CA Unpub Decisions

Phillip O., father of 14‑year‑old S. O. appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating its jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, 364) over S., giving full legal and physical custody to her mother, and denying father any contact with S. Court conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, Corut affirm the order.

Manny C. (father) appeals the juvenile courts order at the six-month review hearing terminating family reunification services with his infant son, Jonathan C. Father argues the court erred in finding he had been provided reasonable services. Father contends respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), should have discovered he was incarcerated soon after the disposition hearing, despite his failure to inform the social worker of his whereabouts. He further argues that the social worker should have provided him with referrals and visitation in jail, though he had made little effort to visit his child before the incarceration. Court affirm.

Tyrone W. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code section 602 upon a finding that he committed a second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211), a felony. He was placed home on probation in the home of his grandparents. The order is affirmed.

Suzette G. (mother) appeals a finding of dependency with respect to her two children, 16-year-old Alissa G. and 13-year-old Jonathon G. Mother contends the evidence presented at the adjudication did not show the children currently were at risk of harm within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),[1] and the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to order informal supervision of the children under section 301. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and the trial court found he committed a prior serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and served a prison term for that felony within five years of the current offense (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of three years eight months.
Defendant appeals contending the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight and abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior conviction finding. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Dwayne Hubbard of one count of assault with intent to commit sexual penetration by a foreign or unknown object (Pen. Code, 220, 289, subd. (a)(1)),[1]and one count of attempted kidnapping. ( 664/207, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found true an allegation that defendant had a prior conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12 and 667, subdivision (a) for a lewd act upon a child. Defendant was sentenced to 13 years in state prison.
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it improperly denied his request to suspend the trial and initiate proceedings to determine his mental competence and improperly granted the prosecutors motion to amend count one of the information. He also argues there was insufficient evidence that he intended to commit sexual penetration by a foreign or unknown object when he assaulted the victim. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395.)[1] Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request for modification and that her due process rights were violated by the termination of her parental rights. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and the trial court found he committed a prior serious felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and served a prison term for that felony within five years of the current offense (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of three years eight months. Defendant appeals contending the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight and abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior conviction finding. Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

David Garrett Yostie entered a negotiated guilty plea to petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, 484/666) and admitted he had a prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The plea bargain provided for a stipulated 32-month sentence and the dismissal of five prison prior allegations (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). On the day of the sentencing hearing, Yostie expressed a desire to withdraw his plea, but later decided to proceed with sentencing. The trial court sentenced Yostie to 32 months in prisonthe lower term of 16 months doubled under the "Three Strikes" law.

Prentis Jackson entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted he had a prior serious/violent felony or strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The plea bargain called for the dismissal of two prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and a stipulated prison term of four years. The court sentenced Jackson, in accordance with the plea bargain, to four yearsthe middle term of two years doubled pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law.

Juan S. appeals an order reinstating a judgment that terminated his parental rights to his son, Anthony S., and an order denying his request for a continuance of a hearing. He contends the San Diego CountyHealth and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he was currently unfit to parent Anthony. Thus, the juvenile court erred by not granting his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 350, subdivision (c). (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) He asserts the court also abused its discretion by not granting a continuance. Court affirm the orders.

Mary Gail Joubert entered a negotiated guilty plea to petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, 484/666) and admitted she had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Under the plea agreement, which called for a stipulated prison term of two years, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a burglary count and three prior prison term allegations. The trial court denied Joubert's motion to withdraw her plea and sentenced her to two years in prison. The court did not award any presentence custody credits. Later, after an ex parte request by appellate counsel, the court ordered Joubert receive 13 days of presentence credit.On April 3, 2007, Joubert took $300 from the purse of a woman employee at a furniture store. The money was recovered inside the store. In 1993 Joubert was convicted of receiving stolen property and served custodial time for the offense. (People v. Joubert (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 1993, No. CRN26339).) The judgment is affirmed.

The issues in this appeal arise out of (1) the trial courts remarks to the jurors after they indicated that they were deadlocked and (2) the trial courts subsequent discharge of one juror.
The facts of the underlying crimes are not particularly pertinent, so we summarize them only briefly. On June 24, 2003, around 9:00 p.m., victims Katie B. and Michelle R. were found shot to death in their home in Riverside. The bedrooms had been broken into; some watches and some loose change had been taken. Other residents of the house sold drugs. Defendant had been to the house earlier that evening, around 7:00 p.m., asking for drugs, but he had been told there were none there.
Defendant was found guilty on two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 189), with multiple murder (Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and burglary-murder (Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)) special circumstances. An enhancement for personally discharging a firearm and causing death (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d)) was found true. As a result, he was sentenced to three consecutive life terms, including two without the possibility of parole.