CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Heather M. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, D.L. (the child). Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; ICWA) did not apply because the notice sent to the applicable tribes omitted information on the maternal great-grandparents and the maternal aunt. Mother requests this court to reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand the case for proper ICWA notice to be given. Court agree with mothers ICWA claim. Therefore, Court conditionally vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order compliance with the ICWA notice provisions.[

A jury convicted defendant of robbery (count 1Pen. Code, 211), resisting an officer by force (count 2Pen. Code, 69), and false identification (count 3Pen. Code, 148.9, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b).) On appeal, defendant contends substantial evidence does not support the jurys determination that defendant personally used a gun or that, to the extent he did, he did so menacingly. Court find the verdict supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment below.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, a jury convicted Raymond Ramirez of felony possession of heroin for sale, felony possession of heroin, and misdemeanor resisting arrest, and found true allegations that he had suffered two prior prison terms and one prior strike. The trial court dismissed the conviction for resisting arrest at the prosecutors request and sentenced Ramirez to an aggregate eight-year prison term. The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to suppress the evidence uncovered in the search discussed above.

Noe Ramon Lopez, a West Fresno Norteo, fired several shots from a revolver into a car where Angelo Gonzales, an Eastside Fresno Bulldog, and Farrah Brown were sitting. Gonzales died. Brown suffered serious injuries. A jury found Lopez guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1]of Gonzales and guilty of attempted murder ( 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) of Brown. In each count, the jury found true a criminal street gang allegation ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and a personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death allegation ( 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court imposed a 25-to-life term on the murder plus a 25-to-life term on the firearm enhancement and a consecutive seven-year (middle) term on the attempted murder plus a 25-to-life term on the firearm enhancement for an aggregate seven-year determinate sentence and an aggregate 75-to-life indeterminate sentence.
On appeal, Lopez raises five issues. (1) The gang experts reliance on hearsay violated his rights to confrontation and cross-examination. (2) The gang experts reliance on jail classification as evidence of gang membership violated his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to due process. (3) Buttons worn at trial by Gonzaless family members showing Gonzaless photograph violated his right to due process. (4) Denial of Lopezs motion to admit exculpatory hearsay of child eyewitnesses to show third-party culpability and to refute key prosecution identification of him as the shooter violated his rights to confrontation and due process. (5) Imposition of consecutive terms on the murder and the attempted murder violated his rights to due process and jury trial.

Appellant, Macario Bejarano, pled no contest to driving with a blood alcohol of .08 percent or greater causing injury (count 2/Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (b)) and admitted two great bodily injury enhancements (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)),[1]four multiple victim enhancements (Veh. Code, 23558), and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On January 31, 2007, the court sentenced Bejarano to an aggregate 13 year term, the midterm of 2 years on the substantive offense, doubled to 4 years because of Bejaranos strike conviction, two 3-year great bodily injury enhancements, and three 1-year multiple victim enhancements. On appeal, Bejarano contends the court violated the terms of his plea bargain. Court affirm.

On July 7, 1980, appellant, Terrance Brownlee, pled guilty to one count each of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187) and robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and admitted an arming enhancement in each count (Pen. Code, 12022.5). On August 4, 1980, Brownlee was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 17 years to life. On October 17, 1980, Brownlee filed an appeal, which was rejected by the Superior Court as untimely. In November 1983, Brownlee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court alleging he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, he did not voluntarily or intelligently waive his constitutional rights, and his plea was coerced.

On November 28, 2006, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) in juvenile court alleging minor B.C. committed a second-degree commercial burglary, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (b)).
On November 30, 2006, the juvenile court issued a warrant of arrest after minor failed to appear for a scheduled November 29, 2006, detention hearing. The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed.

Appellant, Eli Martin Rivera, was charged in a first amended information filed January 17, 2007, with corporal injury to a cohabitant or childs parent on July 16, 2006 (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a), count one),[1]corporal injury to a cohabitant or childs parent on July 22, 2006 ( 273.5, subd. (a), count two), false imprisonment by violence ( 236, count three), second degree robbery ( 211, count four), unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, a felony (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a), count five), assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1), count six), first degree residential burglary ( 459 & 460, subd. (a), count seven), and transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a), count eight). A criminal street gang enhancement ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) was alleged as to counts one, six, and seven. The information further alleged two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b) (i) & 1170.12, subds. (a) (d)).
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Vicente Perez was sentenced to 16 months in prison after pleading guilty to possession of a syringe by an inmate. He has filed an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court affirm.

Appellant Jesus Reyna was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years in prison after pleading guilty to two counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm. He has filed an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court affirm.

On July 1, 2007, appellant, Aaron Shawn Hillblom, assaulted his cohabitant, Dorothy Rainwater, by means of force likely to produce great bodily and inflicted a corporal injury on her that resulted in a traumatic condition. On July 3, 2007, the district attorney filed a complaint charging Hillblom with one count of corporal injury on a cohabitant (count 1/Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2/Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). Count 1 alleged that Hillblom had a prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, (e)(1)) and each count alleged that Hillblom had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (b)-(i)).
The judgment is affirmed.

Barbara Hughes discovered mold in her home located in the Bear Brand development (the development). A construction defect at the development was found to be the cause of the mold problem. Hughes sued various entities, including respondents Breakers at Bear Brand Homeowners Association (Breakers) and Merit Property Management, Inc. (Merit), based on alleged failures to properly remediate the mold problem in her home. Furthermore, neither ARS nor Breakers prevailed at trial on their claims for contractual indemnity. ARS vigorously pursued its cross complaint, and even expanded the scope of its claim at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding neither party was a prevailing party within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717.

Daniel attended Alton school, whose student body is largely comprised of youths who are in foster care or juvenile hall. Graffiti is a problem at the school, as are guns and drugs. In order to curb graffiti, the school has a policy of asking students to empty their pockets before they enter the bathroom; if students refuse to empty their pockets they are supposed to be accompanied into the bathroom by a staff member. According to Assistant Principal Jerry Higdon, the policy was instituted because of the need for safety and to prevent the destruction of property. And, it has in fact helped reduce the amount of graffiti in the schools bathrooms. Higdon said the policy is verbally conveyed to the students. While it does not appear in the student handbook, this case is the first instance of noncompliance with the policy they have had. Charged with possessing a deadly weapon, Daniel moved to suppress the star. He argued the seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing, but the court denied his motion. Specifically, the court found the schools bathroom policy and Marquezs actions were both reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thereupon, Daniel admitted the weapon allegation and was declared a ward of the court and placed on juvenile probation.

The juvenile court declared Mitchell G. (the Minor), born in July 1991, a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after sustaining the allegations of count one, charging the Minor with animal cruelty in violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a). The juvenile court placed the Minor on probation at home in the custody of his mother pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a).

We affirm. The Minor argues the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile courts findings sustaining the allegations of animal cruelty because the testimony of the prosecutions sole eyewitness was inherently improbable and uncorroborated. Court conclude the witnesss testimony was not inherently improbable and substantial evidence supported the juvenile courts findings.