CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court entered a judgment for plaintiff Lisa Davis after a jury found defendant Kiewit Pacific Co. (Kiewit) liable for gender discrimination, hostile work environment harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent harassment, gender discrimination, or retaliation. However, before trial, the trial court granted Kiewit's motion for summary adjudication on Davis's claim for punitive damages, concluding there were no triable issues of material fact whether a managing agent of Kiewit had engaged in or ratified any oppressive, malicious and/or fraudulent conduct against her. Davis appeals, contending the trial court erred by granting Kiewit's motion for summary adjudication on her punitive damages claim because there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether a managing agent of Kiewit engaged in or ratified the wrongful conduct against her. As we discuss below, we conclude a triable issue of material fact exists for determination by a jury.

Live Oak Holding, LLC (Live Oak) and Nazar Najor contested by petition for writ of mandate a stop work order and a civil penalty order issued by the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego (County). Live Oak and Najor ultimately prevailed in the writ proceedings by obtaining a writ of mandate that voided the stop work and civil penalty orders. They then moved for and obtained an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 1021.5. County appeals, challenging the award of attorney fees, arguing there was no evidence to support the award.

Simon Shamon appeals from an order under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) committing him to the State Department of Mental Health, now State Department of State Hospitals, for treatment and confinement in a secured facility for an indeterminate term. He contends the court prejudicially erred by permitting the People's experts to testify he was "likely" to engage in "sexually violent predatory offenses" in the future as these are legal issues and the experts' testimony invaded the jury's province. He additionally contends, like the appellant in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I), his indeterminate commitment violates equal protection principles. We conclude these contentions lack merit and affirm the order.

Attorneys Christopher E. Angelo, Joseph Di Monda, and the law firm of Angelo & Di Monda LLP (collectively, A&D) sued attorneys Randall Winet, Marilyn Perrin, and the law firm of Winet, Patrick & Weaver (collectively, WPW) for actions undertaken while WPW represented Leonel Arellano in a personal injury action. The trial court denied WPW's special motion to strike A&D's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) The trial court found that although WPW made a threshold showing that A&D's complaint arose from protected activity, A&D demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims.

This appeal is from the court's denial of Rochelle T. Bastien's request to set aside a stipulated dissolution of marriage judgment. The judgment was entered in August 2002. On December 30, 2010, eight years after the judgment was entered, Rochelle[1] sought to set aside the judgment on the grounds of fraud, under Family Code[2] section 2122, subdivision (a). She asserted that in December 2009 she found one of her checks dated in 2000 showing her husband Dennis had paid the mediator of their divorce $180 for legal fees, indicating an improper relationship between Dennis and the mediator.

On January 23, 2012, at about 6:17 a.m., a Chico Police Department officer was dispatched to a report of a prowler outside an apartment complex. The officer found defendant Stephen Arthur Lorenz, Jr., near the complex’s entrance. Defendant matched the physical description of the prowler, and a flat-screen television was sitting on the ground next to where he was first found. The officer obtained defendant’s identification and learned he was a former Norteño gang member, a prior parolee, and had a history of resisting arrest and weapons violations.
Defendant said he was moving the television to a storage unit and had spent the night in the complex with his friend Toby. Defendant refused to provide Toby’s last name or apartment number. The officer then conducted a patdown search, which discovered a knife and a handgun holster. After defendant admitted having a handgun, the officer removed a .44-caliber revolver from defendant’s left front pants pocket. Defendant had two prior felony convictions.

Defendant Richard Wisneski entered a plea of no contest to transportation of cocaine from one county to a noncontiguous county (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (b); undesignated section references are to this code; count one) and possession of cocaine for sale (§ 11351; count two) and, in connection with both counts, admitted that the amount of cocaine exceeded 20 kilograms by weight (§ 11370.4, subd. (a)(4)). Defendant entered his plea in exchange for a sentencing lid of 18 years. In entering his plea, defendant understood that the trial court would consider a “split” term, but not probation.
The court sentenced defendant on count one to the low term of three years plus 15 years for the quantity enhancement. The court ordered a “split” sentence under realignment, that is, defendant serves 13 of the 18 years in county jail and the remaining five years on mandatory supervision. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) Sentence on count two was imposed and stayed (Pen. Code, § 654).[1]
Defendant appeals. The trial court granted defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5). Defendant contends the court erred in imposing the enhancement. We affirm the judgment.

In January 2010, defendant Christian Llanes pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and driving a vehicle while having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). Defendant also admitted to a prior conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23540). Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on five years of formal probation, and ordered defendant to serve 12 months in county jail.[1]
In November 2010, defendant admitted to violating his probation. The trial court thus imposed a two-year prison sentence, suspended execution of sentence, and reinstated probation with 365 days in county jail. After defendant admitted another probation violation in December 2011, the trial court terminated probation on defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and ordered execution of the previously imposed two-year state prison term.[2] Defendant asked the court to order his sentence be served in county jail pursuant to the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 15, § 1). The trial court refused defendant's request. Defendant appealed.

Fred Jeffrey Gore appeals a judgment entered following his nolo contendere plea to assault with the intent to commit rape. (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a).)[1] We modify the judgment to reflect imposition of a $540 fine pursuant to section 290.3, and otherwise affirm. (People v. Valenzuela (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1248-1250.)

Claudia M., appellant and mother of 15-year-old Bianca H. and 14-year-old Angela H., appeals from a January 7, 2013 dispositional order removing Bianca and Angela from her physical custody. Bianca and Angela also appeal from the dispositional order. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court made orders returning Bianca and Angela to mother’s physical custody and terminating jurisdiction as to Angela. We requested letter briefs addressing the effect, if any, of those orders on the current proceeding. Respondent, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department), argues the orders render the appeal moot. We agree and therefore dismiss.

Alfredo Perez Regalado appeals an order denying a petition to recall his 25-year-to-life sentence pursuant to the procedure set forth in Penal Code section 1170.126, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.[1]
On February 25, 1999, Regalado was convicted of petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction. (§ 666.) The trial court found that Regalado suffered two prior serious felony strike convictions: a 1990 conviction for forcible rape and a 1983 conviction for kidnapping. (§§ 261, subd. (a), 207.) The court imposed a 25-year-to-life sentence pursuant to the three strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

Carolyn Vickers, Inc. (CVI) purchased undeveloped real estate in San Luis Obispo County from Allen Little Ventures #1, LLC (ALV) in 2006. In 2007, CVI learned the property could not be developed due to soil and groundwater contamination. ALV had purchased the property from Phyllis Madonna. Respondents Linda Wilson and Wilson & Company Real Estate were Madonna's real estate agent in that transaction. In 2009, CVI and ALV sued Madonna, two title companies, several oil companies and Does 1 through 200 on various tort and contract theories. In February 2012, CVI amended its complaint to name respondents as Doe 1 and Doe 2. They demurred on the ground that the statute of limitations had run. After granting leave to amend, the trial court sustained respondents' demurrer to CVI's fourth amended complaint because CVI failed to allege facts justifying its late discovery of the causes of action against respondents. CVI contends the trial court erred because its Doe amendments "relate back" to the date its original complaint was filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 447.)[1] We affirm.

Cory James Benton appeals the judgment entered after he pled no contest to three counts of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,[1] § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)).[2] Appellant also admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the assaults (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that the crimes (except one of the assault counts) were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 25 years in state prison.
Appellant is an admitted member of the Sureno criminal street gang. On February 14, 2010, he was at a party with his girlfriend Veronica Cuevas when Cuevas became involved in a physical fight with Jessica Valencia. Appellant intervened and hit Valencia. Valencia's boyfriend, Victor Gomez, hit appellant, who responded by stabbing Gomez with a knife. Appellant also stabbed Andrew Delarosa when Delarosa tried to intervene.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, found Ezzat Ayyad guilty of one count of grand theft by defrauding a public housing authority. (Pen. Code, § 487i.)[1] The trial court also found true the special allegation that the taking was in excess of $50,000. (§ 12022.6.) We affirm.