CA Unpub Decisions

A.D. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her son, D.J. She contends that there was insufficient evidence that he was adoptable. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence, we will affirm.

Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant T.L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition regarding her child, A.L. (the child). She also claims that the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jose Trinidad Lopez guilty of unlawful firearm activity, having previously been convicted of a crime within the immediate past 10 years.[1] (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1).) After defendant’s motion for new trial was denied, defendant was sentenced to the middle term of two years in county prison with credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment. We find no error and will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Concepcion Rodriguez appeals his conviction for first degree murder with the special circumstance of murder committed during the course of a kidnapping. We find no reversible error, and we will affirm the conviction.
The prosecution appeals from the sentence, contending that the trial court’s decision to suspend the order for victim restitution rendered the sentence unauthorized. We agree. Further, we conclude that the imposition of a parole revocation fine was unauthorized. We will direct the trial court to take corrective action with respect to both sentencing issues.

Defendants Brandon Keith Baskett and Ricco Tucker were tried before separate juries and found guilty of the first degree murder of Lamont Trible. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[1] Defendants claim their murder convictions must be reversed because the court gave an erroneously modified version of CALCRIM No. 376 (Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime), telling the juries they could find defendants guilty of murder—a nontheft-related crime—based in part on evidence defendants knowingly possessed recently stolen property. The People concede the instructional error but argue it was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We agree the error was harmless under Watson. Defendants also claim that insufficient evidence supports the sentencing orders requiring them to pay $4,500 in victim restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) We conclude substantial evidence supports the restitution order. We therefore affirm the judgments in their entirety.

Jose L. appeals the orders entered at the jurisdictional and disposition hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d), and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order obtained by the state, adversely affecting his [or her] custody of a child or his [or her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny Joseph's and Darleen's requests to review the record for error and to address their Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Darleen's counsel also asks this court to exercise its discretion to provide her the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

A jury convicted Mickael Deandre Webb on two counts—counts 3 and 4—of forcible anal or genital penetration (Pen. Code,[1] § 289, subd. (a)), and one count—count 5—of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245 subd. (a)(1)). It found true allegations that Webb personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the crimes (§ 12022.8 [counts 3 and 4]; § 12022.7 subd. (a), 1192.7 subd. (c)(8) [count 5]). The trial court found Webb had suffered a prior prison conviction. (§ 667.5 subd. (b).) It sentenced Webb to prison for 31 years to life—one indeterminate term of 15 years to life (§ 667.1 subds. (b), (c) & (e) [count 3]), one consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life (§ 667.1 subds. (b), (c) & (e) [count 4]), and one consecutive one-year term for the prison prior. The court also imposed and stayed under section 654 the three-year term for count 5 and the corresponding enhancement.
Webb contends there is insufficient evidence of sexual penetration under section 289 subdivision (a) as to counts 3 and 4. We affirm.

In October 2010, minor K.S., age 17, admitted that he was described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, former subd. (a)(1), now subd. (a)(4); count one) and misdemeanor participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count four).[2] In exchange, counts of robbery (§ 211; count two) and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count three) were dismissed along with allegations that the minor personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) in the commission of counts one and two. The court continued the minor as a ward, committed him to juvenile hall for time already served, ordered him into out-of-state placement, and imposed probation conditions including that he obey all laws and not associate with J.C.
In June 2011, the minor admitted an allegation that he had violated his probation by associating with J.C. An allegation that he had failed to obey all laws, in that he had committed burglary and had received stolen property, was dismissed in the interest of justice. The court revoked probation and committed the minor to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), for a maximum period of three years.
On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred when it (1) committed him to DJF on the basis of “unproven” probation violations, specifically, the dismissed allegations of burglary and receiving stolen property and the admitted allegation that the minor had associated with J.C., and (2) failed to determine whether the count one offense of assault was a felony or a misdemeanor. We shall remand for the requisite determination.

Marjorie F., a Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)[1] conservatee, appeals the finding she is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and is unable to provide for her basic personal needs of food, shelter or clothing. She claims there is not substantial evidence to support the finding of grave disability and there is not substantial evidence supporting the imposition of special disabilities on her rights to contract, possess a firearm, and refuse or consent to medical treatment. We affirm.

E.O. (Mother) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Z.O. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and the analogous California statutes governing custody proceedings involving Indian children (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).[1] We conclude, based upon the certified documents provided to us by DCFS with its motion to augment the record on appeal, which motion we grant, that the inquiry and notice conducted was in full compliance with the requisites of the statute and therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Defendant and appellant 99 Cents Only Stores (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel plaintiff and respondent Shelley Pickett (plaintiff) to arbitrate her individual claim brought pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA).[1] According to defendant, notwithstanding our decision to the contrary in Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489 (Brown), the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (FAA)) and recent United States Supreme Court authority interpreting it, required plaintiff to arbitrate her individual PAGA claim pursuant to the terms of her arbitration agreement and to forego pursuit of the representative PAGA claim pleaded in her complaint.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion and in the two concurring opinions, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

A modification decision.

Defendant Charles Shane Hall appeals from a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a negotiated plea of no contest. Hall challenges the order that he “[o]bey the protective order issued in this or any other case.” He also argues that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the award of presentence custody credits. We agree with Hall, affirm the judgment as modified, and remand with directions to modify the abstract of judgment.