CA Unpub Decisions

After defendant Richard Settle pled no contest to a vandalism charge, the trial court sentenced him to a state prison term, ordered him to pay restitution to the victim, and assessed various fees. The court did not impose a restitution fine. However, the subsequent minute order and abstract of judgment reflected restitution and parole revocation restitution fines of $600 each. On appeal, Settle contends we should strike the restitution fines and order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment. The People argue we should either remand the case to the trial court for it to determine whether to impose restitution fines, or impose the minimum allowable fine. We agree with appellant that the restitution fines must be stricken.

After defendant Richard Settle pled no contest to a vandalism charge, the trial court sentenced him to a state prison term, ordered him to pay restitution to the victim, and assessed various fees. The court did not impose a restitution fine. However, the subsequent minute order and abstract of judgment reflected restitution and parole revocation restitution fines of $600 each. On appeal, Settle contends we should strike the restitution fines and order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment. The People argue we should either remand the case to the trial court for it to determine whether to impose restitution fines, or impose the minimum allowable fine. We agree with appellant that the restitution fines must be stricken.

Laura K. (mother), has two daughters, 16-year-old D.K. and four-year-old A.H., and a son, three-year-old W.H. Walter H. (father) is the biological father of A.H. and W.H.[1] The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300[2] petition as to D.K. and A.H., declaring them to be dependents of the juvenile court, and dismissed the section 300 petition as to W.H. On appeal, mother contends that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders must be reversed because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department or DCFS) failed to comply with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or Act) (25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.). The Department cross-appeals from the juvenile court’s order dismissing the section 300 petition as to W.H. We affirm the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders as to D.K. because father did not have a parental relationship to D.K., biological or otherwise, that triggered the ICWA notice provision, and mother does not contend that there was ICWA notice error with respect to mother’s claim of Indian heritage. Because the Department did not comply with the ICWA’s notice requirements as to A.H., we conditionally reverse the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders as to A.H., and remand this case with directions to the juvenile court to ensure full compliance with the ICWA with respect to A.H. We further reverse the juvenile court’s order dismissing the petition as to W.H. Because we hold that the juvenile court should have assumed jurisdiction over W.H., the juvenile court is to make an ICWA determination as to W.H. on remand.

Tyler V., the presumed father of 22-month-old Dahlia C., appeals from the juvenile court’s findings of jurisdiction and its disposition order removing the child from his custody and placing her in the care of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) for suitable placement with a nonrelated extended family member. Tyler contends there was insufficient evidence Dahlia was at risk of serious physical harm based on his history of domestic violence and marijuana and alcohol use and there were reasonable means to protect Dahlia if she was returned to his custody. We reverse the jurisdiction finding based on marijuana and alcohol use but otherwise affirm.

This is the second appeal involving these parties. In the first appeal, defendant and appellant Montana Bail Bonds, Inc. (Montana) challenged the trial court’s judgment of contempt for its willful violation of a preliminary injunction. (Robinson v. Montana Bail Bonds, Inc. (July 25, 2012, B233010) [nonpub. opn.] (Robinson I).) On July 25, 2012, we reversed the trial court’s judgment. (Robinson I, supra, B233010, at p. 1.) On remand, Montana moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied Montana’s motion, and Montana appeals.
We agree that Montana is not entitled to attorney fees. The trial court’s order is affirmed.

Defendant Donald Thomas Miller appeals after the trial court granted the District Attorney’s petition to extend defendant’s commitment under the outpatient conditional release program (CONREP), pursuant to Penal Code section 1606.[1] Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination that, due to a mental disorder or illness, defendant would be dangerous if unconditionally released.
As substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm the order extending defendant’s outpatient commitment.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition filed November 29, 2012, that appellant, Timothy F., a minor, committed a violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer). On January 14, 2013, following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation of the petition to be true. The court also found that appellant had violated probation granted in a previous case in which appellant had been granted deferred entry of judgment.
At the disposition hearing on January 29, 2013, in the instant case, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation with various terms and conditions, including that he perform 64 hours of service in the juvenile court work program. In the prior case, the court continued appellant on probation under the deferred entry of judgment program.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

L.K. (mother) appeals juvenile court orders summarily denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388, and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Rebecca S., and establishing a legal guardianship for her daughter, D.S., under section 366.26. Mother contends the court erred by summarily denying her modification petition, by which she sought to have her daughters returned to her custody or to have reunification services reinstated. She also contends the court erred by failing to find the beneficial parent/child relationship and beneficial sibling relationship exceptions to adoption applied to preclude termination of her parental rights to Rebecca. Finally, she contends the court erred by terminating visitation with D. We affirm the orders.

Daniel S. (father) appeals juvenile court orders terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Rebecca S., and establishing a legal guardianship for his daughter, D.S., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. Father contends the court erred by failing to find the beneficial parent/child relationship exception to adoption applied to preclude termination of his parental rights to Rebecca. He also contends the court erred and denied him substantive due process by terminating visitation with D. We affirm the orders.

Defendant appeals from the order denying its petition to compel arbitration of the disability discrimination claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court denied the petition on the ground the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. We conclude the agreement was not substantively unconscionable and reverse.

Appellant Randy Mendez argues that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss two felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 1203.4, subdivision (a)(1) or to reduce the offenses to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). We are not convinced. The judgment will be affirmed.

Appellant Dyondre Rideaux was charged by the Fresno County District Attorney with the crimes of (1) continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years from January 2, 2008 through March 21, 2009 (Pen. Code, § 288.5, count 1),[1] (2) committing a lewd act on a child on or about January 1, 2008 (§ 288, subd. (a), count 2), and (3) committing a lewd act on a child on or about March 23, 2009 (§ 288, subd. (a), count 3). At trial, the jury heard substantial evidence that appellant had repeatedly sexually molested Natasha. Natasha was 10 years old at the time the incidents began and appellant was 39 years old. Appellant took the stand on his own behalf and claimed that Natasha was the sexual aggressor and he was merely a passive victim, adding that he believed Natasha’s mother had been prostituting Natasha. The jury found appellant guilty as charged on all counts, and the trial court thereafter sentenced him to a total of 20 years in state prison. Appellant appeals on the grounds that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and inadequately instructing the jury on the time parameters of the three counts. We find both arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment.

On December 15, 2010, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging appellant, Eric Thomas Ante, with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a); and possession of paraphernalia used for unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364.
Prior to trial, the defense moved, under Evidence Code section 402, to exclude the statements made by appellant to a law enforcement officer on Miranda[1] grounds, but the motion was denied.
A jury trial commenced on May 17 and concluded on May 18, 2011. The jury found appellant guilty of both counts. On June 1, 2011, appellant was placed on probation for three years pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1. The court also imposed various fines and fees. On motion by the prosecution, the trial court dismissed count 2.
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his Miranda motion and when it failed to give a unanimity instruction. We disagree and affirm.

On January 10, 2012, plaintiff and respondent Michelle Lee-Owens (Owens) filed a complaint for “public disclosure of private facts, intrusion into private affairs,” defamation and infliction of emotional distress against defendant and appellant Anne Goodman (Goodman).
Goodman responded with a special motion to strike, arguing that the action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] In the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, Goodman contended, “[a]ll relevant facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint.”
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion on grounds that section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2) requires a defendant to submit declarations stating facts upon which the liability or defense is based, and Goodman did not submit any such declarations with her motion.
Goodman appeals, arguing that the anti-SLAPP statute only requires consideration of pleadings, affidavits and declarations that are submitted, and declarations are not required when the relevant facts are stated in the complaint. We agree with Goodman and reverse the trial court’s decision.