CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant, David Beltran, of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and torture (§ 209), both of which were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)). In connection with the murder, the jury further found that a principal used a firearm, discharged a firearm and discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to prison for two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. He appeals claiming there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. We agree with him and, therefore, reverse the gang enhancement true findings and the firearm use enhancement true findings (which are dependent on the crimes being committed to benefit a street gang) and their sentences and instruct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment and minutes of the sentencing hearing to reflect this. The parties agree that the trial court incorrectly calculated defendant’s actual presentence time served, therefore, we will direct the trial court to award credit for 1,325 days and to reflect this in the minutes of the sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment. Otherwise, we affirm.

Plaintiff Tonya Pinkins appeals from orders granting the special motion to strike of defendants Meridith Stempinski, Pam Stearns, Virginia Pharris, Christina Amezola, Debbie Gunter, Emily Bares, Lisa Beauregard, Ana Grimes, and Centennial High School Theatre Boosters, and awarding defendants attorney fees. We agree with Pinkins’s contention that the trial court erred in holding that her lawsuit arose from events at an official proceeding and statements made in connection with an issue of public interest. We therefore reverse the orders appealed from. Pinkins’s other contentions of error are moot.

A jury found defendant Todd Richard Laverty guilty of second-degree murder.[1] (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)[2] The jury found true the allegation defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon during the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court found true the allegations defendant suffered two prior convictions that resulted in prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, and a determinate term of three years.
Defendant raises five contentions on appeal. First, defendant asserts the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to impeach defendant with evidence of his prior conviction for child abuse (§ 273a). Second, defendant contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that an unintentional killing without malice committed during the course of an inherently dangerous felony constitutes voluntary manslaughter. Third, defendant asserts the weapon enhancement must be reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the requirement of a union of act and intent. Fourth, defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on how to conduct its deliberations. Fifth, defendant asserts the trial court’s various errors came together to create a denial of due process. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Jacob Daniel Lewis purchased an off-road recreational vehicle on April 16, 2007. The same day, Lewis and his friend, plaintiff Patrick Hernandez, were injured when the vehicle hit a berm on a dirt road and overturned. Following a trial of plaintiffs’ personal injury action, the jury entered a verdict in favor of defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America, and Seidner Enterprises, LLC. Plaintiffs appeal, contending the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the vehicle performed as an ordinary consumer would have expected. We find no error, and we affirm.

Jason D., father of Jaylon D. and Victoria D. (the children), appeals the disposition orders[1] declaring the children dependents of the court and removing them from his custody. Jason contends there was insufficient evidence to support the removal orders and the court's jurisdictional findings that the children are persons described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j).[2] We affirm.

Jose R. appeals juvenile court jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning his son, Raul B. He contends there was no need for the court to retain jurisdiction at the dispositional hearing; the decision was impermissibly based on his immigration status; and the services the court ordered have no relation to the reasons it articulated for retaining jurisdiction. We affirm the orders.

David T. admitted count 1 in the wardship petition that alleged: "On or about November 14, 2012, [David T.] did unlawfully commit an assault upon Sedryc Dees‑Mueller with a deadly weapon and instrument, in violation of [Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1)], a felony." Count 2 and all attendant allegations were dismissed. He was declared a ward of the court under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and placed on probation subject to a commitment to Breaking Cycles for a period not to exceed 365 days.
David T. appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Merlin Lee Bergeron operated a restaurant on property that he rented from defendant Clifton Payne, Sr., under a written lease agreement. Bergeron filed the instant action against Payne for breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relationship based on Payne's alleged unreasonable refusal to consent to Bergeron's assignment of the lease to a third party who entered into a contract with Bergeron to purchase the restaurant. After entering judgment on a jury verdict awarding Bergeron compensatory and punitive damages, the court granted Payne's motion for new trial on all issues. Bergeron appeals the order granting a new trial, contending that the court abused its discretion by not limiting the new trial to the issue of damages. We affirm.

Respondent filed a two-count petition against Omar M. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 602. Following the denial of Omar's motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1), he entered a negotiated admission to one of the counts, carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, former § 12020, subd. (a)(4)), a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)(4)). The court dismissed the remaining count, sustained the petition, adjudged Omar a ward, placed him on probation and detained him in his brother's home. Omar appeals, contending he was unlawfully detained and the court erred in denying his suppression motion. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (a).) We agree.

A jury found defendant William White guilty of assaulting his wife Willie Ruth Dean with a deadly weapon, to wit an extension cord, on December 19, 2009 ( ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 9 s HTOOEH000037 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code" Pen. Code,[1] ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 19 s HTOOEH000039 l "§ 245, subd. (a)(1)" § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1); making criminal threats on December 19, 2009 ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 5 s HTOOEH000040 xpl 1 l "§ 422" § 422; count 2); attempting to murder Dean on January 3, 2010 ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 22 s HTOOEH000041 xpl 1 l "§§ 187, subd. (a), 664" §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3); inflicting corporal injury on Dean on January 3, 2010 ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 18 s HTOOEH000042 xpl 1 l "§ 273.5, subd. (a)" § 273.5, subd. (a); count 4); and contempt of court ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 5 s HTOOEH000043 xpl 1 l "§ 166" § 166, subd. (c)(1); count 6). The jury found defendant not guilty of second degree robbery ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 5 s HTOOEH000044 xpl 1 l "§ 211" § 211; count 5) but guilty of the lesser included offense of petty theft ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 5 s HTOOEH000045 xpl 1 l "§ 484" § 484) on January 3, 2010. The jury also found true allegations defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of counts 3 and 4 ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 20 s HTOOEH000046 xpl 1 l "§ 12022.7, subd. (e)" § 12022.7, subd. (e)), personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of counts 2, 3, and 4 ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 21 s HTOOEH000047 xpl 1 l "§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)" § 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and acted with deliberation and premeditation in the commission of count 3. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant had four prior serious felony convictions ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 37 s HTOOEH000048 xpl 1 l "§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)" §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and served two prior prison terms ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 18 s HTOOEH000049 xpl 1 l "§ 667.5, subd. (a)" § 667.5, subd. (a)).
Sentenced to 61 years to life in state prison, defendant appeals.[2] He contends the trial court erred in (1) failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, and (2) admitting evidence of a prior act of domestic violence. He also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress certain evidence. Finding no error on the part of the trial court or defendant’s trial counsel, we shall affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant, Manuel Hernandez, was convicted of one count each of stalking his ex-wife, Angela,[1] and her current boyfriend, Joe Trujillo (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a) -- counts 1 & 4),[2] stalking Angela while a temporary restraining order was in effect (§ 646.9, subd. (b) -- count 2), one count each of making criminal threats against Angela and Joe (§ 422 -- counts 3 & 4), and a misdemeanor count of contempt of court. (§ 166, subd. (c)(1) -- count 8.) On appeal, he contends: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the stalking and criminal threats charges as related to Joe (counts 4 & 7); (2) the consecutive sentences imposed on the stalking and criminal threats convictions (counts 2, 3, 4 & 7) violated section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishment; (3) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence by selecting count 2 as the principal term; (4) in finding no mitigating circumstances, the court did not exercise informed sentencing discretion; and, (5) the convictions for stalking Angela and contempt of court (counts 1 & 8) should be vacated given his conviction for stalking Angela while a temporary restraining order was in effect. We agree that the consecutive sentences imposed on counts 3 and 4 must be stayed under section 654 and that the conviction for count 1 must be vacated in light of the conviction on count 2. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Tiffany M. (Mother) appeals from the December 12, 2012 jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. The court adjudged minor Christian G., born in December 1995, a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect).[1] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional orders and summarily requests that we reverse the dispositional orders. Rudolph G. (Father) is not a party to this appeal. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional orders, refuse Mother’s summary request to reverse the dispositional orders, and affirm.

The juvenile court found the minor, V.Z., to be a habitual truant and placed her home on probation. She contends the admission of the evidence of her truancy violated her Sixth Amendment rights under the confrontation clause and was inadmissible hearsay. The minor forfeited these contentions by failing to object before the close of the prosecution’s case, and in any event, they have no merit. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Rudy Arellanes appeals the trial court’s grant of a petition for writ of mandate by the California Science Center (Center) seeking to reverse the decision of the State Personnel Board (SPB) overturning Arellanes’s termination. The trial court also denied Arellanes’s petition for writ of mandate seeking reinstatement. We conclude that the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the SPB erred in excluding evidence of Arellanes’s termination by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD), and we affirm.