CA Unpub Decisions

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, appellant Israel Jammir Sanchez was charged with attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a).)[1] It was further alleged that appellant personally and intentionally used a firearm (a handgun) in the commission of the aforementioned crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that the offense was committed at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). Appellant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations.
Trial was by jury. Appellant was found guilty of attempted murder. The intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and gang allegations were also found true. The premeditation allegation was found not true.
Probation was denied, and appellant was sentenced to a term of seven years plus 25 years to life, consisting of the middle term of seven years for attempted murder and an additional 25 years to life for the use of a firearm resulting in great bodily injury. The gang enhancement was stayed.

Defendant Otis Tyrone Baker appeals from the order revoking probation and imposing a previously suspended four-year state prison sentence. No meritorious issues have been identified following a review of the record by defendant’s appointed counsel and our own independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) We affirm.

Appellant Manuel Ocampo was charged with the murder of Juan Corrales. Prior to trial, Ocampo filed a motion to suppress evidence that the victim’s wife, Maria Campana, had tentatively identified him as the perpetrator. Ocampo argued that Campana’s identification was unreliable because police had engaged in suggestive conduct when showing her a photographic lineup. The court denied the motion.
At trial, Campana testified that she was fifty percent certain that Ocampo was the man she saw on the night of her husband’s death. In addition, Manuel Arzate, who was initially charged as a codefendant, testified that he saw Ocampo shoot the victim. The jury found Ocampo guilty. The court sentenced Ocampo to 50 years to life in prison and imposed several penalties and fees, including a $20 DNA assessment under Government Code section 76104.7.
On appeal, Ocampo argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence related to Campana’s identification; and (2) assessed a $20 DNA fee. We modify the judgment to strike the $20 DNA fee and affirm the conviction in all other respects.

This case involves a challenge to the procedural process used by respondents City of Los Angeles and its Harbor Department to terminate appellant Eddie Hernandez’s status as a probationary sergeant in the Los Angeles Port Police. Appellant appeals from the judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate. We reverse and remand with directions.

Respondent, Christopher Null has moved to dismiss appellant, Ashley Klaus’s appeal of the trial court’s March 20, 2013, order on the ground that the court’s subsequent vacation of that order moots Klaus’s appeal. The motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Null also seeks sanctions, a request we deny.

Appellant, Jose Luis Manzo, appeals from the judgment and sentence following a plea of no contest. His court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. As the appeal is based solely on grounds occurring after entry of the plea and does not challenge the validity of the plea, it is authorized by rule 8.304(b)(4)(B) of the California Rules of Court.

This appeal follows from a contested revocation of probation hearing and the imposition of the five-year sentence. Appellant’s counsel filed the opening brief without raising any specific issue and requests that the court conduct an independent review of the entire record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant was apprised by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf and did not do so. We have reviewed the entire record and found no arguable issues that would present a meritorious appeal.

Appellant James D. Reynolds entered pleas of no contest to a felony violation of Penal Code section 646.9,subdivision (a),[1] stalking, and to a misdemeanor violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), resisting, delaying or obstructing a police officer. Reynolds was sentenced to the upper term of three years in state prison on the felony charge, with a concurrent term of one year in county jail on the misdemeanor. At the time of sentencing, the court “strongly encourage[d] the Department of Corrections [and Rehabilitation] to immediately assess Mr. Reynolds for mental health treatment within the prison system” and to assess Reynolds’s qualification as a mentally disordered offender (MDO).[2]
Reynolds contends the court’s statement reflects that the “primary reason” for the prison sentence was to make him eligible for MDO status, and that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in “use of the hope [Reynolds] would be found an MDO to deny probation and send [him] to prison.” We disagree with Reynolds’s characterization of the trial court record and find no abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm.

This is an appeal from a decision by the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea to two felonies, violations of Health & Safety Code sections 11359 (possession for sale of marijuana) and 11366.5, subdivision (a) (management of a location for the unlawful manufacture and storage of controlled substances). The trial court conducted a hearing on the issue during which time original trial counsel for defendant testified, addressing issues raised by defendant in his motion. At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the no contest plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1018. We find no error in this determination and affirm the trial court.

This appeal represents the culmination of attempts by appellant Richard Hancocks to prevent the operation of a charitable food distribution program from a site in an unincorporated area of Alameda County. Having failed in administrative proceedings to halt the Alameda County Board of Supervisors’ approval of a conditional use permit allowing resumption of the program following the destruction of the warehouse, Hancocks was denied a writ of administrative mandamus to overturn that decision. We conclude that denial was proper, and we affirm.

Appellant Abel Bermudez challenges two conditions of felony probation imposed following his conviction by jury for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)).[1] He contends that the two conditions, limiting his association with known gang members and prohibiting him from applying any tattoos to his body, were unconstitutionally overbroad.
We conclude that appellant’s challenges have been forfeited by his failure to object below. Accordingly, we affirm the conditions of probation imposed.

Christopher Lee Ortiz was convicted by jury of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459).[1] In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true an allegation that Ortiz had suffered a prior “strike” conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)) in the state of Texas, which was a serious felony under section 667, subdivision (a).
Ortiz challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that his Texas conviction met the elements of a strike conviction under California law. The Attorney General agrees that the evidence submitted by the prosecution was insufficient, as do we. We therefore remand for retrial of the strike prior allegation.

Defendant Ruben Michelle Johnson pleaded no contest to a charge of false imprisonment under a plea bargain promising probation, but he failed to appear for sentencing. When accepting his plea, the trial court had not addressed the consequences to defendant under the plea bargain if he did not appear for sentencing. Nor had the court mentioned its power under Penal Code[1] section 1192.5 to disapprove the plea bargain or defendant’s right to withdraw his plea in the event of disapproval. The written waiver of rights executed by defendant in connection with the plea bargain stated only that the “promises” made under the plea bargain would not be “binding” if he failed to appear.
After defendant’s arrest on a bench warrant, the trial court imposed a three-year jail sentence, refusing to grant probation as promised by the plea bargain or permit defendant to withdraw his plea. Defendant contends the language in the written waiver form did not constitute an effective waiver of his right under section 1192.5 to withdraw his plea if the trial court disapproved the plea bargain. We agree and reverse.

David Rivera and eight other plaintiffs commenced a putative class arbitration under an agreement subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). After the arbitrator rendered an award applying the FAA to find class arbitration unavailable, defendants Sequoia Education, Inc. and Corinthian Colleges filed a petition to confirm the award. Concluding the arbitrator violated public policy by failing to apply California law in interpreting the arbitration agreement, the trial court vacated the award and ordered rehearing by the arbitrator. We reverse and remand for confirmation of the award.