CA Unpub Decisions

By a complaint deemed an information, defendant John Lee Morales was charged in case No. 09F9118 with driving under the influence (DUI) of an alcoholic beverage and a drug with prior convictions in 2001, 2004, and 2007 (count 1; Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550, subd. (a)); DUI with a blood-alcohol content greater than 0.08 percent with prior convictions (count 2; Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550, subd. (a)); driving with a driver’s license that had been suspended for a prior DUI conviction (count 3; Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)); and operating a vehicle without a functioning interlock device (count 4; Veh. Code, § 23247, subd. (e)). As to counts 1 and 2, defendant was alleged to have had a blood-alcohol content of 0.15 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23578). All offenses were alleged to have occurred on or about November 3, 2009.
In case No. 10F5508, defendant was charged with two counts of felony child abuse alleged to have occurred on or about July 18, 2010 (counts 1 & 2; Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)),[1] with various enhancements.

Defendant Jonathan Wayne Peterson appeals from the sentence imposed following his plea of no contest to assault likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] and admitted a prior strike allegation (§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)). He contends the prospective application of section 4019, the conduct credit provisions of the Realignment Act, violates equal protection principles. Following the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 906, footnote 9 (Lara), we reject this claim.

Plaintiff Gary Taylor, a member of the California Air National Guard, filed suit against defendants California National Guard and California Air National Guard (National Guard), Colonel John Crocker, and Major Thomas Keegan alleging defamation. Taylor’s claims stemmed from an interview given to a Sacramento Bee reporter by Crocker and Keegan regarding an investigation into allegations that National Guard pilots, including Taylor, were receiving dual compensation. Defendants filed a demurrer and a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] The trial court granted the motion to strike, finding Taylor’s defamation claim arose from defendants’ protected activity. Taylor appeals, arguing Crocker’s and Keegan’s statements were not protected speech, and he can prevail on the merits of his claim. We shall affirm the judgment.

In this action, plaintiffs Erik and Renee Sundquist sued Bank of America and various other defendants for the consequences of a home loan they could not afford. The trial court sustained the demurrer of three defendants without leave to amend. On appeal, we conclude the court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to some of the causes of action. Accordingly, we will reverse.

About 6:00 p.m. on December 31, 2009, a search of defendant Amber Adale Morgan during a traffic stop and pursuant to an arrest warrant revealed 19.1 grams of methamphetamine and $1,251 in cash. In 2008, defendant had been convicted of and sentenced to state prison for possession of methamphetamine for sale. (He alth & Saf. Code, § 11378; unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.)
After the December 31, 2009 arrest, defendant entered a plea of no contest to transportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior drug conviction (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)) in exchange for a sentencing lid of five years in state prison, that is, the low term of two years for the offense plus three years for the prior conviction. Defendant also admitted misdemeanor offenses in two other cases with the agreement that punishment for those offenses would be served concurrently with the felony conviction.

The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of real party in interest Quest Home Health Services, Inc. (Quest) on petitioner Joseph Graham’s claim for wrongful death, concluding that there was no triable issue of fact whether Quest’s negligent conduct caused the death of Barbara Ottway. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate the grant of summary adjudication. We deny the petition.

Appellant Leslie D. appeals from the order of the juvenile court sustaining petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 777,[1] and the dispositional order entered after the petitions were sustained. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. On June 19, 2013, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, asking this court to independently review the record for arguable appellate contentions under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant was advised of her right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. No supplemental brief has been received.
We have completed our independent review of the record, which shows appellant was the subject of two prior sustained petitions under section 602. This appeal follows a contested hearing on a third section 602 petition, which was combined with a probation violation under section 777. The juvenile court found appellant committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code § 242) and violated probation by slapping her mother. In doing so, the court expressly resolved credibility issues in favor of mother’s testimony over that of appellant, who claimed her mother fabricated the incident in order to have appellant removed from the home.
The juvenile court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. The dispositional order of suitable placement, and the various terms and conditions of probation, are clear and reasonably related to appellant’s current and prior cases.
We are satisfied there are no arguable contentions on appeal. The judgment is affirmed. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.)

Robin G. (Mother) appeals from the dependency court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order removing her newborn son Tyler from her care. We appointed counsel for Mother, and counsel filed an opening brief informing us she was unable to find any arguable issues, and requesting that we exercise our discretion to permit mother personally to submit a supplemental brief. On June 25, 2013, Mother filed a supplemental brief. Neither Mother’s brief, nor our independent review of the record, reveals any arguable issues. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant and appellant David Victor Robins was found guilty by jury of the following sexual offenses of an unconscious person: counts 1-3—sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d));[1] counts 4-6—oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (f)); and counts 7-8—assault with intent to commit oral copulation or sexual penetration (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant admitted suffering a prior conviction under the three strikes law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) as to all counts and a prior conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), as to counts 7 and 8. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 65 years in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. This court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. On July 10, 2013, appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues, asking this court to independently review the record for arguable appellate contentions under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days. No supplemental brief has been filed by defendant.

Defendant, Markeise Matthews, appeals after he pled orally and in writing no contest to a single kidnapping count. (Pen. Code[1], § section 207, subd. (a).) Eight other felony counts were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. He was sentenced to prison for eight years with total presentence credits of 71 days and the following was also imposed: a $240 section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) restitution fine; a section 1202.45, subdivision (a) $240 parole restitution fine; a $40 section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) court security fee; and a $30 Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a(1) criminal conviction assessment.
The probation report indicates that on September 26, 2012, defendant accosted a 17-year-old victim in a doctor’s office, forced her into a car and drove her away. On another occasion, October 8, 2012, he threatened to kill the victim and her family. After school on October 8, 2012, once again, he accosted the victim and forced her into a car driving her away against her will. On this occasion, defendant used a knife. On October 9, 2012, defendant threatened the victim with a knife. The victim then finally notified the police.

Defendant and appellant, Felix Martin Campos, appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of leaving the scene of an accident which resulted in serious injury to a person other than himself (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Campos to three years in prison. We affirm.

Natasha Jean Pereira (Pereira) appeals from an order revoking her probation. Her appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) stating that there are no arguable issues. On May 7, 2013, we notified Pereira of her counsel’s brief and gave her leave to file, within 30 days, a brief or letter identifying arguments that we should consider. That time has elapsed and Pereira has submitted no letter or brief. After review of the record, we have confirmed that there are no arguable issues. We affirm the judgment.
On June 17, 2012, Pereira committed second degree commercial burglary by breaking into lockers at a 24-Hour Fitness to steal purses and personal items. Subsequently, on June 20, 2012, she committed forgery by signing the name of another while using that person’s credit card. She committed a long list of similar crimes.

Appellants Teresa F. (Mother) and Jeff H. (Father) appeal the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing their then 12-year old daughter, Nicole H., from their custody. Father also appeals the court’s jurisdictional findings, and asserts that the original removal order was not properly issued because it was signed by a referee only. Father further contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering that he participate in drug and alcohol testing, an anger management program, and individual counseling. We affirm.

Defendants, Deborah D. Frahm and Sherryl L. Lilley, appeal from the July 31, 2012 probate court order which distributed assets of the Frahm Family Trust (the trust). The probate court directed the trustees to allocate a $3.2 million payment for promissory notes to plaintiff, Tari F. Rokus. In 1993, an iteration of the family business, Reid Plastics, Inc., issued promissory notes to the settlors, Carl and Shirley Frahm (the Frahms), in exchange for a loan. In 1997, the Frahms received $3.2 million in payment to extinguish the promissory notes. Defendants contend the probate court erred by allocating the $3.2 million to plaintiff rather than having the assets split three ways under the trust’s residuary clause. Plaintiff contends the probate court order was proper because the Frahms intended she receive the proceeds from the Reid Plastics, Inc. sale including the promissory note payment. We affirm the July 31, 2012 order.