CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Raul Torres challenges his convictions for felony child endangerment and felony vandalism. He also says the court violated the ex post facto laws in affixing the amount of the restitution fines imposed against him. Substantial evidence supports the convictions for felony child endangerment and felony vandalism. However, we agree that the amounts of the restitution fines should be reduced from $240 to $200 each because the trial court intended to impose the minimum restitution fines and it imposed the minimum restitution fines in effect at the time of sentencing rather than the minimum restitution fines in effect at the time the crimes were committed. We affirm the judgment but direct that the abstract of judgment be corrected to set the restitution fines at $200 each.

A modification decision.

While serving a commitment at the Kings County Juvenile Academy, appellant repeatedly punched another minor. When a correctional officer intervened, appellant hit the officer.
A juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) was filed charging appellant with battery on a custodial officer and simple battery. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (b), 242.) He admitted both allegations. Appellant was continued as a ward of the court and committed to the Kings County Juvenile Academy Impact Program for 180 days. He was placed under the supervision of the Kings County Probation Office and ordered to comply with specified probation conditions, including a prohibition against possession of gang related clothing, paraphernalia, graffiti and “marker pens” (probation condition No. 19). The court ordered “[t]he minor and parent” to pay a $50 fine, a $50 state restitution fine, $350 for court appointed legal counsel and $25 per day detention costs. Appellant was awarded six days of predisposition custody credit.
Appellant raises several challenges to the dispositional order, arguing: (1) probation condition No. 19 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the court erred by holding him personally liable for detention costs and appointed counsel fees; and (3) he is entitled to additional predisposition custody credits. All of these arguments are persuasive. We reject appellant’s ineffective assistance claim and decline to extend People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192 (High) to juvenile delinquency cases. The dispositional order will be modified to amend probation condition No. 19, strike the imposition of personal liability on the minor for appointed counsel fees and detention costs and award 14 days of predisposition custody credit. As so modified, the detention order will be affirmed.

C.L. Knox, Inc., doing business as Advanced Industrial Services (Advanced), appeals from the judgment in consolidated actions. Advanced sued its former employee, Norm Fox, for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets, among other causes of action; Advanced also appealed the decision of the Labor Commissioner imposing waiting time penalties for failure to pay Fox his earned wages and vacation pay immediately upon termination. Advanced contends the judgment of the trial court, which found Advanced owed Fox vacation pay and imposed waiting time penalties on it, should be reversed because the statement of decision was inadequate and the penalty imposed was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Ronald James Odell challenges his convictions for transportation of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of marijuana on the grounds the evidence was insufficient to establish he had knowledge of and exercised dominion and control over the controlled substances. He also contends the trial court erred when it failed to instruct sua sponte that mere proximity to controlled substances is not sufficient to constitute constructive possession. Finally, he claims his conviction for driving on a suspended license should be reversed because the trial court erred when it refused to instruct on the defense of necessity. We reject Odell’s contentions and will affirm the judgment.

Law Offices of Patricia Law and Patricia A. Law; Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood, for Real Parties in Interest.
In this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real parties in interest. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

Plaintiffs are Nevada residents who purchased a vehicle from a Nevada car dealer, Pat Clark Pontiac, Inc. (“Pat Clark”). Plaintiffs were injured while driving in Mexico. Nevertheless, plaintiffs seek to sue the car dealer for personal injury and wrongful death in the County of San Bernardino. Pat Clark made a motion to quash based on lack of personal jurisdiction.

Defendants and appellants Benny Ross Harris, Jr., James Alexander Rials, Jamaal Edwards Waiters, Anthony Chambers, Jr., and Lasalle Ernest Kimbrough were convicted of crimes arising from an armed bank robbery in Barstow. On appeal, they raise numerous issues, including whether: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for street terrorism and a gang enhancement; (2) the court erred in refusing to inquire into juror bias when one juror allegedly began to cry during closing argument; (3) the court erred in denying a motion for mistrial when a witness stated that defendants’ gang is a Muslim organization; (4) there was inadequate evidence of the chain of custody as to DNA samples; (5) the court erred in allowing evidence of two prior bank robberies and in its limiting instructions regarding such evidence; (6) the prosecutor committed misconduct; (7) certain jury instructions were erroneous; (8) there was sentencing error; and (9) there is a clerical error in Rials’s abstract of judgment.
We agree with defendants that the imposition of certain enhancements and the staying of a firearm enhancement was error. For that reason, a new sentencing hearing is required. We will also direct that the clerical error in Rials’s abstract of judgment be corrected. Otherwise, we reject defendants’ arguments and affirm the judgments.

Miguel S. (Miguel) admitted committing one felony count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c))[1] (count 2) and one misdemeanor count of resisting or delaying a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3). At a contested disposition hearing, the trial court committed Miguel to Camp Barrett for a period not to exceed 365 days. We affirm.

In April 2012 defendant Daniel Jackson entered a guilty plea to petty theft with a prior in exchange for a stipulated sentence of two years to be served locally. A prior grant of probation was revoked. In May 2012 Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In June 2012 the court noted that it had read the motion, but stated it "takes no action at this time."
In July 2012 Jackson filed a motion seeking to modify his sentence due to his "terminal illness and need for adequate medical care." He requested probation with home arrest and GPS monitoring. He had been diagnosed with HIV and hepatitis C. In August 2012 the court found that there had been a stipulated sentence pursuant to a plea bargain so it did not have "discretion to recall or modify the sentence" and took "no action at this time."
Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal and asks us to examine the record and determine if there are any issues deserving of further briefing. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We have done so, find none, and hence affirm the judgment.

Nicholas Dunning pleaded no contest to receiving stolen air conditioner parts (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). At the prosecution's request, in exchange for Dunning's plea and a waiver under People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey), the court dismissed numerous other charges and prior prison commitment allegations. The court sentenced Dunning to 16 months in jail. At a subsequent hearing, the court ordered him to pay direct victim restitution of $6,900.
Dunning appeals, contending the court abused its discretion in imposing direct victim restitution of $6,900 because the restitution included amounts unrelated to either the charge to which he pleaded no contest or the dismissed charges. We conclude this contention lacks merit and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Earl L. Vaults, Jr., appeals a judgment entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant U.S. Bank, N.A. (Bank) in an action filed by Vaults arising out of a loan and subsequent nonjudicial foreclosure on real property he encumbered as security for the loan. On appeal, he contends: (1) he adequately alleged a cause of action for unconscionability; (2) he was not required to make a tender of payment; and (3) the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the contents of certain recorded documents. Based on the grounds discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

This medical malpractice action arises out of a robotically assisted laparoscopic surgery performed by Michael Silverman, M.D., on Georgette Pedraza. After an eight-day trial, the jury found in favor of Dr. Silverman; his colleague, Sheryl Saenz, M.D.; and their employer, the Regents of the University of California (Regents) (collectively defendants). On appeal, Georgette Pedraza and her husband, Luis Pedraza, (together, the Pedrazas) assert the court erred by (1) striking their statement of disqualification of the trial judge; (2) granting Dr. Silverman's motion in limine to exclude a statement of deficiency issued by the California Department of Health Services (DHS or Department); (3) making improper rulings during the trial testimony of both parties' expert witnesses; (4) denying their motion for mistrial or, alternatively, failing to adequately admonish the jury concerning documents not entered into evidence; (5) making certain rulings during jury selection; and (6) granting the Regents' motion for nonsuit. We affirm.

Defendant Justin Wayne Anderson pleaded guilty to assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and admitted a prior strike in exchange for a stipulated sentence of four years in state prison. Defendant’s ensuing appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. In accordance with the latter, we will provide a summary of the offenses and the proceedings in the trial court.
On November 9, 2012, an information was filed accusing defendant of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)—count 1) and battery with serious bodily injury (id., § 243, subd. (d)—count 2.) As to count 1, it was alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (id., former § 12022.7). It was also alleged that defendant had one strike (Pen. Code, § 1170.12) and one prior felony conviction (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)), both arising out of a 2008 Texas conviction for “burglary of habitation” (Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02(c)(2)).
On November 19, 2012, defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted the strike, in return for the dismissal of the remaining count and allegations and a stipulated four-year state prison term (the two-year low term on count 1, doubled for the strike). The trial court awarded defendant 60 days of presentence custody credit (30 actual days and 30 conduct days). The court imposed a $480 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended $480 restitution fine (id., § 1202.45), a $30 criminal conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373), and a $40 court operations fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). The court also ordered victim restitution in an amount to be determined.