CA Unpub Decisions

Ricardo L. seeks review of a juvenile court order directing the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to supervise visitation with his three-year-old daughter, K.L., once a month. Ricardo is incarcerated pending trial on charges that he committed sexual acts with K.L.'s eight-year-old half sister. He contends his statutory and constitutional rights were violated when the juvenile court limited his visitation with his daughter to once a month, and any reduction in visitation is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the order.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, Fabian Guerrero entered a plea of no contest to possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The remaining counts were dismissed. Guerrero was placed on probation on certain terms and conditions.
Guerrero appeals contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We find the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and affirm the conviction.

Thomas Ricotta, Sr. (Thomas) filed a complaint against the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association (SDCERA) alleging seven causes of action. All of Thomas's claims are based on the premise that SDCERA acted illegally in paying a portion of Thomas's pension benefits to the estate of his former wife, Ellen Ricotta (Ellen), pursuant to a 1998 family court order (1998 Order). Thomas maintains that the 1998 Order is defective and invalid.[1] SDCERA filed a demurrer in which it argued that it could not be held liable for obeying a court order, among other contentions. The trial court sustained SDCERA's demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of SDCERA.
On appeal, Thomas claims that the 1998 Order is invalid on various grounds, including that the pension benefits are his separate property and may not be paid to his former wife's estate. Thomas also claims that the 1998 Order was procured by extrinsic fraud and violates federal law, including the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq.).
We conclude that SDCERA cannot be held liable for complying with the 1998 Order, and that the validity of the 1998 Order may not be adjudicated in this action. We affirm the judgment.[2]

Helen Lock, administrator with will annexed of the estate of decedent Robert Clifford Reed, appeals an order granting the petition for partial distribution of the estate filed by claimants David Cunnyngham, Kristy Fyffe, Amy Austin, and Mirna Cunnyngham (together Claimants). That petition, in effect, sought enforcement against the estate of a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the subject of a prior appeal we decided in Lock v. Cunnyngham (Apr. 25, 2013, D062047 [nonpub. opn.]) (Lock I). In Lock I, we affirmed, as modified, the trial court's March 22, 2012, judgment ordering Lock to pay Claimants $91,500 out of property in the estate in the course of administration. Claimants subsequently filed, and the probate court granted, a petition for partial distribution from the estate based on that judgment. On appeal, Lock contends the probate court erred by issuing the order granting Claimants' petition for partial distribution.

In his first jury trial, Derrick Eugene Corlley was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code,[1] § 12021.1, subd. (a), count 6) and unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), count 7), but the jury deadlocked on five robbery charges. However, in Corlley's second trial, the jury convicted him of the robberies (§ 211, counts 1-5) and found true that he personally used a firearm in committing the robberies (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Corlley admitted he had two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and one prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court sentenced him to a determinate term of 75 years and an indeterminate term of 125 years to life.
Corlley contends: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to modify CALCRIM No. 207, or alternatively, give a unanimity instruction regarding the charges of possession; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery convictions; and (3) his sentence on count seven should be stayed under section 654. The People concede the last contention; we agree and modify the sentence on count seven. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. We remand with directions.

The trial court in this commercial fraud case found the defendant, a licensed real estate broker, actively concealed from the plaintiff material information with respect to financing the defendant obtained from the plaintiff for a gas station and convenience store in Coachella, California. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $260,000.
On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court's decision is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm. Among other findings, the trial court determined that the plaintiff was credible; that his testimony was corroborated by correspondence between the parties; and that, with respect to critical issues, the defendant's testimony was contradicted by that correspondence. If, as was the case, the plaintiff's testimony is credited, there is more than ample evidence to support the judgment.

Angelica W. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services regarding her daughter, Aryanna W., and referring the matter to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) She contends the court abused its discretion by terminating her services, and there was not substantial evidence to support the court's finding there was a substantial likelihood she would not reunify with Aryanna. We deny the petition.

Sara S. seeks writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services in the dependency case of minor her son, Connor S., and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. Sara contends the court erred by failing to return Connor to her custody and by terminating her reunification services. We deny Sara's petition and request for a stay.

Thomas Grant Barnes entered guilty pleas to eight felony offenses and admitted four prison priors (Pen. Code,[1] § 667.5, subd. (b)), two serious felony prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two serious/violent felony prior convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) (strike priors)).
At sentencing the trial court denied Barnes's motion to dismiss at least one of the strike priors. The court dismissed counts 6 through 8 in the furtherance of justice (§ 1385) and imposed a sentence of 50 years to life plus a 21-year determinate term of imprisonment. Barnes obtained a certificate of probable cause and filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising a possible, but not arguable issue. We offered Barnes the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but Barnes has not responded.

This case arises from an assault and battery against plaintiff Brian Hernandez in the parking lot of the Mercury Village Shopping Center (Mercury Village) where Hernandez and his girlfriend had gone for a gathering of car enthusiasts. Defendant Fusion Food & Boba Cafe (Fusion Food) leases premises within the shopping center.
The incident occurred when Hernandez attempted to defuse a verbal confrontation between his friend, Fernando, and a man named Christopher Jones. After initially walking away, Jones suddenly turned and without warning attacked Hernandez, punching him in the face and body, slamming him into the hood of a car, and then kicking him while he lay on the ground.
Defendant Capitol Security Services Inc's (CSSI's) on-site security employee tried to stop the assault, then called 911. The police arrived in three minutes, and paramedics then transported plaintiff to the hospital. Hernandez sustained severe injuries, including a broken left jaw and facial lacerations.
Hernandez filed a complaint against, among others, Fusion Food and CSSI for general negligence and premises liability.

A jury found Gilbert Egurrola guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)). Egurrola challenges the murder conviction, contending the homicide instructions taken as a whole, and the standard CALCRIM No. 522 instruction in particular, were unconstitutionally ambiguous with respect to the ability of provocation to reduce murder from first to second degree. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant KDF Automotive Group, Inc. (KDF) appeals an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of the action filed against it by plaintiff William Goodridge arising out of his purchase of a used automobile from KDF. On appeal, KDF contends the trial court erred by concluding the arbitration clause in the purchase contract was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.[1]

A jury convicted Daniel Kenric Karlson of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1]
§ 187, subd. (a)); shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3); being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and in possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)); and participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found true allegations that as to the murder conviction, Karlson personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and as to the negligent discharge of a firearm conviction, he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Karlson to a 44-year-four-month-to-life prison term.
Karlson challenges his conviction for actively participating in a criminal gang, alleging: (1) because the court erroneously denied his section 995 motion to dismiss the charge, extensive gang evidence was admitted against him thus violating his federal due process right to a fair trial; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. He further contends his conviction for discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner must be reversed because uncontroverted evidence showed he was acting in self-defense. We affirm.

A jury convicted Jason Rutan Pappas, Jr. of second degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)); recklessly evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); driving while under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving while intoxicated with a blood alcohol concentration over 0.08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true allegations that Pappas had incurred one strike prior as a juvenile, and subsequently incurred five prior offenses. The court sentenced Pappas to 32 years to life in state prison as follows: fifteen years for the second degree murder conviction, doubled because of his prior juvenile adjudication plus two years for evading a police officer.
Pappas contends: (1) the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury with his proffered pinpoint instruction regarding malice; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing arguments; (3) the jury committed misconduct; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial; and (5) the trial court improperly relied on his prior juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence. We affirm.