CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Theodore Guy Baca was confined to county jail as a condition of probation and awarded conduct credit for time served in custody between his arrest and disposition. (Pen. Code, § 4019.)[1] Under the current statutory provision, which was in effect at the time defendant was awarded credits, the rate at which conduct credits are awarded is determined by the date a crime is committed with a higher rate applied to crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011. (§ 4019, subd. (h); Stats. 2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35.) Defendant’s crime was committed before this date, making him ineligible for enhanced credits. He contends that this disparate treatment violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) With some misgivings, we reject the contention and shall affirm the order.

Charged with possessing Vicodin for sale, 15-year-old A.C. requested that the juvenile court grant him deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq.[1] The court denied the request and A.C. admitted to misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, he asserts the court abused its discretion when it denied his request. It did not, and we affirm.

In 2003, Pambid and his grandfather, George Pambid, retained Gamino to draft a living trust and grant deed for purposes of transferring George’s interest in certain real property to Pambid. Gamino allegedly failed to record the deed before George died, which resulted in Pambid having no ownership interest in the real property. In March 2006, Pambid filed a complaint for damages against Gamino, alleging legal malpractice.
In October 2007, the court granted Pambid’s request for entry of default against Gamino. In December 2007, following a default prove-up hearing, the court entered a default judgment against Gamino in favor of Pambid in the amount of $279,168.79. Thereafter, in June 2008, Gamino moved to set aside the default judgment, which the court granted in July 2008. The court directed Gamino to prepare the order granting the motion to set aside the default judgment.
Over the course of the next several months, Gamino refused to comply with Pambid’s discovery requests, which resulted in a successful motion to compel by Pambid in November 2008 and sanctions against Gamino in July 2009. Meanwhile, Gamino had failed to comply with the trial court’s July 2008 directive to prepare the order granting the motion to set aside the default judgment. Finally, in November 2009, Pambid took it upon himself to prepare and file the order granting the motion to set aside the default.[2]

While driving with a blood alcohol content of more than two—and quite possibly three—times the legal limit, defendant Carlos Cortez caused a car accident that seriously injured two people in the car he hit. After a bench trial resulted in defendant’s conviction on felony drunk driving and hit and run charges, the court sentenced him to seven years, four months in prison, comprised of a one‑year, four‑month base term and two consecutive three-year enhancements. Defendant presents three legal challenges to his sentence, all contending that the enhancements were wrongfully imposed. Consistent with existing legal authority, we conclude to the contrary. We thus affirm.

Plaintiff Rinske Bolander (Rinske) sued her now ex-husband, defendant Frederick (Rick) Bolander, for domestic violence after he twice drugged her with Ambien and engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her while she was incapacitated.[1] A jury found in favor of Rinske, awarding her $30,000 in economic damages, $175,000 in noneconomic damages, and $200,000 in punitive damages, for a total award of $405,000.
After the trial, Rinske filed a motion for attorney’s fees, seeking $455,600 plus a 1.5 multiplier, and a memorandum of costs seeking $155,622. The trial court denied Rinske’s fee request and, on Rick’s motion to tax costs, awarded Rinske only a fraction of the costs requested.
Both sides appeal. Rick’s appeal asserts multiple errors that he claims require reversal of the judgment. We reject his arguments, and we affirm the judgment.
Rinske’s appeal argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney’s fees in its entirety and in rejecting a substantial portion of her costs. We conclude that, based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on Rinske’s requests for fees and costs. We therefore remand for the trial court to reconsider Rinske’s motion for attorney’s fees and Rick’s motion to tax costs in a manner consistent with this decision.

Defendant Israel Sebastian Morales pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted a prior conviction for a serious felony. (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a).) Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, and moved for substitution of counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The court denied both motions and sentenced him to six years in state prison under the terms of his plea agreement.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motions because, at the Marsden hearing, defense counsel told the court defendant was “playing games,” undermining defendant’s credibility and causing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. He argues that the court should have granted his motion to withdraw his plea or should have postponed the case for a further hearing after appointing new counsel. Respondent contends the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motions. We agree with respondent and affirm the decision below.

Defendant William Langhorne appeals from an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health (now State Department of State Hospitals; hereafter the Department) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)[1]
On appeal, Langhorne contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to remove a juror for cause; (2) he was entitled to more than six peremptory challenges; (3) the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion for new evaluators, evaluations, and a new probable cause hearing; (4) there was insufficient evidence he had tried to control his behavior but failed; (5) an indeterminate term of commitment violates due process, equal protection, ex post facto and double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Augustine Villaseñor of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) against a minor victim. Defendant admitted to serving a prior prison term (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)) and his sentence was enhanced accordingly. The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison.
On appeal, defendant claims that there is insufficient evidence that he committed the offense for which he was convicted because there is insufficient evidence that the minor victim heard his threat and “was frightened by it specifically.” He argues that his conviction by a jury under these circumstances violated his right to due process of law. He contends, instead, that his conviction should be reduced to the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats.
We find no due process violation and will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Mark Gregory is serving a five-year prison term for purchasing a car with fraudulent documents and an invalid check. Defendant argues the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because jurors heard a partially redacted audio tape recording of him admitting to the above, but during which the investigating officer stated “I know a little bit about some other stuff that you have done in the past . . . .” As discussed below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that this vague comment was not significant enough in the context of the trial to alert the jury that defendant had prior convictions for theft.

Appellant Maria Padilla sued her supervisor, Dong Min Kim, for sexually harassing her at work; she sued their mutual employer, Pulmuone Wildwood, Inc., for failing to prevent or correct the harassment.[1] After a six-day trial, the jury returned a defense verdict. Padilla appeals on the grounds the trial court improperly granted several motions in limine and overruled her objections to two statements made during the defense’s closing argument. She also appeals from an order denying her motion for new trial.
We affirm. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to rein in a trial that was threatening to expand into areas that were either marginally relevant or totally irrelevant to the core issues of sexual harassment and failure to prevent or correct. Defense counsel’s remarks during closing argument of which Padilla complains were in one case entirely proper and in the other not prejudicial. Finally, Padilla abandoned the issue of the new trial motion by failing to present argument and authority about it.

A modification decision.

Antonio E., appellant, was charged in a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with a misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (Pen Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). After a contested jurisdiction hearing on December 12, 2012, the juvenile court found the allegation to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the disposition hearing on January 9, 2013, the juvenile court placed appellant on probation for six months upon various terms and conditions including that he complete 24 hours of a juvenile work program or other qualifying community service. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Eric David Halsey, pled no contest to felony child abuse (Pen. Code,[1] § 273a, subd. (a)) and admitted an enhancement allegation that in committing that offense he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of eight years and ordered that appellant pay, inter alia, victim restitution in the amount of $264,836.57, pursuant to section 1202.4.[2]
On appeal, appellant contends a portion of the amount of victim restitution ordered—$261,236.57—is not supported by substantial evidence.[3] We affirm.

Defendant Curtis Barnette Joshua appeals from an order denying his petition for recall of his indeterminate life term, under Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (f).[1] We will affirm the order.