Karimlou asserts she pled sufficient facts to maintain causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, unconscionability of contract, unjust enrichment, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair business practices. We conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and we affirm the court’s judgment dismissing the action.

The owners of 57 homes in a condominium development (the homeowners) appeal from an order dismissing their petition to vacate an arbitration award setting the allowable increases in monthly rent charged by the trust that owns the property on which their homes are situated. The trial court’s dismissal order was based on the homeowners’ failure to properly serve the respondent trustees with their petition to vacate within 100 days of service of the award, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1288. (All further statutory citations are to this code unless otherwise indicated.)
The homeowners argue the trial court erred in dismissing their petition because: (1) the petition was served in accordance with the requirements of the parties’ lease agreements, and thus was properly served under section 1290.4; (2) the court abused its discretion by refusing to treat the petition as part of a previously filed and still pending declaratory relief action between the parties; (3) the court abused its discretion by refusing to find that the trustees were estopped from asserting service was improper; and (4) the homeowners were entitled to relief from the dismissal pursuant to section 473. We find none of these contentions persuasive and affirm the order.

The trial court issued an order barring the prosecutor from proceeding further against defendant Mark Anthony Rodriguez on count 1 (murder) and count 3 (firing into an inhabited dwelling house) of the criminal complaint filed against him. The order was made pursuant to Penal Code section 1387, which bars further prosecution of any felony offense after it has twice been terminated for reasons specified in the statute. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The prosecutor appeals, arguing the court’s order dismissing the first indictment alleging those counts did not qualify as a termination for purposes of section 1387. Alternatively, the prosecutor argues he should have been afforded one additional opportunity to refile the charges, because the court’s order dismissing the first indictment constituted “excusable neglect” under section 1387.1. Finding neither contention persuasive, we affirm.
The court’s order dismissing the first indictment qualified as a termination for purposes of section 1387 because it arose out of Rodriguez’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 995 – one of the specified bases for a qualifying termination under section 1387. Although the prosecutor did argue the court should simply dismiss the first indictment as “duplicative” and not reach the merits of the section 995 motion, in light of the grand jury’s subsequent return of a second indictment against Rodriguez alleging the same counts, the court rejected that option. Instead, the court made clear its intention to afford Rodriguez relief on the merits of his section 995 motion, just as it had previously done for a different defendant who had been separately indicted on charges arising out of the same incident. (We grant Rodriguez’s request for judicial notice of documents pertaining to the motion to dismiss filed by the other defendant, Wesley Solis, as well as the court’s ruling thereon.) Indeed, the court expressly stated its intention was to treat the dismissal “as [a] 1387” dismissal. And while that order was directly appealable, the prosecutor elected not to pursue such an appeal.
The prosecutor’s alternative claim, that the court’s order dismissing the first indictment constitutes “excusable neglect” under section 1387.1, likewise fails because it is unsupported by any showing that either the court’s decision to reach the merits of the section 995 motion, or its ruling thereon, was actually erroneous.

Petitioner SFPP, L.P. (SFPP) is a Delaware limited partnership that operates both intrastate and interstate oil pipelines. SFPP’s upstream owners are Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., a publicly traded partnership, which, through one of its operating partnerships, Kinder Morgan Operating L.P. “D” (which itself is partly owned by Kinder Morgan, Inc.) owns 99.5 percent of SFPP. The other .5 percent is owned by Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc., a wholly owned, indirect subsidiary of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation.
Respondent Public Utilities Commission of the State of California (the PUC) is the agency charged with regulating public utilities pursuant to Article XII of the California Constitution and the Public Utilities Act,[1] and accordingly, it regulates SFPP’s intrastate pipelines.